New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Frazier

  • People v. Frazier, 16 N.Y.3d 36 (2010): Determining When Consecutive Sentences for Burglary and Larceny are Permissible

    People v. Frazier, 16 N.Y.3d 36 (2010)

    Consecutive sentences for burglary and larceny are permissible if the acts constituting each crime are separate and distinct, even if larceny was the intended crime upon entering the premises unlawfully.

    Summary

    Defendant Frazier was convicted of burglary and grand larceny. The issue before the New York Court of Appeals was whether consecutive sentences were permissible for these offenses, given that the larceny arguably satisfied the intent element of the burglary. The Court of Appeals held that consecutive sentences are authorized because burglary (unlawful entry with intent to commit a crime) and larceny (theft) are separate offenses requiring distinct acts. The Court emphasized that the test is whether separate acts occurred with the requisite intent, not whether the criminal intent inspiring the whole transaction was the same. The Court modified the Appellate Division’s order and remitted for further proceedings.

    Facts

    Defendant broke into two apartments on the same floor of a walk-up building within weeks of each other. In both instances, the apartment doors were forced open, the apartments were ransacked, and personal property worth thousands of dollars was stolen. Defendant’s fingerprints were found inside both apartments. After his arrest, he failed to appear in court and was apprehended in Pennsylvania.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ordered a competency examination, initially finding the defendant unfit to stand trial. After a brief commitment for treatment, he was deemed competent. The trial court conducted a competency hearing, concluding the People demonstrated competence by a preponderance of evidence. The defendant was convicted of burglary, grand larceny, and bail jumping and sentenced as a persistent violent felony offender. The Appellate Division modified the sentence, ordering the larceny sentences to run concurrently with the burglary sentences, finding the acts making up each crime could not be viewed as separate and distinct. The Court of Appeals modified, reinstating the possibility of consecutive sentences, and remitted the case.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether consecutive sentences are permissible for burglary and grand larceny when the larceny is the crime intended at the time of the unlawful entry.
    2. Whether the People demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was competent to stand trial.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the crime of burglary is completed when a person enters a dwelling unlawfully with the intent to commit a crime, while larceny is a separate act of stealing property.
    2. Yes, because four experts provided reports concluding the defendant was fit to proceed and the trial court concluded that the defendant’s failure to communicate was volitional.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 70.25(2), which requires concurrent sentences when multiple offenses are committed through a single act or when one act constitutes both offenses. The Court stated that it must look to the statutory definitions to see if the actus reus element is the same for both offenses. The Court reasoned that the actus reus of burglary (Penal Law § 140.25[2])—unlawfully entering a dwelling with the intent to commit a crime—differs from the actus reus of grand larceny (Penal Law § 155.35[1])—stealing property valued over $3,000. The burglary was complete upon entry with the intent to commit a crime; the larceny was a separate act. Even if larceny was the intended crime, the court stated that “[t]he test is not whether the criminal intent is one and the same and inspiring the whole transaction, but whether separate acts have been committed with the requisite criminal intent” (People v. Day, 73 N.Y.2d 208, 212 (1989).

    Regarding the defendant’s competency, the Court noted that its review was limited to whether he was incompetent as a matter of law, given the Appellate Division’s affirmance. Citing People v. Mendez, 1 N.Y.3d 15, 19 (2003), the Court reiterated that competency requires understanding the proceedings and assisting in one’s defense. Even the defense expert agreed the defendant understood the charges. The trial court found the defendant’s lack of communication was volitional.

  • People v. Frazier, 46 N.Y.2d 271 (1978): Concession of Facts in Speedy Trial Motions

    People v. Frazier, 46 N.Y.2d 271 (1978)

    A court may summarily grant a motion to dismiss if the prosecution’s papers do not present a factual dispute that must be resolved at a hearing; a failure to controvert the facts alleged in the motion is deemed a concession.

    Summary

    This case addresses the procedure for deciding motions to dismiss on speedy trial grounds under CPL 30.30. The Court of Appeals held that a trial court may grant such a motion without a hearing if the prosecution fails to raise a factual dispute in response to the defendant’s allegations. The Court emphasized that the prosecution cannot demand a hearing simply by refusing to expressly concede the facts, especially when the relevant information is available to both sides. The Court remitted the cases to allow the prosecution to submit additional papers, given the prevailing practice in the relevant county.

    Facts

    The defendants in these consolidated cases moved to dismiss their indictments, arguing that the People were not ready for trial within six months of the commencement of the criminal actions, violating CPL 30.30(1)(a). The People did not dispute the facts alleged in the defendants’ motion papers but instead requested a hearing.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the indictments without a hearing, reasoning that the People’s failure to raise a factual issue in their answering papers was equivalent to conceding the truth of the allegations in the moving papers. The People appealed, claiming that the court erred by not holding a hearing because they had not expressly conceded the facts. The Appellate Division orders were appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a court must conduct a hearing on a motion to dismiss an indictment on speedy trial grounds when the prosecution does not expressly concede the facts alleged by the defendant but also fails to controvert those facts in their responding papers.

    Holding

    No, because the court may summarily grant a motion to dismiss unless the prosecutor’s papers show a factual dispute that must be resolved at a hearing. A failure to controvert facts is generally deemed a concession.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the prosecution’s argument that CPL 210.45(4) requires an express concession of facts before a motion to dismiss can be granted without a hearing. The Court stated that this interpretation would have a “catastrophic effect on motion practice in all criminal cases” by virtually abolishing the court’s power to grant motions on the papers. The Court reasoned that, normally, what is not disputed is deemed conceded, and a party cannot arbitrarily demand a hearing for a “fishing expedition.”

    The Court cited People v. Ganci, highlighting the court’s previous emphasis on reducing delays caused by unnecessary hearings. The Court noted that the Legislature’s enactment of CPL 30.30 was intended to ameliorate the harsh results of earlier rules regarding speedy trials and that the prosecution’s current position would be a procedural luxury.

    The Court clarified that opposition papers need not be as detailed as those required to defeat a motion for summary judgment. However, in cases where the facts are available to both sides, the failure to raise an issue by contradiction or avoidance eliminates the need for a hearing.

    In this specific case, the court acknowledged that a different practice may have prevailed in Westchester County. Therefore, the Court remitted the cases to allow the People to submit additional papers. The Court noted that in the Frazier case, the claim that the defendant had absconded might warrant a hearing, but in the Gruden case, the alleged facts might not be sufficient to defeat the motion even if proven at a hearing.