New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Glover

  • People v. Glover, 86 N.Y.2d 172 (1995): Integrated Testimony and Lesser Included Offenses

    People v. Glover, 86 N.Y.2d 172 (1995)

    When the evidence of a greater offense (possession with intent to sell) and a lesser included offense (simple possession) is derived from the integrated testimony of a single witness, a charge-down to the lesser offense is not warranted unless there is a rational basis for the jury to selectively credit portions of the witness’s testimony related to simple possession while rejecting the portions related to intent to sell.

    Summary

    Glover was convicted of third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance. At trial, the key evidence was the testimony of a police officer who witnessed Glover engaging in apparent narcotics transactions. Glover requested the trial court to submit to the jury the lesser included offense of seventh-degree criminal possession (simple possession). The trial court denied the request, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the officer’s testimony was integrated, meaning there was no reasonable basis to reject the portion of the testimony that described the drug sales while accepting the portion related to possession. Because the evidence of possession with intent to sell and simple possession came from the same source, the court found no rational basis for the jury to selectively credit the officer’s testimony to find Glover guilty of simple possession only.

    Facts

    A police officer, from a vantage point in a library, observed Glover engaging in two transactions from an apartment building stoop. The officer testified that Glover retrieved a bundle from the door frame, untied it, and handed glassine envelopes to individuals in exchange for money. Four glassines containing heroin were recovered from the door frame, and $74 was recovered from Glover during the arrest. Glover argued at trial that the officer’s testimony was inconsistent and that no drugs or purchasers were apprehended. He requested a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of simple possession.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Glover’s request to charge the jury on the lesser included offense of seventh-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance. Glover was convicted of third-degree criminal possession. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit seventh-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance to the jury as a lesser included offense of third-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance, pursuant to CPL 300.50.

    Holding

    No, because there was no reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that Glover committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense. The officer’s testimony was integrated, and no rational basis existed to reject only the portion describing drug sales.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on CPL 300.50, which allows a court to submit a lesser included offense if there is a reasonable view of the evidence to support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. The Court referenced its prior decision in People v. Scarborough, where it held that where proof of guilt of both the greater and lesser offenses relies on the testimony of one witness, a charge-down to the lesser offense is appropriate if it would be reasonable for the jury to reject the portion of the witness’s testimony establishing the greater offense while crediting the portion establishing the lesser offense. However, this does not apply when no identifiable record basis exists upon which the jury might reasonably differentiate between segments of a witness’ testimony, because that would force the jury to resort to speculation. The Court found the present case indistinguishable from Scarborough, because the single witness’s testimony was essential to support a verdict of guilt for both the lesser and greater offenses. The Court stated that the officer’s testimony about Glover retrieving the drugs and dealing them was precisely what established the greater offense of possession with intent to sell. Thus, the court concluded that there was no reasonable basis upon which the jury could simultaneously credit the testimony necessary to establish simple possession and reject the same testimony insofar as it established possession with intent to sell. “[T]he identical portion of that testimony constituted the proof of both defendant’s simple possession as well as the indictment count for possession with intent to sell.”

  • People v. Glover, 87 N.Y.2d 838 (1995): Unequivocal Invocation of Right to Counsel

    People v. Glover, 87 N.Y.2d 838 (1995)

    A suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel must be unequivocal to trigger the protections of the New York Constitution, and a statement that simultaneously requests and negates the need for counsel is not considered unequivocal.

    Summary

    Glover was taken to the police station for questioning about a murder. After initially speaking freely, he mentioned wanting to call a friend to get a lawyer upon being confronted with incriminating evidence. However, almost immediately thereafter, he retracted this statement, saying he did not want a lawyer and would talk to the police. The New York Court of Appeals held that Glover’s initial request for counsel was not unequivocal because he immediately negated it. Therefore, his subsequent statements were admissible, and his constitutional rights were not violated.

    Facts

    Police brought Glover to the station for questioning regarding a murder investigation. He initially spoke freely with the police. When officers confronted him with a bloodstained T-shirt found outside his apartment, Glover stated he wanted to call a friend to get a lawyer. He then suggested calling his mother instead. Before the officer dialed, Glover stated, “Hang up the telephone. I do not want a lawyer. I’ll talk to you.” Between 30 and 60 seconds elapsed between Glover’s initial request and retraction. Glover then made incriminating statements, some spontaneously and others in response to questioning.

