New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Feingold

  • People v. Jean-Baptiste, 11 N.Y.3d 539 (2008): Retroactivity of Feingold’s Depraved Indifference Standard on Direct Appeal

    People v. Jean-Baptiste, 11 N.Y.3d 539 (2008)

    When a defendant’s conviction for depraved indifference murder is pending on direct appeal and the defendant has adequately challenged the sufficiency of the proof, the appellate court must apply the subjective mental state standard for depraved indifference established in People v. Feingold.

    Summary

    Jean-Baptiste was convicted of depraved indifference murder under the then-prevailing objective standard. While his appeal was pending, People v. Feingold redefined depraved indifference murder to require a culpable, subjective mental state. Jean-Baptiste argued that his conviction should be overturned because the evidence did not establish the mental state required under Feingold. The New York Court of Appeals held that the Feingold standard applies to cases on direct appeal where the defendant has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, distinguishing direct appeals from collateral attacks on final convictions. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision to reduce the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree.

    Facts

    Michael Weekes attended a party and had a confrontation with a man nicknamed “Back-shot,” striking him with a bottle. Jean-Baptiste, Back-shot’s cousin, then pulled a handgun and shot Weekes in the chest at close range, killing him.

    Procedural History

    Jean-Baptiste was initially charged with intentional murder and depraved indifference murder. The first trial resulted in an acquittal on the intentional murder charge but a hung jury on the depraved indifference charge. A superseding indictment added manslaughter in the first degree. At the second trial, the jury convicted Jean-Baptiste of depraved indifference murder under the objective standard established in People v. Register. The Appellate Division reversed the depraved indifference murder conviction, finding insufficient evidence of the mental state required under the new standard established in People v. Feingold, and reduced the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the subjective mental state standard for depraved indifference murder articulated in People v. Feingold applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal where the defendant has challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a depraved indifference murder conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because cases on direct appeal are generally decided in accordance with the law as it exists at the time the appellate decision is made, and a failure to apply the new standard would result in a conviction even though one of the elements of the crime had not been established.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on common-law principles that cases on direct appeal should be decided based on the current state of the law. The Court cited People v. Hill, which held that a new definition of “knowingly” applied to cases pending on direct appeal. The Court reasoned that failing to apply the new, more demanding standard for depraved indifference murder would result in a person being found guilty even if an essential element of the crime (depraved indifference mental state) was not proven.

    The Court distinguished Policano v. Herbert, which held that the new depraved indifference standard did not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Court emphasized the critical difference between cases on direct appeal and those where the appellate process had concluded. Applying the new standard to cases on direct appeal is consistent with ensuring convictions are based on legally sufficient evidence, while retroactive application to final convictions would create a flood of collateral attacks, disrupting the finality of judgments.

    The Court also addressed the People’s argument that the legal sufficiency should be measured by the jury charge given at trial. The Court noted that defense counsel made a specific motion for a trial order of dismissal based on legal insufficiency, anticipating the change in law brought by Feingold, therefore preserving the issue for appeal.

    Ultimately, the Court agreed with the Appellate Division, stating that, in applying the Feingold standard, “the evidence failed to establish that defendant acted with the requisite mental state of depraved indifference to human life.” The Court further concurred that the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for manslaughter in the second degree.

  • People v. Policano, 9 N.Y.3d 583 (2007): Depraved Indifference Murder Standard Pre- and Post-Feingold

    People v. Policano, 9 N.Y.3d 583 (2007)

    The legal standard for depraved indifference murder in New York evolved significantly between 2001, when Policano’s conviction became final under the Register standard, and 2006, when Feingold redefined the culpable mental state.

    Summary

    The Second Circuit certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals regarding the elements of depraved indifference murder at the time David Policano’s conviction became final in 2001. Policano was convicted of depraved indifference murder for shooting Terry Phillips multiple times. The Court of Appeals clarified that under the prevailing standard at the time (People v. Register), the focus was on the objective circumstances and the degree of risk created by the defendant’s conduct, not the defendant’s subjective intent. The court held that People v. Feingold which shifted the focus to the defendant’s mental state, should not be applied retroactively.

