People v. Formato, 30 N.Y.2d 103 (1972)

Evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test is admissible in court, provided the defendant was clearly warned of the consequences of refusal, and such admission does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination.

Summary

Formato was found slumped over in his car after an accident, with signs of intoxication. He refused a blood alcohol test after being warned that his refusal could be used against him in court. At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of his refusal. Formato was convicted of possession of gambling records and driving while impaired. The Appellate Term reversed, holding that the refusal evidence violated his self-incrimination rights. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Term, holding that because Formato had no constitutional right to refuse the test, evidence of his refusal was admissible, provided he was properly warned of the consequences. The court reasoned that the statute did not compel him to refuse, but rather offered a choice with known consequences.

Facts

Police officers found Formato alone in his car, which had crashed into a fence. He was bleeding, and the officers smelled alcohol on his breath. They found two wine bottles in the car, one nearly empty. The officers, experienced in DWI arrests, believed Formato was intoxicated. At the hospital, Formato had difficulty producing his driver’s license and refused to provide his registration. An officer took his wallet and found the registration and betting slips. Officer Haverlin, from the Intoxicated Drivers Testing Unit, informed Formato of his rights and warned him that refusing a blood test could result in license revocation and that his refusal could be used as evidence in court. Formato still refused the test.

Procedural History

Formato was charged with gambling offenses and driving while intoxicated. His motion to suppress the betting slips was denied. At trial, evidence of his refusal to take the blood test was admitted over his objection. The jury acquitted him of promoting gambling and driving while intoxicated but convicted him of possession of gambling records and driving while impaired. The Appellate Term reversed the conviction, holding that the refusal evidence violated Formato’s privilege against self-incrimination. The People were granted leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the admission of evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a chemical blood alcohol test violates the defendant’s constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, when the defendant was warned that such refusal could be used against him in court?

Holding

No, because the defendant has no constitutional right to refuse the test, and the statute provides for the admissibility of the refusal as evidence, provided the defendant is properly warned of the consequences of refusing.

Court’s Reasoning

The court relied on Schmerber v. California, which held that compelled blood tests do not violate the Fifth Amendment because they are not testimonial or communicative. Since a defendant can be compelled to take a blood test, they have no constitutional right to refuse. The court acknowledged that evidence of refusal is admitted to permit the inference that the defendant refused because he feared the test results. The court reasoned that the constitutional protection only applies to compelled communicative or testimonial evidence. Here, the statute doesn’t compel refusal; it presents a choice. The defendant is free to take the test. The court stated, “Although the evidence of the defendant’s refusal to take the test be classified as communicative or testimonial… it should be admissible so long as the defendant was under no compulsion of any sort to refuse to take the test.” The court distinguished this situation from cases where comment on a defendant’s silence is prohibited because, in those cases, the defendant has a constitutional right to remain silent. Here, Formato had no constitutional right to refuse the blood test. The court also reasoned that admissibility of refusal evidence is a permissible condition attached to the privilege of operating a motor vehicle on state highways. As Chief Justice Traynor observed, “A guilty party may prefer not to find himself in a situation where consciousness of guilt may be inferred from his conduct, but it can scarcely be contended that the police…will tend to coerce parties into refusing to take tests in order to produce this evidence.” The court overruled its prior holdings in People v. Paddock and People v. Stratton, which found error in admitting refusal evidence, because those cases were decided when the Vehicle and Traffic Law conferred an unqualified right to refuse a blood test.