New York Law Review

Tag: People v. De Bour

  • People v. Garcia, 20 N.Y.3d 317 (2012): Extending De Bour to Questioning Occupants of Lawfully Stopped Vehicles

    People v. Garcia, 20 N.Y.3d 317 (2012)

    New York’s De Bour rule, which requires police to have a founded suspicion of criminal activity to justify intrusive questioning of citizens, extends to the questioning of occupants in a lawfully stopped vehicle.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the De Bour framework, which governs police encounters with civilians on the street, applies to questioning occupants of a lawfully stopped vehicle. The Court held that it does, reasoning that occupants of a vehicle are entitled to no less protection from police intrusion than pedestrians. The Court suppressed evidence obtained as a result of questioning that exceeded the permissible scope of inquiry under De Bour, emphasizing that even in a traffic stop, police questioning must be justified by an objective, credible reason or founded suspicion of criminal activity.

    Facts

    Police lawfully stopped a vehicle for a traffic infraction. After stopping the vehicle, an officer questioned the occupants. The specific content of the questions and the officer’s reasons for asking them are not detailed extensively in this particular opinion, but the court’s analysis hinged on the premise that the questioning exceeded the scope permissible under People v. De Bour, given the lack of sufficient justification.

    Procedural History

    The case originated in the Supreme Court, Bronx County. The defendant sought to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the police questioning during the traffic stop. The lower court denied suppression. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the questioning violated the principles established in People v. De Bour and remitted the case back to the Supreme Court for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the principles established in People v. De Bour, governing police encounters with civilians, apply to the questioning of occupants in a lawfully stopped vehicle.

    Holding

    Yes, because occupants of a lawfully stopped vehicle are entitled to no less protection from police intrusion than pedestrians, and the questioning in this case exceeded the permissible scope under De Bour.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that the principles of People v. De Bour, designed to protect citizens from arbitrary and intrusive police encounters, apply equally to individuals in vehicles as they do to pedestrians. The Court rejected the argument that a lawful traffic stop eliminates the need for any justification for questioning the vehicle’s occupants beyond the reason for the initial stop. The Court cited People v. Battaglia, where they previously assumed De Bour’s applicability in a traffic stop context. The court emphasized the importance of balancing the state’s interest in law enforcement with the individual’s right to be free from unreasonable government intrusion. Quoting De Bour, the Court reiterated that the touchstone of any police encounter is reasonableness. The Court found the questioning in this case to be an unjustified intrusion, requiring suppression of the evidence obtained. The dissenting opinion argued that extending De Bour to traffic stops was an unwarranted expansion of the rule and that a police officer who has lawfully stopped a vehicle should be allowed to ask questions of its occupants without needing an independent basis for suspicion. The dissent highlighted that the occupants are already detained due to the traffic stop. However, the majority was not persuaded and maintained that the De Bour framework serves as a crucial safeguard against potential abuse of power by law enforcement during traffic stops, ensuring that questioning remains reasonably related to the purpose of the stop or is independently justified by a founded suspicion of criminal activity.

  • People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Lawful Basis for Police Encounters with Citizens

    People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

    A police officer’s encounter with a citizen must be justified by the circumstances, ranging from a simple request for information based on an objective credible reason to an arrest based on probable cause.

    Summary

    This case outlines a four-tiered framework for evaluating the legality of police encounters with citizens. The court held that police encounters must be justified by the circumstances. These range from a simple request for information based on an objective credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality, to a stop and frisk based on reasonable suspicion, to an arrest based on probable cause. The court found the initial encounter in this case justified, but suppressed the evidence because the escalated search was not.

    Facts

    Two police officers patrolling in New York City observed De Bour walking towards them at 12:30 a.m. in an area with a high incidence of drug activity. De Bour crossed the street when he was approximately 30 feet from the officers. The officers followed De Bour and asked him a question. During the encounter, one of the officers noticed a bulge in De Bour’s jacket. The officer asked De Bour to open his jacket, and upon doing so, the officer discovered a gun.