    Procedural History

    The lower courts found Glover’s statements admissible. Glover appealed, arguing his statements were obtained in violation of his right to counsel under the New York Constitution because he had invoked his right to counsel before making the incriminating statements. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, upholding the admissibility of Glover’s statements.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements made by a suspect after an initial request for counsel, which is immediately retracted, are admissible in court, or whether that initial request, even if retracted, triggers the constitutional right to counsel, thus barring subsequent questioning without an attorney present.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s request for counsel was not unequivocal. Glover’s statement expressing a desire for counsel was immediately negated, therefore his subsequent statements were admissible in court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established New York precedent holding that when a defendant unequivocally requests counsel, any subsequent waiver of that right without counsel is ineffective, citing People v. Esposito, 68 NY2d 961 and People v. Cunningham, 49 NY2d 203. However, the court emphasized that this protection only applies when the request for counsel is clear and unambiguous, citing People v. Hicks, 69 NY2d 969, 970 and People v. Rowell, 59 NY2d 727, 730. The court determined that whether a request is unequivocal depends on the circumstances, including the defendant’s demeanor, manner of expression, and specific words used, citing People v. Johnson, 79 AD2d 201, 204. The court found that Glover’s statement wanting to call a friend for a lawyer was immediately negated, therefore the lower court’s finding that the request was not unequivocal was supported by evidence and not reviewable. As such, Glover’s constitutional rights were not violated, and his statements were deemed admissible. The court highlighted the importance of clear communication from the defendant regarding their desire for counsel. A simultaneous request and retraction creates ambiguity, preventing the right to counsel from attaching.

  • People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61 (1982): Establishing Lesser Included Offenses in New York

    People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61 (1982)

    A defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense charge only if (1) it is theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without also committing the lesser crime, and (2) a reasonable view of the evidence supports a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals clarified the two-pronged test for determining when a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense. The Court emphasized that the first prong requires a theoretical, abstract comparison of the statutory definitions of the crimes, not an examination of the specific facts of the case. The second prong requires that there be a reasonable view of the evidence in the particular case that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. In this case, the court found that it is theoretically possible to sell drugs without the intent to aid another person in committing a Class A felony. Therefore, the defendant was not entitled to a charge of criminal facilitation as a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree. At trial, the defendant requested that the court also charge the jury on criminal facilitation in the second degree as a lesser included offense.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s request to charge the jury on criminal facilitation. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser included offense.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request to charge the jury on criminal facilitation in the second degree as a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the second degree.

    Holding

    No, because it is theoretically possible to commit the greater crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance without also committing the lesser crime of criminal facilitation.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals articulated a two-pronged test for determining when a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense charge. The first prong, derived from CPL 1.20(37), requires that it be “impossible to commit the greater crime without concomitantly, by the same conduct, committing the lesser offense.” This is determined by comparing the statutes in the abstract, without reference to the specific facts of the case. The second prong, prescribed by CPL 300.50(1), requires “an assessment of the evidence of the particular criminal transaction in the individual case and a determination that there is a reasonable view of such evidence which would support a finding that, while the defendant did commit the lesser offense, he did not commit the greater.”

    The Court found that the defendant failed to satisfy the first prong. The Court reasoned that “it would be theoretically possible for a defendant illegally to sell a drug without intending to aid anyone else in the commission of a class A felony (as, for instance, when the criminal transaction involved only the defendant and an undercover police buyer).” Because the defendant could not satisfy the first prong of the test, the Court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to charge the jury on criminal facilitation.

    The Court explicitly overruled prior cases like People v. Johnson, People v. Cionek, and People v. Hayes, “to the extent that our decisions…may be read as at variance with this application, they are no longer to be followed.” These cases had resolved the first inquiry by examining only the criminal transaction on which the particular prosecution was predicated.

  • People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61 (1982): Defining ‘Lesser Included Offense’ and Preservation of Fourth Amendment Claims

    People v. Glover, 57 N.Y.2d 61 (1982)

    A crime is a ‘lesser included offense’ only if it is impossible to commit the greater offense without also committing the lesser offense; furthermore, failure to raise a specific legal argument at trial, such as a Fourth Amendment violation, forfeits the right to raise it on appeal.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the defendant’s statements and eyewitness identification were properly admitted. The Court also found that the trial court did not err in refusing to submit a charge of assault in the third degree to the jury. The Court reasoned that assault in the third degree is not a lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree or felony assault because one can commit the latter offenses without necessarily committing the former. Additionally, the Court emphasized that the defendant’s failure to object to the admission of evidence based on Fourth Amendment grounds at the suppression hearing precluded appellate review of that issue.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with robbery in the second degree and felony assault. Prior to trial, the defendant sought to suppress statements he made to the police and an eyewitness identification, arguing a violation of his right to counsel and the unreliability of the identification. The defendant did not argue that his detention or the evidence obtained violated his Fourth Amendment rights. At trial, the defendant requested that the court instruct the jury on assault in the third degree as a lesser included offense.

