New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Foster

  • People v. Foster, 12 N.Y.3d 566 (2009): Limits on Joining Offenses in a Superior Court Information After Waiver of Indictment

    12 N.Y.3d 566 (2009)

    When a defendant waives indictment, offenses joined in the superior court information must be “the same or similar in law,” and the inclusion of a criminal possession of stolen property charge was not sufficiently similar to a grand larceny offense to be properly joined.

    Summary

    Defendant waived indictment and pleaded guilty to grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property charges in a superior court information (SCI). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the criminal possession charge was improperly joined with the grand larceny charge because the two offenses were not sufficiently similar under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 200.20(2)(c). The Court emphasized that CPL 200.20(2)(c) is typically used when a defendant violates the same Penal Law provision on multiple occasions, or comparable criminal conduct in discrete incidents is alleged. This case underscores the importance of strict adherence to statutory requirements when utilizing waivers of indictment and the limits on joining offenses.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with grand larceny in the fourth degree for allegedly stealing $1,100 from a victim’s bank account. He was also charged with criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree after being found in possession of a stolen vehicle. These incidents were unrelated and occurred weeks apart.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was arraigned on both sets of charges in Buffalo City Court and held for grand jury action on the felony offenses. The grand larceny charge was dismissed and a new superior court felony complaint was filed. The defendant waived indictment and agreed to be prosecuted by SCI, pleading guilty to both grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, vacated the guilty plea, and dismissed the SCI.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the criminal possession of stolen property charge was properly joined with the grand larceny charge in the superior court information (SCI) under Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 200.20(2)(c), which allows joinder of offenses that “are defined by the same or similar statutory provisions and consequently are the same or similar in law.”

    Holding

    No, because the criminal possession of stolen property charge was not sufficiently similar in law to the grand larceny offense to be properly joined in the SCI under CPL 200.20(2)(c).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 200.20(2)(c) is generally applied when a defendant has violated the same Penal Law provision multiple times or has engaged in comparable criminal conduct in separate incidents. The Court found that grand larceny and criminal possession of stolen property lacked the requisite similarity. While both involved misappropriated property, the crimes had different elements and the criminal conduct was distinct. The Court emphasized the importance of ensuring that offenses joined under CPL 200.20(2)(c) share commonality and comparable criminal conduct. "Offenses will not be deemed sufficiently similar to support joinder under CPL 200.20 (2) (c) if the offenses do not share any elements and the criminal conduct at the heart of each crime is not comparable." The improper inclusion of an offense in a waiver of indictment and SCI is a jurisdictional defect that requires reversal and dismissal. The Court distinguished this case from People v. Zanghi, 79 N.Y.2d 815 (1991), noting that in this case, the triggering offense (grand larceny) was included in the SCI. However, the joinder of the possession of stolen property offense was still impermissible because the two offenses were not sufficiently similar in law.

  • People v. Foster, 93 N.Y.2d 177 (1999): Interpreting “Auto Stripping” to Include Damage During Theft

    People v. Foster, 93 N.Y.2d 177 (1999)

    The “auto stripping” statute, which prohibits the intentional destruction or defacing of any part of a vehicle, encompasses breaking a car window to steal property inside.

    Summary

    Foster was observed breaking a car window and stealing items from the trunk. He was convicted of auto stripping in the first degree, among other charges. Foster argued the auto stripping statute was intended to deter dismantling cars for parts, not theft. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statute’s plain language, proscribing the destruction of any part of a vehicle, included breaking a car window during a theft. The Court also considered legislative history, which demonstrated a broader goal of combating auto-related crime beyond just theft of parts. The conviction was affirmed.

    Facts

    Officer Coviello observed Foster suspiciously surveying parked cars. Foster approached a car, broke the rear passenger window, opened the trunk, rummaged through it, and then walked away. Officers apprehended Foster, recovering stolen bridge tokens and loose change. Upon inspecting the vehicle, the rear passenger window was shattered, the glove compartment was opened, and the ashtray was pulled out.

    Procedural History

    Foster was indicted for auto stripping, criminal mischief, and petit larceny. The Supreme Court denied Foster’s motion to dismiss the auto stripping charge. At trial, the motion was renewed and again denied. Foster was convicted on all charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, modifying the sentence by deleting a fine. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the auto stripping statute, which prohibits removing or intentionally destroying or defacing any part of a vehicle, encompasses breaking a car window in order to steal property from within the vehicle.