    Facts

    David Policano and Terry Phillips had a prior altercation. One evening, Policano, while selling bathrobes and smoking crack, encountered Phillips at a bus stop. Policano shot Phillips multiple times in the head, neck, and thigh. A witness observed the shooting, identifying Policano by his jacket. Phillips died from his wounds.

    Procedural History

    Policano was convicted of depraved indifference murder in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals was denied. Policano then filed a habeas corpus petition in federal court, which was initially denied but later granted based on People v. Gonzalez. The Second Circuit affirmed the grant of habeas corpus and certified questions to the New York Court of Appeals to clarify the state of New York law regarding depraved indifference murder at the time Policano’s conviction became final.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether, on June 28, 2001, under New York law, where the evidence indicated that the defendant committed homicide with the conscious objective of killing the victim, a jury could find the elements of depraved indifference murder satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt.

    2. At the time Policano’s conviction became final, what were the established elements of depraved indifference murder?

    3. Does the interpretation of N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (1) and (2) set forth in People v. Payne and People v. Gonzalez, state the correct interpretation of the law of New York with respect to the elements of depraved indifference murder on the date Policano’s conviction became final?

    Holding

    1. Yes, because under the Register standard prevailing at the time, the jury could consider the objective circumstances of the shooting, which created a grave risk of death, even if the evidence suggested an intentional killing.

    2. The elements were: (1) recklessly engaging in conduct (2) which created a grave risk of death to another person (3) thereby causing the death of another person (4) under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life.

    3. No, because Register, not Payne or Gonzalez, stated the correct interpretation of the law at the time Policano’s conviction became final.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the evolution of New York’s depraved indifference murder jurisprudence. Under People v. Register, the focus was on the objective circumstances and the degree of risk created by the defendant’s conduct, not the defendant’s subjective intent. The “circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life” were viewed objectively. The Court acknowledged that post-Sanchez decisions, including People v. Gonzalez and culminating in People v. Feingold, shifted the focus to the defendant’s mental state, requiring a culpable mental state of depraved indifference. The Court found this new interpretation should not be applied retroactively, as it would disrupt reliance on the old standard and potentially flood the courts with motions to vacate convictions. Quoting from People v. Sanchez, the Court noted that purposeful homicide itself is the ultimate manifestation of indifference to the value of human life. The court reasoned that at the time of Policano’s conviction, the jury was permitted to sort out the defendant’s state of mind, and strong proof of intent did not foreclose a finding of recklessness and depraved indifference. “[T]he focus of the offense is not upon the subjective intent of the defendant, as it is with intentional murder, but rather upon an objective assessment of the degree of risk presented by defendant’s reckless conduct”. The Court ultimately concluded that under the law at the time of Policano’s conviction, the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find him guilty of depraved indifference murder.

  • People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 752 (2006): Redefining Depraved Indifference Murder

    People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 752 (2006)

    A conviction for depraved indifference murder requires more than recklessness; it requires conduct evincing a depraved indifference to human life, and a request for a lesser-included charge of manslaughter does not forfeit a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence for depraved indifference.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, reducing the defendant’s conviction of depraved indifference murder to manslaughter in the second degree. The Court held that the defendant’s actions, while possibly reckless, did not meet the threshold for depraved indifference murder as defined by the statute and clarified in prior cases. The Court also rejected the argument that the defendant forfeited his right to challenge the depraved indifference murder conviction by requesting a charge on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter. The case was remitted for resentencing.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of depraved indifference murder. The specific facts surrounding the crime are not detailed in this memorandum opinion, but the court implies the defendant’s actions, though resulting in death, did not rise to the level of depraved indifference.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was initially convicted of depraved indifference murder in Supreme Court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and modified the order, reducing the conviction to manslaughter in the second degree and remitting the case to the Supreme Court for resentencing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s conduct constituted depraved indifference murder under Penal Law § 125.25(2)?

    2. Whether the defendant forfeited his right to challenge the sufficiency of his conviction for depraved indifference murder by requesting that the jury be charged on the lesser-included offense of manslaughter in the second degree?