    Procedural History

    The trial court rejected the defendant’s suppression arguments and refused to submit the charge of assault in the third degree to the jury. The Appellate Division affirmed. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s failure to object to the admission of evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds at the suppression hearing precluded appellate review of that issue.

    2. Whether assault in the third degree is a lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree or felony assault, such that the trial court was required to submit that charge to the jury.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the defendant failed to object to the admission of the evidence on the ground that it was obtained in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment, the issue is beyond the Court’s power to review.

    2. No, because it is possible to commit robbery in the second degree and felony assault without concomitantly committing assault in the third degree.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the Fourth Amendment claim, the Court relied on the principle that issues not raised at the trial level are generally not preserved for appellate review. Citing People v. Martin, 50 N.Y.2d 1029, the Court emphasized the importance of timely objections to allow the trial court to address the alleged error.

    On the lesser included offense issue, the Court applied CPL 300.50 subds 1, 2, which requires the defendant to show both that the offense is a lesser included offense and that a reasonable view of the evidence would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. The Court focused on the first prong, relying on CPL 1.20 (subd 37), which defines a lesser included offense as one where “it is impossible to commit a particular crime without concomitantly committing, by the same conduct, another offense of lesser grade or degree.”

    The Court reasoned that robbery in the second degree (Penal Law, § 160.10, subds 1, 2, par [a]) and felony assault (Penal Law, § 120.05, subd 6) can be committed without the specific intent or recklessness required for assault in the third degree (Penal Law, § 120.00). Specifically, robbery only requires forcible stealing, and felony assault requires causing physical injury during the commission of a felony, but neither inherently requires the specific intent or recklessness that defines assault in the third degree. Thus, the statutory elements of the greater offenses do not necessarily include the elements of the purported lesser offense.

    The Court acknowledged its prior holdings in People v. Lett, 39 N.Y.2d 966 and People v. Warren, 43 N.Y.2d 852, where assault in the third degree was considered a lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree. However, the Court explicitly stated that those cases were wrongly decided because they did not adequately consider whether it was impossible to commit the robbery without also committing the assault.

  • People v. Glover, 43 N.Y.2d 834 (1977): Defining Lesser Included Offenses Based on Factual Allegations

    People v. Glover, 43 N.Y.2d 834 (1977)

    In determining whether an offense is a lesser included offense, courts must examine the specific facts alleged in the indictment and information, rather than relying solely on legal abstractions.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to submit assault in the third degree as a lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree. The court held that the determination of a lesser included offense hinges on the specific facts of the case, as detailed in the information and indictment, rather than abstract legal definitions. The court further found that submitting the lesser charge did not violate the defendant’s due process rights because the defendant was adequately informed of the charges against him, given the details in the information and the indictment’s allegation of “physical injury.”

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted for robbery in the second degree. Prior to trial, the prosecution sought to have the court also consider assault in the third degree as a lesser included offense. The information provided to the defendant contained details of the alleged assault. The indictment itself alleged “physical injury”.

    Procedural History

    The trial court submitted assault in the third degree as a lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s judgment, finding no error in the submission of the lesser included offense or violation of the defendant’s due process rights. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in submitting assault in the third degree as a lesser included offense of robbery in the second degree.

    2. Whether the procedure of submitting the lesser included offense violated the defendant’s due process rights.

    Holding

    1. No, because the determination of whether an offense is a lesser included offense depends on the facts of the particular case, and here, the facts supported the submission of assault in the third degree.

    2. No, because the defendant was given reasonable notice and information of the specific charge against him and a fair hearing, as the details of the assault were in the information and the indictment alleged “physical injury”.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that determining whether an offense qualifies as a lesser included offense requires a fact-specific analysis, referencing People v. Stanfield and People v. Johnson. This means courts should examine the facts alleged in the indictment and information, rather than relying on abstract legal definitions of the crimes. The court found no merit to the defendant’s due process argument, stating that the defendant was adequately advised of the charges. The court relied on Paterno v. Lyons, quoting, “It would be exaltation of technical precision to an unwarranted degree to say that the indictment here did not inform petitioner that he was charged with substantial elements of the crime”. The court reasoned that the defendant was not prejudiced by the submission of the lesser count, as the details of the assault were outlined in the information, and the indictment specifically alleged “physical injury”. This provided sufficient notice to the defendant of the potential charges against him. The court considered the overall fairness of the proceedings, focusing on whether the defendant had reasonable notice and a fair hearing.