    Holding

    Yes, because the plain language of the statute proscribes the destruction or defacing of any part of a vehicle, and breaking a car window during a theft falls within that definition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on the statutory language, stating, “If the words chosen have a ‘definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, [then] there is no room for construction and courts have no right to add to or take away from that meaning.’” The Court found the words “destroys or defaces” clear and applicable to Foster’s actions. The Court stated, “By shattering a car window in the course of a theft, defendant ‘intentionally destroy[ed] or deface[d] [a] part of a vehicle * * * without the permission of the owner’ (Penal Law § 165.09 [1]).” The Court rejected limiting the statute to instances of removing auto parts, noting such a reading would ignore the plain language. The Court also discussed the statute’s legislative history, referencing the legislature’s efforts to eradicate the burgeoning problem of automobile-related crime and protection against “vandalism” and “damage” to motor vehicles. The Court stated that “overlapping in criminal statutes, and the opportunity for prosecutorial choice they represent, is no bar to prosecution.” The Court rejected the argument that Foster should only be prosecuted for criminal mischief since the legislature intended to set auto-related offenses apart from offenses against other types of property by imposing stiffer penalties.

  • People v. Foster, 73 N.Y.2d 596 (1989): Larceny and Enforcement of Default Judgments

    People v. Foster, 73 N.Y.2d 596 (1989)

    Taking money pursuant to a default judgment, even if the judgment is later found to be jurisdictionally defective due to improper service, does not constitute larceny unless the defendants misrepresented the facts to the court.

    Summary

    Defendants, attorneys, obtained a default judgment against Prior for unpaid legal fees. Prior’s bank account was levied to satisfy the judgment. Prior had been part of a communal group and had lived at a group-owned apartment. She moved out, allegedly without informing the group of her new address and attempting to conceal it. The defendants served the summons at the group address, although service may have been improper. The People charged the attorneys with larceny, arguing they knew service was defective and the judgment was invalid. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s reinstatement of the guilty verdict, holding that enforcing a default judgment, even if jurisdictionally flawed, does not automatically constitute larceny absent misrepresentation to the court.

    Facts

    Mia Prior was a member of a communal group for 10 years, during which time she received benefits, including legal assistance. Defendant Foster, also a member and an attorney, assisted her with legal issues related to her father. After her father’s death in 1984, Prior inherited a trust and decided to leave the group. A dispute arose over Foster’s legal fees. Prior moved out of the group’s apartment at 415 East 12th Street and allegedly concealed her new address. Foster, represented by codefendant Paolo, sued Prior for unpaid fees and served a summons at the East 12th Street address, claiming it was Prior’s “last known residence”. The service arguably violated CPLR 308(2). A default judgment was entered, and Prior’s bank account was levied for over $7,000.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were charged with grand larceny in the second degree. The trial court initially denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the indictment. A jury found the defendants guilty, but the trial court set aside the verdict, reasoning that the judgment was valid when executed. The Appellate Division reversed, reinstating the conviction, holding that obtaining a judgment with knowledge of improper service and intent to deprive property constitutes larceny. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether obtaining money pursuant to a default judgment, even if jurisdictionally defective due to improper service and the defendant’s knowledge of the defect, constitutes larceny.

    Holding

    No, because the defendants did not misrepresent the facts of service to the court when applying for the default judgment. The Court reasoned that merely obtaining a judgment known to be defective is not sufficient for a larceny conviction; there must be evidence of fraud or misrepresentation to the court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that the defendants did not misrepresent the facts of service to the court. While the affidavit of service contained the legal conclusion that service was “duly made,” the affidavits also disclosed that service was made at Prior’s “last known residence” and mailed to the same address, which, on its face, reveals a potential defect under CPLR 308(2). The court distinguished the case from others where defendants obtained court orders through forgery, perjury, or other factual misrepresentations. The Court acknowledged the People’s argument that taking money under a void order constitutes larceny under Penal Law § 155.05(1). However, the Court stated this section is not a “catchall” for acts not specifically prohibited by the Legislature. The Court cited the reluctance to elevate civil wrongs to criminal larceny, especially in business activities where intent is unclear. The Court noted the need for specific legislative action to criminalize such conduct, including safeguards against abuse. “Conduct which is wrongful in the civil context is not necessarily ‘wrongful’ within the meaning of the larceny statutes”. The Court emphasized that the Legislature has generally identified prohibited conduct quite specifically and provided some additional safeguard, such as the corroboration requirement for perjury. The Court concluded that the defendant’s conduct was not larceny as defined by the Legislature and reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

  • People v. Foster, 52 N.Y.2d 911 (1981): Defining ‘Business Records’ Under New York Penal Law

    People v. Foster, 52 N.Y.2d 911 (1981)

    ‘Business records,’ as defined in New York Penal Law § 175.00(2), include writings maintained by an enterprise to reflect its condition or activity, regardless of their eventual destination.

