New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Feliciano

  • People v. Feliciano, 17 N.Y.3d 16 (2011): Duty to Promptly Execute a Violation of Probation Warrant

    People v. Feliciano, 17 N.Y.3d 16 (2011)

    A court’s failure to promptly execute a violation of probation (VOP) warrant for a defendant incarcerated out-of-state does not automatically divest the court of jurisdiction, especially when extradition is complex and the delay is partially attributable to the defendant’s actions.

    Summary

    Luis Feliciano pleaded guilty to a felony drug charge and received a split sentence of jail time and probation. He violated his probation by fleeing to Puerto Rico, prompting the court to issue a VOP warrant. Years later, while incarcerated in Pennsylvania for a separate crime, Feliciano requested resolution of the VOP. The New York court delayed the VOP hearing until Feliciano’s release from Pennsylvania due to extradition difficulties. After his release, Feliciano was resentenced to a prison term. The New York Court of Appeals held that the delay did not divest the court of jurisdiction because of the complexities of interstate extradition and the defendant’s initial flight, distinguishing the case from situations where a defendant is readily available within the state.

    Facts

    In 1992, Feliciano was sentenced to jail and probation for a drug felony.

    He violated probation by fleeing to Puerto Rico without permission.

    A VOP complaint was filed, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.

    In 2000, he was arrested in Pennsylvania for homicide-related crimes.

    In 2002, he requested resolution of the outstanding VOP from New York.

    The District Attorney noted the difficulties of extraditing him from Pennsylvania.

    The court postponed the VOP hearing until his release from Pennsylvania.

    In 2007, after his release from Pennsylvania, the VOP warrant was executed, and he was resentenced.

    Procedural History

    The County Court initially imposed a split sentence for the drug charge.

    After Feliciano violated his probation, the County Court declared him delinquent and issued an arrest warrant.

    After serving time in Pennsylvania, Feliciano was returned to Greene County, and the County Court revoked his probation and resentenced him.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the resentencing.

    Feliciano filed two CPL 440.20 motions, claiming jurisdictional defect and ineffective assistance of counsel, both of which were denied.

    His application for a writ of error coram nobis was denied by the Appellate Division, but leave to appeal was granted by the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the five-year delay in adjudicating the VOP complaint, due to the defendant’s incarceration in another state and the difficulties of extradition, violated his statutory or constitutional rights and divested the County Court of jurisdiction to revoke his probation.

    Holding

    No, because the delay was not unreasonable given the complexities of interstate extradition, the defendant’s initial flight from New York, and the lack of a clear legal obligation for New York to prioritize his return for the VOP hearing while he was serving a sentence in Pennsylvania.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Horvath, where the probationer was incarcerated within New York and readily available. The court emphasized that CPL 410.30 requires the court to “promptly take reasonable and appropriate action,” but what constitutes “reasonable and appropriate action” depends on the circumstances.

    The court cited Carchman v. Nash and Moody v. Daggett, highlighting that the Supreme Court has drawn distinctions between detainers based on criminal charges and those based on probation violations, noting the reduced urgency and constitutional dimension of the latter.

    The court also distinguished this case from People v. Winfrey, where the People made no effort whatsoever to secure the defendant’s return from out-of-state. Here, the District Attorney investigated the possibility of extradition and determined it was impractical.

    The court stated, “The arguments that defendant asserts trial counsel should have advanced at the VOP hearing are not so strong that ‘no reasonable defense lawyer could have found [them] … to be not worth raising.’ They are, in fact, novel and call for an extension of or change in — not an application of — existing law.”

    Because the arguments were not clearly dispositive, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them.

  • People v. Feliciano, 32 N.Y.2d 140 (1973): Sufficiency of Evidence for Accomplice Liability in Drug Possession

    People v. Feliciano, 32 N.Y.2d 140 (1973)

    Evidence presented to a grand jury is legally sufficient to indict a defendant as an accomplice if it establishes a prima facie case supporting the inference that the defendant aided and abetted the principal in committing the charged offense.

    Summary

    Feliciano and Gonzalez were indicted for possession of a dangerous drug after Santana was caught with marijuana, and they were nearby in a car. The prosecution argued they were accomplices who intended to help Santana escape. The trial court dismissed the indictment against Feliciano and Gonzalez, which the Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally sufficient to establish a prima facie case that Feliciano and Gonzalez aided and abetted Santana, thus making them liable as principals.

    Facts

    Customs officers received information about an attempt to land marijuana from a ship at Pier 3 in Brooklyn. Santana disembarked from the ship carrying ten pounds of marijuana. Feliciano and Gonzalez were parked nearby in an automobile. As Santana fled from the customs officers, discarding the marijuana, Feliciano and Gonzalez drove their car towards Santana, who then entered the rear seat of the vehicle.

    Procedural History

    A Kings County grand jury indicted Feliciano, Gonzalez, and Santana for possession of a dangerous drug in the third degree. Feliciano and Gonzalez moved for dismissal of the indictment. The trial court denied Santana’s motion but granted the motions of Feliciano and Gonzalez. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally sufficient to establish that Feliciano and Gonzalez committed the offense of possession of a dangerous drug in the third degree as accomplices to Santana.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence before the grand jury supported the inference that Feliciano and Gonzalez were parked where they were and acted as they did to aid and abet Santana in possessing the marijuana.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally sufficient, within the meaning of CPL 190.65, to establish a prima facie case that Feliciano and Gonzalez committed the offense charged. The court reasoned that the evidence supported the inference that they were present to aid and abet Santana in possessing the marijuana, making them accomplices and therefore principals in the commission of the offense under Penal Law § 20.00. The court stated, “In our view, the evidence before the grand júry was ‘ legally sufficient’, within the sense of the applicable statute (CPL 190.65), ‘ to establish ’ that Feliciano and Gonzalez committed the offense charged against them: prima facie, such évidence supported the inference that they were parked where they w’ere, and acted as they did, to aid and abet Santana—who physically possessed the marijuana—to commit the crime charged of possessing a dangerous drug in the third degree.” The court also noted that even if the evidence was insufficient to establish the full crime, it was at least sufficient to establish the lesser included crime of an attempt to commit the crime charged in the indictment, as the dissenting Appellate Division justices had observed. The court did not address the lawfulness of the arrest or search and seizure, deeming it unnecessary for the determination of the case.