16 N.Y.2d 242 (1965)

Once a suspect has retained counsel and that counsel has requested arraignment, any statements elicited from the suspect in the absence of counsel are inadmissible, even if the suspect has not been formally arraigned.

Summary

Friedlander was arrested, and her attorney requested that she be arraigned. The police did not arraign her but instead interrogated her without her attorney present, eliciting incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that these statements were inadmissible. The court reasoned that once a suspect is represented by counsel, and the authorities are aware of this representation, they cannot interrogate the suspect in the absence of counsel after counsel has requested arraignment. This rule protects the defendant’s right to counsel, ensuring that any waiver of this right is made knowingly and intelligently.

Facts

On January 3, 1962, police searched the business premises of Tele-A-Flash, Inc., and Friedlander’s apartment pursuant to a valid warrant, seizing documentary evidence related to alleged bookmaking activities.

Friedlander was taken to the District Attorney’s office for questioning.

Later that evening, Friedlander’s attorney arrived and consulted with her privately for over half an hour.

After the consultation, the attorney requested the officer to arrest and arraign Friedlander, but the officer did not respond.

The attorney then left the District Attorney’s office.

At approximately 1:00 a.m., the same officer interrogated Friedlander in the absence of her counsel, during which she admitted ownership of some of the seized material.

Friedlander was not warned of her right to counsel or her right to remain silent.

Procedural History

The trial court admitted Friedlander’s inculpatory admissions into evidence over her attorney’s objection.

Friedlander was convicted. She appealed.

The appellate division affirmed the conviction.

The New York Court of Appeals granted permission to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether inculpatory admissions obtained from a defendant after her attorney has requested arraignment, but before the arraignment occurs and in the absence of her attorney, are admissible in evidence.

Holding

No, because the authorities, knowing the defendant was represented by counsel who had requested them to arrest and arraign his client, nonetheless, after counsel left, took occasion to elicit damaging admissions from her.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals emphasized the fundamental right to counsel, citing Escobedo v. Illinois and People v. Donovan.

The court stated that statements obtained after arraignment not in the presence of counsel are inadmissible, as are statements obtained where access to counsel has been denied, citing People v. Meyer, People v. Failla, and People v. Sanchez.

The court extended this principle to situations where counsel cannot obtain access due to physical circumstances, as in People v. Gunner.

The court reasoned that the police, knowing Friedlander was represented by counsel who had requested her arraignment, improperly elicited damaging admissions from her after her counsel had left.

The court distinguished this situation from permissible investigatory conduct, emphasizing that the focus shifted once counsel was retained and had requested arraignment. The court highlighted the importance of protecting the attorney-client relationship and preventing the state from undermining it through interrogation in the attorney’s absence.

The court concluded that while the search warrants were properly issued and executed, the admission of Friedlander’s statements was prejudicial error, warranting a new trial.