New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Diaz

  • People v. Diaz, 28 N.Y.2d 230 (1971): Defining Lesser Included Offenses Based on Intent

    People v. Diaz, 28 N.Y.2d 230 (1971)

    A crime is not a lesser included offense of another if it requires proof of an element not required for the greater offense.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether harassment could be considered a lesser included offense of assault. The defendant was charged with assault in the third degree for allegedly striking a police officer. The trial court instructed the jury that they could convict him of the “lesser offense” of harassment, and he was convicted of harassment. The Appellate Term reversed, holding that harassment could not be deemed a lesser included offense of assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that harassment requires proof of an intent to harass, annoy, or alarm, which is not an element of assault, which requires intent to cause physical injury.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00) for allegedly striking a police officer with intent to cause injury.

    At trial, the judge instructed the jury that they could find the defendant guilty of the “lesser offense” of harassment (Penal Law § 240.25).

    The jury convicted the defendant of harassment.

    Procedural History

    The Appellate Term reversed the conviction and dismissed the information, holding that harassment could not be deemed a lesser included offense of assault.

    The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether harassment may be deemed a lesser included offense of assault.

    Holding

    No, because the violation of harassment requires proof of an element—an intent to harass, annoy, or alarm—which is not required to establish the crime of assault.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court began by examining the definitions of assault and harassment under the New York Penal Law. Assault in the third degree, as defined in § 120.00, requires proof that the defendant, “ [w]ith intent to cause physical injury to another person, he causes such injury to [him] ”. Harassment, as defined in § 240.25, requires proof of an “ intent to harass, annoy or alarm ”. The statute reads that a person is guilty of harassment “ when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm ” he “ strikes, shoves, kicks or otherwise subjects [another] to physical contact ”.

    The court emphasized that the intent to injure, which is an element of assault, does not include an intent to harass, annoy, or alarm. Because harassment requires proof of an additional element not required for assault, it cannot be considered a lesser included offense. As the court stated, “since an additional element or fact must be shown to be present in a case of harassment, that violation may not be said to be included in the crime of assault.”

    The court also referenced the new Criminal Procedure Law (CPL), particularly § 220.20, which addresses guilty pleas. This section lists specific rules under which an offense of “lesser grade” than the one charged may be deemed a “lesser included offense for plea purposes only.” Subdivision 1, paragraph (f) of § 220.20 states that, “ [w]here the crime charged is assault * * * the offense of harassment [Penal Law, § 240.25] is deemed to constitute a lesser included offense ” “ only for the purposes of conviction upon a plea of guilty and not for purposes of conviction by verdict ” (subd. 2). The court reasoned that if the Legislature considered harassment a lesser included offense of assault for both plea and verdict purposes, there would have been no need to specify that it is only a lesser included offense for plea purposes. This distinction implies that the Legislature recognized that harassment is not a lesser included offense of assault under the general statutory definition (CPL, § 1.20, subd. 37).

    The court noted that while CPL § 220.20(2) allows conviction by verdict for lesser included offenses as defined in CPL § 1.20(37), the specific designation of harassment as a lesser included offense of assault “ only for purposes of conviction upon a plea of guilty ” constitutes a legislative determination that it is not an included crime under the statutory definition.

  • People v. Diaz, 19 N.Y.2d 547 (1967): Accomplice Testimony and the Requirement of Corroboration

    People v. Diaz, 19 N.Y.2d 547 (1967)

    A conviction cannot stand solely on the testimony of an accomplice, including a codefendant testifying in their own defense, unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence connecting the defendant to the crime.

    Summary

    Diaz and Green were charged with grand larceny and related crimes. At trial, Green, a codefendant, testified against Diaz, implicating him in the crime. The trial court refused to instruct the jury that Green’s testimony required corroboration, believing it unnecessary when the accomplice is a codefendant. The Appellate Division agreed this was error, but deemed it harmless. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the jury should have been instructed on the need for corroboration of accomplice testimony, regardless of whether the accomplice is a codefendant, and that the error was not harmless because the jury’s verdict may have relied heavily on Green’s uncorroborated testimony.

    Facts

    Police officers observed Diaz driving a car pushing another car, which was later identified as stolen, with Green behind the wheel of the stolen vehicle. As the officers approached, Green fled. Diaz drove off. Green testified against Diaz at trial, detailing Diaz’s involvement in the crime and identifying a transmission in Diaz’s car as belonging to the stolen vehicle.

    Procedural History

    Diaz was convicted of concealing and withholding stolen property. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, acknowledging that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury about the need for corroboration of accomplice testimony, but held the error harmless. Diaz appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a conviction can be upheld when based on the uncorroborated testimony of a codefendant implicating the defendant in the commission of a crime, where the trial court failed to instruct the jury that accomplice testimony requires corroboration under Section 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

    Holding

    No, because Section 399 of the Code of Criminal Procedure mandates corroboration of accomplice testimony, and this requirement applies regardless of whether the accomplice is a codefendant testifying in their own defense; therefore, the failure to so instruct the jury was prejudicial error.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the plain language of Section 399, which states, “A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless he be corroborated by such other evidence as tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.” The court found no basis in the statute to distinguish between an accomplice who is merely a witness and one who is a codefendant testifying in their own behalf. The court noted that the jury might have relied heavily on Green’s testimony, particularly regarding the transmission, which was a key piece of evidence. The court reasoned that, despite the existence of other evidence, the jury could have discredited that evidence, leaving Green’s uncorroborated testimony as the primary basis for the conviction. Quoting People v. Wallin, 32 Cal. 2d 803, 809, the court stated: “‘Although there was evidence which, if believed, was corroborative of the testimony of [the accomplice], defendant was clearly prejudiced by the refusal to give the requested instructions, since the jury in considering the credibility of witnesses may have rejected the corrobative evidence leaving the testimony of the accomplice to stand alone.’” The court also addressed the argument that a codefendant might be less likely to seek leniency by implicating another, stating that the District Attorney’s office could still have offered a lighter sentence to Green in exchange for his testimony against Diaz. Therefore, the court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, emphasizing the importance of instructing the jury on the need for corroboration of accomplice testimony to ensure a fair trial.