    Procedural History

    De Bour was charged with possession of a weapon. He moved to suppress the weapon as evidence, arguing that the police stop and search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The trial court denied the motion, and De Bour was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the police officers’ initial approach and questioning of De Bour was justified.
    2. Whether the officer’s request for De Bour to open his jacket constituted an unlawful search.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the police officer had an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality, to approach De Bour to request information.
    2. Yes, because the officer’s request to open his jacket was an unreasonable intrusion absent reasonable suspicion that De Bour was armed or dangerous.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals established a four-tiered analysis for evaluating police encounters: “The minimal intrusion of approaching to request information is permissible when there is some objective credible reason for that interference not necessarily indicative of criminality.” The court reasoned that the officers’ initial approach and questioning were justified because De Bour’s act of crossing the street late at night in a high-crime area provided an objective, credible reason for the officers to seek information. However, the court found that the officer’s request for De Bour to open his jacket was an unreasonable search. The court stated that a more intrusive encounter, such as a search, requires a greater degree of suspicion. “Before the police officer places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he must have reasonable suspicion that that person is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime.” Because the officer’s observation of a bulge in De Bour’s jacket, without more, did not provide reasonable suspicion that De Bour was armed or dangerous, the request to open the jacket was unlawful.

  • People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Articulable Suspicion Required for Stop and Frisk Based on Citizen Tip

    People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

    A police officer may not frisk a suspect based solely on a citizen’s report of “suspicious” behavior without the officer independently assessing the facts and forming a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous.

    Summary

    This case addresses the limits of stop-and-frisk procedures based on information provided by a civilian. The New York Court of Appeals held that a frisk is unlawful when based solely on a citizen’s conclusory report of “suspicious” behavior without the officer independently observing facts to justify a reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and dangerous. The court emphasized the importance of the officer’s personal observation and experience in forming a reasonable suspicion, distinguishing the case from situations where the tip has indicia of reliability or is immediately verifiable.

    Facts

    Shortly before midnight, a liquor store was robbed by two armed black men. Officer Morris responded to the scene. A man identifying himself as a patron of “Fat Man’s Bar,” located near the liquor store, flagged down Officer Morris. The patron reported hearing about the shooting and stated that two “suspicious” black men had just entered Fat Man’s Bar. Without further inquiry or observation, Officer Morris entered the bar and, based solely on the citizen’s identification, frisked the defendant and his companion, finding a loaded revolver on the defendant. The liquor store owner later stated that the men were not the robbers.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was charged with attempted felonious possession of a weapon. He moved to suppress the evidence (the revolver), arguing that the frisk was unlawful. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant pleaded guilty. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a police officer may conduct a lawful frisk based solely on a citizen’s report that an individual looks “suspicious,” without the officer having any independent basis to suspect that the individual is armed and dangerous.

    Holding

    No, because the officer had no independent knowledge of facts to suggest the defendant possessed a firearm or posed a threat, and the citizen’s report of suspicion, without more, did not provide adequate grounds for a frisk.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on Terry v. Ohio, which requires specific and articulable facts, combined with rational inferences, to justify a stop and frisk. The court emphasized that the officer’s personal knowledge and experience are critical in evaluating the circumstances. A mere anonymous tip of “men with guns” is insufficient to justify a pat down (citing People v. Benjamin). The court distinguished this case from Adams v. Williams and People v. Moore, where the information received by the police had indicia of reliability (e.g., a known informant with a history of providing tips, or a man claiming to be the suspect’s husband). Here, the tip lacked any indicia of reliability and was subjective, non-particularized, and conclusory. The court stated, “whether a person is ‘suspicious’ is the ultimate determination that is to be reached by the officer on the basis of his or her own observations and experience.” The court further reasoned that the circumstances required further investigation before a forcible stop and frisk would be authorized. The court noted that a frisk based solely on an officer’s conclusory statement that someone looks suspicious would be unjustifiable; relying solely on a layperson’s conclusory and unsubstantiated suspicion is even weaker.

