People v. Frawley, 36 N.Y.2d 300 (1975)

Prior identification of a defendant is admissible on direct examination to bolster in-court identification when the defendant’s identity is in issue from the outset of the trial.

Summary

In People v. Frawley, the New York Court of Appeals addressed the admissibility of a police officer’s testimony regarding a pretrial lineup identification of the defendant during the officer’s direct examination. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s decision, which had deemed the testimony inadmissible under Section 393-b of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court of Appeals clarified that when the defendant’s identity is in question from the beginning of the trial, testimony about prior identification is admissible on direct examination to bolster the in-court identification. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for factual determination.

Facts

A police officer identified the defendant in court. During the officer’s direct examination, the prosecution elicited testimony about the officer’s prior identification of the defendant at a pretrial lineup. The defendant’s identity was a central issue throughout the trial.

Procedural History

The trial court allowed the police officer’s testimony regarding the pretrial lineup identification during direct examination. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court’s decision, finding the admission of the bolstering testimony on direct examination to be reversible error. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether Section 393-b of the Code of Criminal Procedure permitted the introduction of testimony regarding a prior lineup identification on the direct examination of a witness who had already identified the defendant in court, when the defendant’s identity was in issue from the start of the trial.

Holding

Yes, because when the identity of the defendant is in issue from the outset, testimony bolstering the in-court identification through prior recognition is admissible on direct examination.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Appellate Division’s interpretation of Section 393-b of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court clarified that the statute did not restrict the introduction of bolstering testimony regarding prior identification solely to redirect examination or rebuttal. The Court stated, “In this case the identity of the defendant was in issue from the outset, and the bolstering testimony was admissible on direct examination of the police officer.” The Court cited People v. Spinello, noting prior precedent which supports the admission of such evidence to strengthen the reliability of witness identification when identity is a key element of the case. The Court differentiated situations where bolstering testimony would be improper, such as when identity is not initially contested and only becomes relevant during the defense’s case. The allowance of such testimony aims to reinforce the accuracy and credibility of the identification process, particularly when the defendant’s identification is a primary point of contention. The ruling aligns with principles that ensure reliable evidence is presented to the jury for informed decision-making. Ultimately, the Court prioritized the probative value of the identification evidence when the defendant’s identity is centrally disputed.