    Summary

    The defendant, an employee of the Genesee County Automobile Bureau, was convicted of falsifying business records and grand larceny. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the forms the defendant falsified, which were used to account for missing registration plates and stickers to the Department of Motor Vehicles, qualified as ‘business records’ under Penal Law § 175.00(2). The court also found no error in requiring the defendant to appear before the grand jury, even though she intended to claim privilege, and deemed the testimony of other employees admissible and the evidence sufficient to support the conviction.

    Facts

    The defendant was an employee of the Genesee County Automobile Bureau. Her duties involved preparing forms to account for missing or mutilated registration plates and validation stickers, which were then submitted to the New York State Department of Motor Vehicles. The defendant was found to have falsified these records. Some validation stickers certified as missing were actually issued. The numbers of the missing stickers appeared in her handwriting on vehicle owners’ checks. The office cash showed no shortage or overage during the relevant period. She admitted to preparing all of the falsified documents.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted on seven counts of falsifying business records and two counts of grand larceny. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether requiring a grand jury target to appear before the grand jury and claim privilege constitutes constitutional error?
    2. Whether the forms prepared by the defendant constituted ‘business records’ within the meaning of Penal Law § 175.00(2)?
    3. Whether the testimony of other employees of the Genesee Bureau was improperly admitted as self-serving and irrelevant?
    4. Whether the evidence presented was sufficient as a matter of law to support the conviction?

    Holding

    1. No, because requiring a grand jury target to appear and claim privilege does not constitute constitutional error.
    2. Yes, because the forms were writings maintained by an enterprise (the Genesee Bureau) to reflect its activity.
    3. No, because the testimony was relevant to the issue of the defendant’s guilt, especially considering the circumstantial nature of the evidence.
    4. Yes, because the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was sufficient to permit the jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court addressed each of the defendant’s claims of error.

    First, the court stated that requiring a grand jury target to appear and claim privilege is not a constitutional error, citing United States v. Wong and Matter of Cunningham v. Nadjari. While acknowledging that it may be better practice not to do so, the court held that the prosecutor’s actions did not warrant dismissal of the indictment.

    Second, the court addressed the definition of ‘business records’ under Penal Law § 175.00(2), which includes writings maintained by an enterprise for the purpose of evidencing or reflecting its condition or activity. The court found that the forms falsified by the defendant met this definition because they were required to account for missing items and transactions, thus reflecting the activity of the Genesee Bureau. The court emphasized that the subsequent transfer of the documents to the Department of Motor Vehicles did not negate their status as business records of the Bureau.

    Third, the court rejected the argument that the testimony of other employees was self-serving and irrelevant. The court clarified that the defendant’s argument was a misconception of the meaning of self-serving in the law of evidence. Furthermore, the court found the testimony relevant as the defendant had argued the evidence against her was weak due to the presence of other employees. It was up to the jury to weigh the credibility of those witnesses.

    Fourth, regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the court emphasized that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the People, citing People v. Benzinger. The court noted that the defendant was present on the days in question, arrived early, admitted to preparing the falsified documents, and that some validation stickers certified as missing were actually issued. Additionally, the defendant’s handwriting appeared on vehicle owners’ checks associated with the missing stickers, and there were no cash discrepancies. Considering all this, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The case against the defendant was circumstantial, and the People had to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

  • People v. Foster, 40 N.Y.2d 946 (1976): Adequacy of Guilty Plea Inquiry and Withdrawal Motions

    People v. Foster, 40 N.Y.2d 946 (1976)

    A guilty plea will be upheld if the court record demonstrates that the defendant understood the charges, received adequate representation, and entered the plea voluntarily, even if a subsequent motion to withdraw the plea is denied without an evidentiary hearing, provided the denial is not an abuse of discretion.

    Summary

    Foster, a prisoner, pleaded guilty to assault charges stemming from an altercation with corrections officers. The court carefully questioned Foster about the incident before accepting the plea. Foster later sought to withdraw his plea, claiming a subsequent prison homicide bolstered his self-defense argument. The court denied the motion without a hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the initial plea was properly accepted because Foster understood the charges, had adequate representation, and entered the plea voluntarily. While an evidentiary hearing on the withdrawal motion could have been held, the court’s decision not to do so was not an abuse of discretion.

    Facts

    Foster, an inmate at Green Haven Correctional Facility, was indicted on three counts of assault for attacking two corrections officers. Prior to the assault, a guard approached Foster to inspect his cell for contraband and conduct a personal search. Foster resisted the personal search and struck the guard with a stool, claiming he feared an assault by the guard.

