New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Duncan

  • People v. Duncan, 89 N.Y.2d 903 (1996): Preserving Jury Instruction Error for Appeal

    People v. Duncan, 89 N.Y.2d 903 (1996)

    To preserve for appellate review a claim that the trial court erred in failing to give an interested witness instruction, the defendant must specify on the record the particular witness for whom the instruction was requested.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery and attempted robbery. He appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing his request for an interested witness instruction. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the issue was not preserved for appellate review because the defendant failed to specify which witness the instruction should apply to. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that while a defendant generally need not submit specific proposed language for a jury instruction, under these circumstances, the failure to specify the witness waived the issue.

    Facts

    Defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and attempted robbery in the first degree after a jury trial.

    Procedural History

    The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to give an interested witness instruction. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding the issue was unpreserved. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant must specify the particular witness for whom an interested witness instruction is requested to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Holding

    Yes, because under the circumstances of this case, the defendant’s failure to specify to the trial court on the record the particular witness for which the instruction was requested, although given an opportunity to do so, renders the defendant’s claim of error unreviewable.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision. The court acknowledged the general rule that a defendant need not submit specific proposed language for a jury instruction to preserve an objection. However, the Court distinguished this case, emphasizing that the defendant was given an opportunity to specify the witness in question but failed to do so. The court reasoned that without this specification, the trial court could not properly evaluate the request and, therefore, the error was not preserved for appellate review. The court cited CPL 470.05[2] in support of the preservation requirement. The court differentiated the facts from cases such as People v. Karabinas, 63 NY2d 871, where preservation was found despite a lack of perfect specificity.

  • People v. Duncan, 46 N.Y.2d 74 (1978): Admissibility of Prior Inconsistent Statements and Accomplice Testimony Corroboration

    People v. Duncan, 46 N.Y.2d 74 (1978)

    Accomplice testimony requires corroboration by independent evidence materially connecting the defendant to the crime, and the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements is subject to the trial court’s discretion, requiring a proper foundation.

    Summary

    In a case involving the murder of two elderly women, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction, holding that accomplice testimony was properly corroborated and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain prior inconsistent statements. The court emphasized that accomplice testimony must be scrutinized carefully and corroborated by independent evidence connecting the defendant to the crime. The court also clarified the standard for admitting prior inconsistent statements, requiring a proper foundation to allow the witness an opportunity to explain any inconsistencies.

    Facts

    The defendant was suspected of murdering two elderly women after police found their bodies in their apartment. The defendant’s common-law wife, Ziriphia Mayhew, who was the niece of one of the victims, implicated the defendant in exchange for immunity. Mayhew testified that the defendant stated they would have to hurt her aunt to get money, and on the night of the murders, the defendant accompanied her to the apartment, stating he needed “scratch money.” She further testified that the defendant murdered the women after failing to find money. The defendant claimed he waited in the car and found Mayhew in a state of shock with the bodies present when he went up to the apartment.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted and tried on multiple charges, including intentional murder, felony murder, and attempted robbery. The jury found the defendant guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, and the defendant appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in its supplemental charge to the jury regarding accessorial liability.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge criminal facilitation as a lesser included offense.
    3. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit the jury to hear testimony concerning prior inconsistent statements by Mayhew.

    Holding

    1. No, because there is no distinction between liability as a principal and criminal culpability as an accessory, and the jury was already charged that Mayhew was an accomplice as a matter of law. Furthermore, there was no exception to the supplemental instructions, thus no issue of law was preserved for review.
    2. No, because the request to charge criminal facilitation was not made until after the jury had commenced its deliberations, thereby waiving any right to have facilitation submitted as a lesser included offense.
    3. No, because the admissibility of prior inconsistent statements is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and in this case, either the testimony was irrelevant due to the witness’s uncertainty or a proper foundation had not been laid.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the supplemental charge regarding accessorial liability was proper because there is no legal distinction between principal and accessory liability. It emphasized that the jury had already been instructed that Mayhew was an accomplice. On the issue of criminal facilitation, the Court held that the defendant’s request for this charge was untimely, as it was made after the jury had begun deliberations, thus waiving the right to such a charge. Regarding the prior inconsistent statements, the court emphasized that the admissibility of such evidence is within the trial court’s discretion. The court noted that one witness’s testimony was properly excluded because it was uncertain and lacked probative value. The court also found that the other witness’s testimony was correctly rejected because a proper foundation was not laid, meaning Mayhew was not given the opportunity to explain the alleged inconsistency. The court cited People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 202, stating that the trial judge’s rulings are not subject to review unless there has been an abuse of discretion as a matter of law. The court emphasized the importance of laying a proper foundation for prior inconsistent statements, citing People v. Weldon, 111 N.Y. 569, 575-576, to prevent surprise and give the witness an opportunity to explain any inconsistencies.