  • People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Establishing a Four-Tiered Framework for Police Encounters

    People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

    Police encounters with citizens are governed by a four-tiered framework that balances an individual’s right to privacy against the needs of law enforcement; the permissible level of intrusion increases as the level of suspicion increases.

    Summary

    This landmark New York case establishes a four-tiered framework for evaluating the legality of police encounters with citizens. The court recognized that not every encounter constitutes a seizure, and that the permissible level of police intrusion should be calibrated to the degree of suspicion they possess. From a simple request for information to a full-blown arrest, each level requires a different justification. The case emphasizes the importance of balancing individual rights with the legitimate needs of law enforcement in maintaining public order and investigating potential criminal activity. The court ultimately suppressed evidence because the police action exceeded the permissible level of intrusion justified by the circumstances.

    Facts

    A police officer, patrolling in New York City at night known for its high incidence of crime, observed the defendant walking on the same side of the street, approaching him. The officer noticed the defendant crossed the street when he was approximately 30 feet away. The officer became suspicious and called out to the defendant, asking him to stop and approach the officer. When the defendant complied, the officer asked him what he was doing in the neighborhood. The defendant gave an unsatisfactory answer. The officer then frisked the defendant and discovered a weapon. The defendant was arrested and charged with possession of the weapon.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the weapon, and the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine whether the police encounter and subsequent search violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officer’s initial encounter with the defendant, including the request to stop and the questioning, was justified under the Fourth Amendment.

    Whether the subsequent frisk of the defendant was justified.

    Holding

    No, the police officer’s actions were not justified because the officer lacked a reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk the defendant. The court articulated a four-tiered test that the officer’s actions violated. Evidence was suppressed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals articulated a four-tiered method for evaluating police encounters with citizens. Tier 1 is a request for information, which requires only an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality. Tier 2 is the common-law right to inquire, which requires a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. Tier 3 is a forcible stop and detention, which requires a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime (based on specific and articulable facts). Tier 4 is an arrest, which requires probable cause to believe that the person has committed a crime. The court found that the officer’s initial actions in this case constituted a Tier 2 encounter (common-law inquiry). However, the court held that the officer lacked the requisite founded suspicion to justify even this level of intrusion. The defendant’s act of crossing the street, even in a high-crime area, was not sufficient to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court stated, “[t]he police may not forcibly detain an individual without any indication of criminal activity.” The court reasoned that to justify a frisk, an officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the individual is armed and dangerous, which was absent here.

  • People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Justification for Police Stops Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

    A police officer may stop a motor vehicle based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, justifying an investigative check of the operator’s license and registration.

    Summary

    This case addresses the permissible grounds for a police officer to stop a motor vehicle. Officers stopped a vehicle matching the description of one seen earlier that evening with different license plates. The Court of Appeals held that the stop was justified because the officers had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen or involved in other criminal activity, supporting an investigative check. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for a fourth adjournment to secure a witness.

    Facts

    On September 24, 1971, Officers Santiago and Braga, assigned to a taxi and truck surveillance unit, stopped a blue Buick Riviera with Queens license plates. Later that evening, the officers observed a similar Buick Riviera near the Triborough Bridge, but this one had Brooklyn license plates and multiple occupants. The officers stopped the second vehicle because it appeared identical to the first but had different plates. During the stop, officers discovered that the driver was not the registered owner, and a visible envelope containing what appeared to be cocaine was found in plain view. The occupants, including the defendant, were arrested.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was indicted for criminal possession of a dangerous drug. The trial court denied the defendant’s suppression motion. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a police officer’s suspicion of criminal activity justifies stopping a motor vehicle for an investigative check.
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s request for an adjournment to secure the presence of a witness.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the officer had a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen or involved in other criminal activity, warranting the stop for an investigative check of the driver’s license and registration.
    2. No, because the trial court had already granted multiple adjournments, and the defendant’s own actions contributed to the witness’s unavailability.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the police action in stopping the vehicle was permissible because it was based on the officer’s observation of two apparently identical cars with different license plates within a short time frame. This observation created a reasonable suspicion that the vehicle was stolen or involved in other criminal activity, thus justifying the stop for an investigative check. The court distinguished this situation from routine or arbitrary stops, which are prohibited under People v. Ingle. The court emphasized that “it [is] enough if the stop is based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion’ (Terry v Ohio, 393 US 1, 21, supra).”

