New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Doshi

  • People v. Doshi, 17 N.Y.3d 155 (2011): Falsifying Business Records & Third-Party Submissions

    People v. Doshi, 17 N.Y.3d 155 (2011)

    A physician can be found guilty of falsifying business records in the first degree for submitting fraudulent medical documentation to a no-fault insurance carrier to receive payments for unnecessary or unperformed treatments; these documents qualify as “business records” under the statute, even when submitted by a third party.

    Summary

    Defendant Doshi, a physician, was convicted of falsifying business records and insurance fraud for submitting false consultation reports to State Farm, an insurance carrier, seeking payment for procedures purportedly performed on accident victims. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that these submissions constituted falsifying business records, even though the defendant was an outside party providing the false information. The Court reasoned that the submitted documents directly affected State Farm’s financial condition and legal obligations, thus qualifying as business records under Penal Law § 175.00.

    Facts

    Doshi worked at IK Medical P.C., a clinic investigated for insurance fraud. She submitted false “Verification of Treatment Forms” and accompanying medical reports to State Farm for nerve testing purportedly performed on two accident victims. These forms were intended to evidence State Farm’s obligation to pay for medical services and became part of State Farm’s permanent business records. The patients testified that Doshi did not perform all the tests she billed for. IK Medical was found to be fraudulently billing no-fault insurance companies irrespective of the patients’ actual needs.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied Doshi’s motion to dismiss the falsifying business records counts. At trial, Doshi was convicted of insurance fraud and falsifying business records, but acquitted of scheme to defraud. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Penal Law § 175.10 is violated when a third party submits false information to a company to induce action based on that information.
    2. Whether medical reports submitted to an insurance carrier constitute “business records” under Penal Law § 175.00 when they falsely evidence the submitter’s activities and the condition of their patients, rather than the recipient’s condition or activity.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Penal Law does not limit the types of persons who may be liable; outsiders or third parties are not immune from prosecution under this statute.
    2. Yes, because State Farm “kept or maintained” the consultation reports and claim forms, which evidenced or reflected its legal obligation to reimburse medical providers for services rendered, thus affecting its financial condition.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court focused on the plain language of Penal Law §§ 175.00 and 175.10. It stated, “Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning.” The Court rejected the argument that only insiders could be liable for falsifying business records, citing People v. Bloomfield, 6 N.Y.3d 165 (2006), which eliminated the “insider/outsider distinction.” Several other courts have held third parties accountable for submitting fraudulent records. The Court also distinguished People v. Papatonis, 243 A.D.2d 898 (1997), noting that in that case, the falsifications on a job application did not relate to any rights or obligations of the recipient agency, whereas Doshi’s submissions created financial liabilities for State Farm. The court emphasized that State Farm’s financial condition was directly affected by the false submissions, giving rise to liabilities under its policies and classifying the documents as business records. The court held that the excluded evidence regarding the Attorney General’s investigator would not have changed the outcome, since Doshi was acquitted of the scheme to defraud charge, and the evidence was not relevant to the fraudulent submission of claims for unperformed treatments.

  • People v. Doshi, 93 N.Y.2d 422 (1999): Addressing Spillover Errors and Brady Violations in Criminal Convictions

    People v. Doshi, 93 N.Y.2d 422 (1999)

    When an error affects some counts in a multi-count indictment, the remaining counts are reversed only if there is a reasonable possibility that the error influenced the jury’s verdict on those counts in a meaningful way; the prosecution is not required to disclose information that the defendant knew or should have known.

    Summary

    Doshi, a psychiatrist, was convicted on multiple counts related to the illegal sale of controlled substances. The trial court erred by instructing the jury that good faith was irrelevant for four counts concerning lorazepam 2.5 mg. The Appellate Division vacated these counts, but Doshi argued this error tainted the remaining convictions. The Court of Appeals held that the error did not warrant reversal of the remaining counts because the jury was properly instructed on the element of good faith for those charges, and the jury acquitted on other counts. The Court also found no Brady violation, as Doshi knew of the Medicaid records he claimed were improperly withheld.

    Facts

    Doshi, a psychiatrist, was accused of illegally selling controlled substances and prescriptions. Sara Cordova, a former addict and police informant, testified that she purchased drugs from Doshi for resale, and that Doshi was aware of this. Thomas Creelman, an undercover agent, also purchased drugs from Doshi. Doshi claimed he acted in good faith as a psychiatrist. He was convicted on multiple counts, but the trial court erroneously instructed the jury that “good faith” was irrelevant for counts related to lorazepam 2.5 mg.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Doshi. Doshi moved to vacate the judgment, arguing a Brady violation. The Supreme Court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to vacate but reversed four counts relating to lorazepam 2.5 mg. Doshi appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction on four counts of the indictment had a prejudicial “spillover effect” on the remaining counts, requiring reversal of those convictions.

    2. Whether the People’s failure to turn over certain Medicaid records constituted a violation of the People’s disclosure obligations under Brady v. Maryland.

    Holding

    1. No, because there is no reasonable possibility that the trial judge’s erroneous charge influenced the jury’s decision to convict on the remaining counts.

    2. No, because Brady does not require prosecutors to supply a defendant with evidence when the defendant knew of, or should reasonably have known of, the evidence and its exculpatory nature.

    Court’s Reasoning

    1. The Court applied the standard from People v. Baghai-Kermani, focusing on whether there was a “reasonable possibility” that the jury’s decision to convict on the tainted counts influenced its guilty verdict on the remaining counts in a “meaningful way.” The Court found the tainted counts distinguishable because the jury was specifically instructed that “good faith” was irrelevant for the lorazepam 2.5 mg counts, while the remaining counts required a showing of absence of “good faith.” The Court also noted the jury acquitted Doshi on five other counts, demonstrating they were capable of distinguishing between the charges.

    2. The Court stated that the Brady doctrine requires prosecutors to turn over material exculpatory evidence to defendants but does not require prosecutors to supply a defendant with evidence when the defendant knew of, or should reasonably have known of, the evidence and its exculpatory nature. The billing statements were generated by Doshi himself when he submitted claims to Medicaid. The Court found that Doshi knew of the Medicaid payment records because he billed Medicaid and received payment, thus, the People had no obligation to disclose them. As stated in the opinion, “the existence of the Medicaid payment records was necessarily known to defendant by virtue of his having billed Medicaid and received payment.”