    Procedural History

    Foster pleaded guilty to two counts of assault in full satisfaction of the indictment. He later moved to withdraw his plea, alleging that an intervening homicide at the prison supported his claim of self-defense. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in accepting Foster’s guilty plea, given his claim of self-defense and the lack of a factual basis for the assault charge beyond his own admission.
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying Foster’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea without holding an evidentiary hearing.

    Holding

    1. No, because the requisite elements of the assault crime appeared from the defendant’s own recital of the facts and the record demonstrated adequate representation and a knowing plea.
    2. No, because, on the facts of this case, there was no abuse of discretion as a matter of law in failing to hold such a hearing.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found the guilty plea was properly accepted. The court emphasized several factors: (1) Foster himself provided the factual basis for the assault, satisfying the elements of the crime. As the court stated, “the requisite elements of the assault crime appeared from the defendant’s own recital of the facts”. (2) Foster had adequate legal representation. (3) As a repeat offender, Foster was familiar with criminal proceedings. (4) Foster understood the potential sentence and consequences of pleading guilty. The court cited People v. Serrano, 15 NY2d 304, 308 regarding the defendant’s recital of facts establishing elements of the crime. Regarding the motion to withdraw the plea, the Court acknowledged that an evidentiary hearing could have been held, especially given Foster’s status as a prisoner, the allegations of assaults by guards, and the subsequent homicide. The court stated, “Given the status of the defendant as a prisoner, the allegations of assaults by the guards and the actual homicide, the Judge might well have exercised his discretion to have investigated the matter further through the vehicle of an evidentiary hearing.” However, the Court concluded that failing to hold a hearing was not an abuse of discretion in this particular case, emphasizing that the trial court has discretion based on the facts of each case when accepting a plea, citing People v Nixon, supra, p 355. The court also noted, “Where the court which accepts a plea has no reason to believe it is unfair or inappropriate, it should become final”.

  • People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150 (1967): Validity of Guilty Plea to a Hypothetical Crime

    People v. Foster, 19 N.Y.2d 150 (1967)

    A defendant may validly plead guilty to a lesser crime, even if that crime is technically or logically inconsistent with the facts, as part of a plea bargain for their benefit.

    Summary

    Foster was charged with first-degree manslaughter. He later pleaded guilty to attempted second-degree manslaughter. On appeal, Foster argued that because manslaughter requires no intent to kill, and attempt requires intent, a plea to attempted manslaughter is a legal impossibility, thus invalidating his conviction. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that a defendant can knowingly and voluntarily plead guilty to a lesser included offense, even if logically inconsistent, as part of a plea bargain that benefits the defendant and avoids the risk of a conviction on a more serious charge. This is permissible as long as the plea is made knowingly and voluntarily.

    Facts

    The defendant, Foster, was indicted for manslaughter in the first degree for killing one Thomas Hicks. He initially pleaded not guilty. The defendant then withdrew his not-guilty plea and pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of attempted manslaughter in the second degree. The defendant subsequently appealed the conviction based on the guilty plea, claiming the plea was invalid.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with first-degree manslaughter. He pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of attempted second-degree manslaughter. The New York Court of Appeals heard the appeal after the lower courts presumably upheld the guilty plea.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant’s plea of guilty to a lesser crime of attempted manslaughter in the second degree is invalid when the crime of manslaughter does not require intent, while the crime of attempt does require intent.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant can knowingly accept a plea to attempted manslaughter as part of a bargain that benefits them, even if the crime is technically inconsistent. The court reasoned that such a plea avoids the risk of a conviction on a more serious charge and reduces the potential sentence.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the logical inconsistency between the crime of manslaughter, which requires no intent, and the crime of attempt, which requires intent. However, the court emphasized the practical realities of plea bargaining, stating, “The practice of accepting pleas to lesser crimes is generally intended as a compromise in situations where conviction is uncertain of the crime charged. The judgment entered on the plea in such situation may be based upon no objective state of facts. It is often a hypothetical crime”. The court reasoned that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily accepted the plea to reduce his potential sentence and avoid the risk of being convicted of the more serious charge of manslaughter in the first degree. The court also cited People v. Griffin, noting that a guilty plea “may relate to a hypothetical situation without objective basis”. The court distinguished this case from People v. Brown, where a jury verdict for attempted manslaughter was overturned due to the logical inconsistency. In Foster, the plea was a compromise and a benefit to the defendant, distinguishing it from a jury’s finding of guilt on a logically impossible crime. The court emphasized that a defendant “ought not to be allowed to take the benefit of the favorable charge and complain about it on appeal.” The court found no violation of the defendant’s due process rights since the plea was part of a beneficial bargain initiated by the defendant.