    Regarding the adjournment, the court found no abuse of discretion. The trial court had granted multiple adjournments, and the defendant had contributed to the witness’s unavailability by previously absconding from the jurisdiction. The court distinguished this case from People v. Foy, where the trial court denied even a brief adjournment. Here, the court had been cooperative and accommodating. The court also noted that there was doubt about the needfulness of the potential witness’s testimony since the defense attorney admitted to not knowing whether the testimony would help or hurt the defendant.

    The court held that a trial court’s discretion in granting adjournments should not be manipulated to avoid due process, especially when the defendant’s actions contributed to the situation. The court concluded that, under the circumstances, the additional adjournment denial was within the trial court’s discretion.

  • People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Police Authority to Approach and Question Citizens

    People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

    A police officer may approach a private citizen on the street to request information if there is an articulable reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality, to justify the police action.

    Summary

    This case addresses the extent to which police officers can approach and question private citizens without probable cause or reasonable suspicion. The Court of Appeals held that a police officer may approach a citizen for information if they have an articulable reason for doing so, even if it doesn’t amount to suspicion of criminal activity. However, the level of permissible intrusion increases only as the level of suspicion increases. In the companion case, People v. La Pene, the court found an anonymous tip insufficient to justify a stop and frisk.

    Facts

    Around 12:15 a.m., two police officers on foot patrol in Brooklyn noticed Louis De Bour walking towards them on the same side of the street. When De Bour was about 30-40 feet away, he crossed the street. The officers followed suit and asked De Bour what he was doing in the neighborhood. De Bour responded that he had parked his car and was going to a friend’s house. When the officer asked for identification, De Bour said he had none. The officer then noticed a bulge in De Bour’s jacket, asked him to unzip it, and discovered a revolver. De Bour was arrested.

    Procedural History

    De Bour moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the police encounter was unconstitutional. The trial court denied the motion, finding the officer’s testimony credible. De Bour pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a weapon and received a conditional discharge. The Appellate Division affirmed without opinion. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a police officer, in the absence of any concrete indication of criminality, may approach a private citizen on the street for the purpose of requesting information, and whether the subsequent search was justified.

    Holding

    Yes, because a police officer may approach a citizen if they have an articulable reason, and the officer’s observation of the bulge, coupled with the time and location, justified the request to unzip the jacket.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that not every police encounter constitutes a seizure. A seizure occurs when there is a significant interruption with an individual’s liberty of movement. However, the court stated that police officers have a duty to maintain order and assist the public. Therefore, they can approach individuals to request information, even without reasonable suspicion, but the intrusion must be minimal and justified by an articulable reason, not whim or caprice. The court established a four-tiered framework for evaluating police-citizen encounters:

    1. A police officer may approach for information when there is some objective credible reason for that interference not necessarily indicative of criminality.
    2. The common-law right to inquire is activated by a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot and permits a greater intrusion.
    3. Where a police officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that a particular person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor, the CPL authorizes a forcible stop and detention of that person.
    4. A police officer may arrest and take into custody a person when he has probable cause to believe that person has committed a crime, or offense in his presence (CPL 140.10).

