New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Drake

  • People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28 (2006): Limits on Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Identification

    People v. Drake, 7 N.Y.3d 28 (2006)

    While expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification is admissible under certain circumstances, a trial court’s jury instruction stating that such testimony cannot be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony is erroneous when read in isolation, but may not require reversal if the charge as a whole conveys the correct standard.

    Summary

    Drake was convicted of assault after an eyewitness identified him as the perpetrator of a brick attack. The trial court allowed expert testimony regarding factors affecting eyewitness identification but instructed the jury that this testimony could not be used to either discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony. The New York Court of Appeals held that this specific instruction, taken by itself, was erroneous, but that, viewing the jury charge in its entirety, the jury was properly instructed on how to consider expert testimony. Thus, the conviction was upheld.

    Facts

    Nicole Barrett was seriously injured when struck in the head with a brick in Manhattan. Several eyewitnesses were present. Defendant Drake was arrested and charged with the assault after an investigation. At trial, the key issue was identification. Some eyewitnesses identified Drake as the attacker, while others did not, or were uncertain.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court granted defendant’s pretrial motion to admit expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification, subject to limitations. At the conclusion of the trial, the court instructed the jury that the expert testimony could not be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony, to which the defendant objected. Drake was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a jury instruction stating that expert testimony on eyewitness identification cannot be used to discredit or accredit eyewitness testimony constitutes reversible error.

    Holding

    No, because while the instruction was erroneous when read in isolation, the court’s charge, taken as a whole, conveyed to the jury the correct standard as to the proper use of expert testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the challenged jury instruction was “improper and should not have been used” (People v. Fields, 87 NY2d 821, 823 [1995]). The court reasoned that the instruction could have been taken to mean that the expert testimony could not be considered for any purpose. The court emphasized that jurors are always free to accept or reject expert evidence. It clarified that jurors must be permitted to apply the identified psychological factors to the facts of the case in deciding whether they are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt as to the accuracy of the identifications if they accept the expert’s testimony. The court then focused on the charge as a whole. It noted that the charge expressly instructed the jury that the expert testimony was admitted to provide factors relevant to a person’s ability to perceive and remember, and that the jury was the sole judge of the reliability and credibility of the eyewitness testimony. The court concluded that no reasonable juror could have concluded that the expert’s testimony had been effectively stricken from the case. The court cited People v. Russell, 266 NY 147, 153 (1934) for the proposition that “[t]he test is always whether the jury, hearing the whole charge, would gather from its language the correct rules which should be applied in arriving at decision”.

  • People v. Drake, 61 N.Y.2d 362 (1984): Consequences of Unreasonable Delay in Sentencing After Conviction

    People v. Drake, 61 N.Y.2d 362 (1984)

    An unreasonable delay in sentencing a defendant after conviction can result in a loss of jurisdiction by the court, requiring dismissal of the indictment, unless the delay is excusable due to the defendant’s actions or other good cause.

    Summary

    Drake, a state employee, was convicted of grand larceny for falsely claiming jury duty leave. Thirty-nine months passed between the guilty verdict and sentencing. The Court of Appeals held that this delay was presumptively unreasonable and could result in a loss of jurisdiction, requiring dismissal of the indictment unless the delay was excusable. The court emphasized that the burden to explain and justify the delay rests with the prosecution and the court, not the defendant, and that unexplained delays are prejudicial to the defendant. The case was remitted to the trial court for a hearing to determine if the delay was excusable.

    Facts

    Drake, a supervisor in the NYS Department of Taxation and Finance, was convicted of larceny for submitting a false time card claiming he was on jury duty when he was not. State employees received fully compensable leave for jury duty but were expected to work when court was not in session. Drake claimed for over 10 days of jury duty when he only served 4. As a result, he was unlawfully paid for six days of unauthorized leave time.

    Procedural History

    Drake was indicted by the Grand Jury and convicted of grand larceny in the third degree. Thirty-nine months later, he was sentenced to an unconditional discharge. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Drake then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing insufficient evidence and unreasonable delay in sentencing.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for larceny by false pretenses.
    2. Whether the 39-month delay between the guilty verdict and sentencing was an unreasonable delay that resulted in a loss of jurisdiction by the trial court.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the evidence sufficiently established that the defendant received money from the State in the form of salary because of the State’s reliance upon his false statements concerning jury service.
    2. Yes, because a 39-month delay is facially unreasonable. The case is remitted for a hearing to determine if the delay was excusable; absent excusing facts, the indictment must be dismissed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the larceny conviction, the court found the evidence sufficient. Even though Drake received the money before the false statements were made, the State relied on the false statements to avoid deducting money from a subsequent paycheck. The larceny was complete when Drake wrongfully received funds due to his false statements.

    Regarding the delay in sentencing, the court emphasized that sentence must be pronounced without unreasonable delay (CPL 380.30(1)). Failure to do so results in a loss of jurisdiction. The court distinguished this case from Matter of Weinstein v Haft, where the delay was at the defendant’s behest. Here, the 39-month delay was unexplained, with the court merely alluding to extrajudicial pleas for leniency. The court stated, “It is unexcusable delay that does so. If the delay is caused by legal proceedings or other conduct of the defendant which frustrates the entry of judgment, it is excusable.” In contrast, negligence by judicial or prosecutorial staff is not excusable.

    The court emphasized that the New York rule assumes the defendant has been prejudiced by unreasonable delay and does not require the defendant to demand sentencing. The burden rests solely with the State. Unless the delay is excused, it requires dismissal of the indictment.

    The court noted that “[s]peedy trial requirements focus upon the need for a prompt trial so that witnesses are available, possible exoneration is swift and the public’s interest in deliberate prosecution is fulfilled. After a defendant is convicted, the focus shifts to the defendant’s right to appeal, his eligibility for pardon and commutation of sentence, and, if a retrial becomes necessary, the danger that witnesses may be unavailable. Of equal significance in the need for timely sentencing is the public perception that prompt and certain punishment has been imposed upon a defendant found guilty, uninfluenced by legally irrelevant considerations.”