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant’s actions, while perhaps reckless, did not demonstrate the depraved indifference to human life required for a conviction under Penal Law § 125.25(2).

    2. No, because “Depraved indifference” is an additional core statutory requirement of depraved indifference murder, beyond mere recklessness and risk.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its prior holdings in People v. Payne and People v. Suarez to clarify the definition of depraved indifference murder. The court emphasized that depraved indifference requires more than just recklessness or risk of harm; it requires a particularly blameworthy state of mind demonstrating a complete disregard for human life. The court found that the evidence presented did not establish this level of depravity. Regarding the forfeiture argument, the Court stated, “‘Depraved indifference’ is an additional core statutory requirement of depraved indifference murder, beyond mere recklessness and risk.” The court reasoned that requesting a charge on a lesser-included offense does not preclude a defendant from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on the “depraved indifference” element of the murder charge. The court noted, “testimony at trial could have led a rational jury to infer that the victim moved into a shot that was intended only to scare him,” indicating that the evidence pointed more towards recklessness than depraved indifference. Judge Graffeo concurred in the result, constrained by the precedent set in People v Suarez.

  • People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288 (2006): Depraved Indifference Requires a Culpable Mental State

    People v. Feingold, 7 N.Y.3d 288 (2006)

    Depraved indifference to human life, as an element of both depraved indifference murder and first-degree reckless endangerment, is a culpable mental state that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of first-degree reckless endangerment. He attempted suicide by turning on the gas in his apartment, causing an explosion that damaged neighboring apartments. The trial court found his actions reckless but not indicative of depraved indifference. The Court of Appeals modified the conviction to second-degree reckless endangerment, explicitly holding that depraved indifference is a culpable mental state. This decision overruled prior case law that treated depraved indifference as merely an objective assessment of risk, clarifying that a defendant must possess a mental state of utter disregard for human life to be convicted of depraved indifference crimes.

    Facts

    The 52-year-old defendant, an attorney, attempted suicide in his 12th-floor apartment by sealing the door, blowing out the stove’s pilot lights, and turning on the gas while taking tranquilizers. Several hours later, a spark ignited the gas, causing an explosion that damaged his and neighboring apartments. No one was seriously injured, including the defendant.

    Procedural History

    Defendant was charged with first-degree reckless endangerment under Penal Law § 120.25. Supreme Court found the defendant’s state of mind wasn’t depraved indifference but, relying on prior precedent, found him guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed. A Judge of the Court of Appeals granted defendant leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether depraved indifference, as used in Penal Law § 120.25, requires a culpable mental state, specifically a showing that the defendant possessed an utter disregard for the value of human life, or whether it is merely an objective assessment of the circumstances surrounding the reckless conduct.

    Holding

    Yes, because depraved indifference to human life is a culpable mental state that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court’s finding that the defendant’s state of mind was not one of extreme wickedness or abject moral deficiency precludes a conviction for first-degree reckless endangerment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court explicitly stated that depraved indifference to human life is a culpable mental state. The court reviewed its prior decisions, particularly People v. Register and People v. Sanchez, which had treated depraved indifference as an objective assessment of risk. The Court acknowledged a shift in its jurisprudence, beginning with People v. Hafeez, emphasizing that depraved indifference requires a mental state of utter disregard for human life. The Court noted that prior decisions had weakened the Register/Sanchez rationale, making it difficult to sustain depraved indifference murder convictions in one-on-one killings. The Court emphasized the trial judge’s explicit finding that the defendant was not depravedly indifferent, stating, “When a jury (or here, the court at a bench trial) pointedly says that defendant was not depravedly indifferent, it is not our place to say that he was.” The Court reasoned that a person cannot be guilty of a depraved indifference crime without actually being depravedly indifferent. The Court stated that its holding aligns with the view of the dissents in Register and Sanchez, which argued that “depraved indifference to human life” is a culpable mental state. The Court clarified that while circumstantial evidence can prove the mens rea of depraved indifference, the factfinder in this case expressly found that the defendant lacked that mental state. The court affirmed that “depraved indifference is best understood as an utter disregard for the value of human life—a willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply doesn’t care whether grievous harm results or not”.