People v. Gonzales, 61 N.Y.2d 633 (1983)

When a defendant is acquitted of a greater offense, double jeopardy bars further prosecution on that charge, and a new trial cannot be ordered on a lesser included offense if the indictment related to the greater offense must be dismissed.

Summary

The People appealed an Appellate Division order that reversed the defendant’s manslaughter conviction and dismissed the indictment except for a weapons possession count, with leave to re-present appropriate charges to another Grand Jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the defendant was acquitted of second-degree murder, double jeopardy barred further prosecution on that charge. Further, the Appellate Division could not order a new trial on the lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter because the indictment had to be dismissed concerning the murder charge, leaving nothing to support further prosecution for manslaughter under that indictment.

Facts

The defendant was indicted for second-degree murder, second-degree assault, and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The first trial ended in a mistrial due to a deadlocked jury. At the second trial, the jury considered manslaughter in the first degree as a lesser included offense of second-degree murder. The defendant was acquitted of second-degree murder and assault but convicted of first-degree manslaughter and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon.

Procedural History

The Appellate Division initially reversed the conviction due to prejudicial trial error and ordered a new trial. On reargument, the Appellate Division modified its prior order to direct a new trial only on the criminal possession of a weapon count and otherwise dismissed the indictment without prejudice to the People re-presenting any appropriate charges to another Grand Jury. The People then appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the Appellate Division’s corrective action was illegal under CPL 470.20 (subd 1).

Issue(s)

Whether the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the indictment for manslaughter after the defendant was acquitted of murder, where manslaughter was a lesser included offense of the murder charge.

Holding

Yes, because the defendant was acquitted of second-degree murder, further prosecution on that charge was barred by double jeopardy. Further, the Appellate Division could not order a new trial on the lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter because the indictment had to be dismissed as to the murder charge, and there was thus nothing remaining to support further criminal prosecution for manslaughter under that accusatory instrument.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Appellate Division acted correctly in dismissing the manslaughter charge. The court relied on the principle that double jeopardy bars further prosecution on a charge of which the defendant has been acquitted. Since the defendant was acquitted of second-degree murder, further prosecution on that charge was prohibited. The court further explained that because the indictment was dismissed as to the murder charge, no basis remained for a new trial on the lesser included offense of first-degree manslaughter under that same indictment. The court cited People v. Mayo, 48 N.Y.2d 245, 253, and its progeny (People v. Villani, 59 N.Y.2d 781; People v. Beslanovics, 57 N.Y.2d 726) to support this conclusion. The practical effect is that the prosecution cannot retry the defendant for manslaughter under the original indictment. The prosecution does, however, have the option to present the case to another Grand Jury to seek a new indictment on appropriate charges, excluding second-degree murder.