New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Epps

  • People v. Epps, 63 N.Y.2d 730 (1984): Trial In Absentia Requires Knowing Waiver of Right to Be Present

    People v. Epps, 63 N.Y.2d 730 (1984)

    A defendant may only be tried in absentia if they knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive their right to be present, which requires, at a minimum, being informed of the right to be present and the consequences of failing to appear.

    Summary

    Epps was convicted of petit larceny after failing to appear for his trial, which had been rescheduled. The trial court proceeded in absentia, rejecting defense counsel’s request for a continuance. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that a defendant must knowingly and intelligently waive their right to be present at trial before a trial can proceed in absentia. The court emphasized that the defendant must be informed of the right to be present and the consequences of failing to appear. This requirement applies even in misdemeanor cases, as the right to be present stems from constitutional confrontation clauses.

    Facts

    Epps was charged with petit larceny for stealing two pairs of sunglasses from a drug store.

    The Town Court of Guilderland initially set the trial date for February 12, 1980.

    The trial was subsequently rescheduled for February 13, 1980.

    Epps failed to appear on February 13.

    His attorney requested a continuance, explaining he couldn’t reach Epps to inform him of the date change.

    The court noted a bench warrant had been issued, but Epps had left his job and home a week prior.

    The trial court concluded Epps knowingly and intentionally waived his right to be present and proceeded with the trial in absentia over counsel’s objection.

    Epps voluntarily appeared for sentencing approximately two weeks after the conviction.

    He received the maximum sentence: a one-year jail term.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court convicted Epps of petit larceny.

    The County Court affirmed the conviction.

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the County Court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be tried in absentia when there is no evidence that the defendant was informed of the right to be present at trial and the consequences of failing to appear.

    Holding

    No, because to effect a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver, “the defendant must, at a minimum, be informed in some manner of the nature of the right to be present at trial and the consequences of failing to appear for trial.”

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on its recent decision in People v. Parker, which established the standard for a valid waiver of the right to be present at trial. The court emphasized that the record was devoid of any indication that Epps was informed that the trial would proceed in his absence. The court rejected the People’s argument that the Parker rule should not apply to misdemeanor prosecutions, stating that the constitutional right to be present at a criminal trial cannot be compromised simply because only a misdemeanor is charged. The court stated, “[T]o effect a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver, ‘the defendant must, at a minimum, be informed in some manner of the nature of the right to be present at trial and the consequences of failing to appear for trial’ (People v Parker, supra, at p 141).” The court distinguished the present case from situations where a defendant’s disruptive behavior leads to removal from the courtroom, highlighting that Epps’ absence was due to a lack of notification regarding the rescheduled trial date, not a deliberate attempt to disrupt the proceedings.

  • People v. Epps, 37 N.Y.2d 343 (1975): Waiver of Right to Be Present at Trial by Incarcerated Defendant

    People v. Epps, 37 N.Y.2d 343 (1975)

    An incarcerated defendant can waive their right to be present at trial, but such a waiver is suspect and subject to careful examination to ensure it is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, free from official coercion or obstruction.

    Summary

    Donald Epps, incarcerated during his trial for multiple violent felonies, refused to attend court proceedings as part of an inmate boycott. The trial continued in his absence, and he was convicted. Epps appealed, arguing that an incarcerated defendant cannot voluntarily waive their right to be present at trial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while the right to be present can be waived even by incarcerated defendants, such waivers must be carefully scrutinized for voluntariness and knowledge. The Court found no evidence of official coercion in Epps’s absence, which stemmed from his participation in the boycott after being advised of his right to attend.

    Facts

    Donald Epps was charged with multiple counts of attempted murder, sexual abuse, sodomy, coercion, grand larceny, and assault stemming from an attack on two women. He was incarcerated pending trial. Jury selection occurred with Epps present. After the first victim testified to the brutal acts committed against her, Epps refused to attend the trial on subsequent days, participating in a jail boycott. The court and his attorney advised him to attend, warning him that the trial would proceed in his absence. Epps remained absent, and the trial continued. Defense counsel rested without calling any witnesses due to Epps’s absence.

    Procedural History

    The jury convicted Epps on multiple counts. Epps moved to vacate his conviction, arguing that his trial in absentia violated his right to be present. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed. Epps appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether an incarcerated defendant is capable of waiving the right to be present at trial.

    2. Whether Epps knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to be present, given his incarceration and participation in an inmate boycott.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the right to be present at trial, while fundamental, is waivable under both the Federal and State Constitutions, even by an incarcerated defendant.

    2. Yes, because the trial court determined that Epps had the opportunity to be present but failed to avail himself of the opportunity by his own volition, and there was no official conspiracy to deprive Epps of his right to be present.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the historical roots of the right to be present at trial, tracing it back to early jurisprudence where absence could lead to outlawry. However, the court emphasized that the modern view, as established in Diaz v. United States, recognizes the right as being for the benefit of the accused and therefore waivable. “Whenever there is a waiver by an incarcerated defendant it will be suspect and subjected to careful examination. If a judicial inquiry discloses the slightest hint of official connivance or obstruction with respect to the defendant’s right to be present at his trial, that waiver will not be operative.”

    The Court distinguished Epps’s situation from cases involving official obstruction, noting that Epps’s absence stemmed from his voluntary participation in an inmate boycott. To allow such conduct to halt trials would set a dangerous precedent. “To condone this course of conduct, particularly where the defendant senses imminent conviction, would make a travesty of our criminal justice system.”

    Regarding whether Epps knowingly and intelligently waived his right, the Court found that Epps was repeatedly advised by the trial judge, his attorney, and Department of Correction personnel of the consequences of his absence. While having the defendant state his waiver on the record would be preferable, the Court noted the practical difficulties and potential dangers of forcing Epps to appear, especially given the ongoing boycott. The court determined that Epps understood the impact of his decision.