New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Dlugash

  • People v. Dlugash, 41 N.Y.2d 725 (1977): Criminal Liability for Attempt When Completion is Impossible

    41 N.Y.2d 725 (1977)

    A defendant can be convicted of attempted murder even if the victim was already dead when the defendant acted, provided the defendant believed the victim was alive at the time of the attempted act.

    Summary

    Melvin Dlugash was convicted of murder. The evidence showed that Dlugash shot Michael Geller multiple times in the head. Dlugash admitted to the shooting, but claimed Geller was already dead from prior gunshot wounds inflicted by another person, Joe Bush. The trial court instructed the jury on intentional murder and attempted murder. The Appellate Division reversed, finding insufficient evidence that Geller was alive when Dlugash shot him. The New York Court of Appeals modified the order, holding that even if Geller was dead, Dlugash could be guilty of attempted murder if he believed Geller was alive. The court reasoned that the Penal Law eliminates impossibility as a defense to attempt if the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be.

    Facts

    Michael Geller was found dead in his apartment, riddled with bullets. The autopsy revealed multiple gunshot wounds to the head and chest from different caliber weapons. Dlugash confessed to police that he, Geller, and Bush were together the night of the murder. Bush shot Geller after an argument. Dlugash then shot Geller in the head and face with a .25 caliber pistol. Dlugash stated that Geller looked dead at the time of his shots. Bush and Dlugash disposed of the weapons. Ballistics evidence confirmed that different guns were used.

    Procedural History

    Dlugash was indicted for murder by the Grand Jury of Kings County. At trial, the prosecution presented Dlugash’s confession and medical testimony that could not definitively determine if Geller was alive when Dlugash shot him. The defense presented expert testimony suggesting Geller could have died quickly from the initial chest wounds. The trial court declined to charge the jury on aiding and abetting but submitted intentional murder and attempted murder. The jury convicted Dlugash of murder. The Appellate Division reversed the conviction and dismissed the indictment, finding the prosecution failed to prove Geller was alive when Dlugash shot him, and that the uncontradicted evidence showed Dlugash believed Geller was dead. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant can be convicted of attempted murder when the target of the attempt may have already been dead, by the hand of another, when the defendant made his felonious attempt, but the defendant believed the target to be alive.

    Holding

    Yes, because under Penal Law § 110.10, it is no defense to a charge of attempt that the crime was factually impossible to commit if the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that the prosecution failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Geller was alive when Dlugash shot him. Therefore, a murder conviction could not stand. However, the court analyzed whether Dlugash could be convicted of attempted murder. The court reviewed the historical distinction between factual and legal impossibility as defenses to attempt, noting that New York Penal Law § 110.10 eliminates the defense of impossibility in most situations, reflecting the Model Penal Code’s approach. The statute focuses on the actor’s mental state. The court found sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude Dlugash believed Geller was alive when he shot him. This evidence included the fact that Dlugash fired five shots at Geller’s head from close range, and his actions after the shooting indicated a consciousness of guilt. Dlugash’s admissions, particularly his cooperative actions in disposing of the weapons and providing a false alibi, contradicted his later claim of duress or belief that Geller was dead. While Dlugash argued the jury was bound to accept the exculpatory portions of his admission, the court stated the jury could reject those portions if they were improbable or contradicted by other evidence. The court found the Appellate Division erred in dismissing the indictment instead of modifying the judgment to reflect a conviction for attempted murder, a lesser-included offense. The case was remitted to the Appellate Division for review of the facts and further proceedings regarding the sentence.

  • People v. Dlugash, 41 N.Y.2d 725 (1977): Sufficiency of Miranda Warnings and Witness Testimony in Confession Admissibility

    People v. Dlugash, 41 N.Y.2d 725 (1977)

    A confession is admissible if, despite a potentially deficient written Miranda warning, the totality of the evidence demonstrates the defendant received adequate oral warnings and voluntarily waived their rights; further, the prosecution is not required to produce every witness to a confession if there’s no indication the uncalled witness would offer contradictory testimony.

    Summary

    Dlugash pleaded guilty to burglary, but appealed, arguing his confession should have been suppressed because the Miranda warnings were inadequate and the prosecution failed to call all witnesses to the confession. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that despite a potentially deficient written warning, the evidence showed Dlugash received adequate oral warnings and waived his rights. The court further held that the prosecution wasn’t required to produce every witness to the confession, particularly since Dlugash knew of the uncalled witness and chose not to call him, and there was no indication this witness would have offered contradictory testimony.

    Facts

    Dlugash was arrested and charged with burglary in the third degree. Prior to questioning, Dlugash received Miranda warnings, which included a printed statement on a Mount Vernon Police Department form. The form stated, in part, “We cannot ourselves furnish you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, when you go to court.” Dlugash confessed to the crime. At the confession suppression hearing, evidence was presented concerning the warnings Dlugash received, both written and oral.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Dlugash’s motion to suppress the confession, finding that Dlugash had received full and sufficient constitutional pre-interrogation advice and warnings, and that he had waived his rights voluntarily. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s findings and the conviction. Dlugash appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether Dlugash’s confession should have been suppressed due to allegedly inadequate Miranda warnings.

    2. Whether the People were required to produce both detectives who witnessed the confession to establish its admissibility.

    Holding

    1. No, because despite a potentially deficient written warning, the totality of the evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Dlugash received adequate oral warnings and voluntarily waived his rights.

    2. No, because the prosecution is not required to call every witness to a confession if there is no indication that the uncalled witness would give different testimony, and the defendant knew of the witness’s identity but chose not to call him.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that while the written statement on the Mount Vernon Police Department form, standing alone, would be considered deficient under Miranda v. Arizona, any claimed inadequacies were overcome by other evidence produced at the hearing that showed Dlugash received full, proper, and sufficient oral constitutional pre-interrogation advice and warnings. The court emphasized that the trial court, in findings affirmed by the Appellate Division, was warranted in concluding that Dlugash waived his rights and that the confession was voluntarily given.

    Regarding the second issue, the court stated that it is not incumbent upon the prosecution “to call at trial every witness to a crime or to make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all law enforcement investigatory work” (quoting People v. Stridiron, 33 NY2d 287, 292). The court noted that, as in Stridiron, there was no showing that the uncalled witness would have given different testimony. Moreover, Dlugash knew of the witness’s identity and chose not to call him. Therefore, Dlugash’s claim of denial of due process or unlawful suppression of evidence by the prosecution was unavailing. The Court cited Moore v. Illinois, holding that a due process claim requires, among other elements, a suppression of evidence, after a request by the accused, where the evidence is favorable to the accused and material to either guilt or punishment. The court found none of these elements were present here.