New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Favor

  • People v. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d 254 (1993): Defendant’s Right to be Present at Voir Dire is Statutory, Not Constitutional

    People v. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d 254 (1993)

    A defendant’s right to be present during sidebar discussions with prospective jurors, particularly when those discussions concern potential juror bias, is a statutory right under New York law (CPL 260.20), not a constitutional right.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals clarified that a defendant’s right to be present during sidebar discussions with prospective jurors is based on state statute (CPL 260.20) and not on constitutional grounds. The defendant argued that because the voir dire questioning concerned “specific bias,” his right to be present was constitutional, making the rule retroactive. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that the right to be present at voir dire sidebars is statutory, whether the inquiry concerns “specific” or “general” bias, and therefore not retroactive under People v. Mitchell. This case distinguishes between the statutory right to be present and instances where no such right exists, emphasizing that the presence of counsel alone may suffice in certain ancillary proceedings.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of selling cocaine to an undercover officer. During jury selection (voir dire), several prospective jurors indicated potential bias or familiarity with the defendant, his family, or the crime location during sidebar discussions with the judge. These discussions occurred outside the defendant’s hearing, although defense counsel participated. The defendant objected to the jury’s racial composition after it was impaneled but did not object to his absence from the sidebar conferences during jury selection.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Division initially reversed the conviction based on People v. Antommarchi, which addressed a defendant’s right to be present at sidebar conferences. However, the Court of Appeals subsequently held in People v. Mitchell that the Antommarchi rule was prospective only. The People’s motion for reargument, considering the Mitchell decision, was denied. The case reached the Court of Appeals to determine if the defendant’s situation was distinguishable from Antommarchi, warranting retroactive application.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s right to be present at sidebar conferences during voir dire, where questioning concerned potential jurors’ specific biases, is a constitutional right that should be applied retroactively.

    Holding

    No, because the right to be present at voir dire sidebars, regardless of whether the inquiry concerns specific or general bias, is conferred solely by CPL 260.20, making it a statutory right, not a constitutional one, and therefore subject to prospective application only.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that while a defendant has a constitutional right to be present at core proceedings where witnesses or evidence are presented, the right to be present at ancillary proceedings, such as voir dire sidebars, is governed by CPL 260.20. The court emphasized that the state statute provides broader protection than the federal constitution. The Court distinguished the case from situations like People v. Velasco, where sidebar inquiry is directed only to ministerial matters (availability for jury service), in which case the statutory right isn’t even triggered. In People v. Sloan, the court had explained that where bias is at issue, a defendant’s presence would permit assessment of a juror’s facial expressions and demeanor. However, the court clarified that reliance on Snyder v. Massachusetts in the context of the state statutory right is to construe the scope of the statutory right. The court stated, “Under our own body of State law, we now look to the effect that defendant’s absence might have on the opportunity to defend as measure of whether the statutory right to be present at an ancillary trial proceeding is triggered.” The court concluded that the defendant’s claim is determined by People v. Mitchell and cannot be given retroactive effect.

  • People v. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d 254 (1993): Retroactivity of Right to be Present at Sandoval Hearings

    People v. Favor, 82 N.Y.2d 254 (1993)

    The rule established in People v. Dokes, granting defendants the right to be present during Sandoval hearings, applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal at the time Dokes was decided, unless the defendant’s presence would have been superfluous.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether the ruling in *People v. Dokes*, which grants defendants the right to be present during *Sandoval* hearings, applies retroactively. The Court of Appeals held that the *Dokes* rule does apply retroactively to cases on direct appeal when *Dokes* was decided. The Court reasoned that the purpose of the *Dokes* rule is to enhance the accuracy of *Sandoval* determinations, and there was no established precedent that permitted excluding defendants from *Sandoval* hearings. However, the Court clarified that the *Dokes* rule does not apply retroactively where the defendant’s presence at the *Sandoval* hearing would have been superfluous.

    Facts

    In *People v. Favor*, the defendant was excluded from an in-camera conference held to determine the admissibility of his prior convictions for cross-examination purposes. The trial court subsequently described the discussion and the *Sandoval* decision in the defendant’s presence. In *People v. Smith*, the defendant was excluded from a brief bench conference during which the court made a preliminary determination excluding ten of fourteen prior bad acts. The defendant was present for the remainder of the *Sandoval* hearing.

    Procedural History

    In *People v. Favor*, the Appellate Division upheld the conviction, noting the defendant did not preserve the argument by timely objection. Leave to appeal was granted after the *Dokes* decision. In *People v. Smith*, the Appellate Division held that the defendant’s exclusion from the bench conference did not require reversal, because the outcome was not prejudicial. The case was appealed by permission of a judge of the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the rule established in *People v. Dokes*, granting defendants the right to be present during *Sandoval* hearings, applies retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal.

    2. Whether the defendant’s exclusion from the *Sandoval* hearing in *People v. Favor* requires reversal of the conviction.

    3. Whether the defendant’s exclusion from the *Sandoval* hearing in *People v. Smith* requires reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the purpose of the *Dokes* rule is to enhance the accuracy of *Sandoval* determinations, and there was no firmly established body of case law approving the defendant’s exclusion from *Sandoval* hearings.

    2. Yes, because the defendant’s exclusion from the *Sandoval* hearing was a clear violation of the *Dokes* holding and the defendant was not afforded the opportunity for meaningful participation.

    3. No, because the portion of the proceeding from which the defendant was excluded resulted in a wholly favorable outcome; therefore, the defendant’s presence would have been superfluous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that cases on direct appeal should generally be decided in accordance with the law as it exists at the time the appellate decision is made. The Court adopted a three-factor test from *People v. Pepper* to determine whether a new rule should be given retroactive effect: “(1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application.” Applying these factors, the Court determined that the *Dokes* rule should be applied retroactively. The Court reasoned that the purpose of *Dokes* is directly related to enhancing the accuracy of the *Sandoval* determination. The court found that there was no firmly established body of case law approving the exclusion of the defendant from *Sandoval* hearings. The Court further reasoned that there was no indication that retroactive application of *Dokes* would lead to wholesale reversals.

    Regarding *People v. Favor*, the Court found the defendant’s exclusion from the *Sandoval* hearing a clear violation of *Dokes*, because the trial court’s recitation of the decision did not provide the defendant the opportunity for meaningful participation. The Court rejected the argument that a case-specific “prejudice” test should be injected into the *Dokes* inquiry, because prejudice is inherent when a defendant is deprived of the opportunity for meaningful participation. The court also rejected the idea that a new *Sandoval* hearing would be an adequate remedy.

    Regarding *People v. Smith*, the Court found that the defendant’s presence would have been wholly “superfluous” because the portion of the proceeding from which the defendant was excluded resulted in a wholly favorable outcome. However, the Court noted that the better practice would be to have the accused present during every colloquy relating to the *Sandoval* question.