    In De Bour’s case, the court found the officers legitimately approached De Bour to inquire as to his identity because the encounter was brief, devoid of harassment, and occurred after midnight in an area known for drug activity, and De Bour conspicuously crossed the street to avoid them. The court further held that the officer was justified in asking De Bour to unzip his jacket after noticing the bulge, which reasonably suggested a weapon. The court distinguished People v. Sanchez, noting that in that case, the officer did not testify that the object felt like a weapon.

  • People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Justification for Police Intrusion During Street Encounters

    People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

    Police conduct during street encounters must be justified by the circumstances, ranging from a simple request for information supported by an objective credible reason to an arrest supported by probable cause.

    Summary

    This case outlines a four-tiered framework for evaluating the propriety of police encounters on the street. The court held that police intrusions must be justified at their inception and reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that prompted the encounter. The degree of permissible intrusion increases as the level of suspicion rises, from a mere request for information to a forcible stop and frisk based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity or danger. The court differentiated the instant case from People v. Sanchez, emphasizing the defendant’s furtive conduct and the officers’ safety concerns that validated the stop and frisk.

    Facts

    The defendant was observed the previous evening with the victim of a violent assault and robbery. The following morning, the defendant was overheard stating that the victim kept her money in her brassiere. Later that day, police officers stopped the defendant for questioning regarding the assault. The defendant exhibited furtive behavior, refused to answer questions, and began to walk away from the officers. Fearing for their own safety, the officers conducted a pat-down search (a “stop and frisk”) of the defendant.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained during the stop and frisk. The suppression motion was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officers’ stop and frisk of the defendant was justified under the circumstances.

    Holding

    Yes, because given the violent nature of the crime, the defendant’s conduct, and the officers’ fear for their own personal safety, the stop and frisk was proper.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that police intrusions must be predicated on reasonable suspicion, tailored to the specific circumstances of the encounter. The Court articulated a four-tiered framework:

    1. A police officer may approach a citizen to request information when there is an objective, credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality.
    2. A police officer may exercise the common-law right to inquire, which involves a greater intrusion than a simple request for information, when the officer has a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
    3. A police officer may forcibly stop and detain a person when the officer has reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.
    4. A police officer may arrest a person when the officer has probable cause to believe that the person has committed a crime.

    The Court found that the defendant’s presence with the victim the night before, his overheard statement about the victim’s money, his furtive conduct when questioned, and the officers’ fear for their safety justified the stop and frisk. The court distinguished the case from People v. Sanchez, noting that in Sanchez, the defendant did not attempt to evade police, the officer did not articulate any feeling of danger, the defendant had not engaged in furtive conduct, and the police had no information linking the defendant to a weapon.

    The court reasoned that the level of intrusion was commensurate with the reasonable suspicion generated by the defendant’s actions. The Court highlights the importance of balancing individual rights against the need for law enforcement to prevent crime and ensure public safety. The court implicitly acknowledged the practical realities faced by officers on the street, where quick decisions must be made based on limited information.

  • People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Justifying Warrantless Searches Based on Informant Tips

    People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

    A warrantless search is permissible if based on a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that the individual is carrying a weapon, especially when the suspicion arises from a known informant’s tip regarding a serious crime.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the validity of a warrantless search of the defendant’s handbag and the seizure of a loaded revolver. The search occurred at a police station after the defendant reported being menaced with a knife by Felix Dotson, with whom she lived. Dotson, after being arrested, told the police the defendant had a gun. The court held that the motion to suppress the weapon was properly denied because the police had reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant possessed a weapon, justifying the search. The court emphasized the balance between individual rights and public safety, particularly when dealing with concealed weapons.

    Facts

    The defendant was accosted in her car by Felix Dotson, who threatened her with a knife. She escaped and reported the incident to the police, stating Dotson had been harassing her. Dotson was arrested and told the arresting officer that the defendant was his wife and was “sick” and that she had a gun in her possession. The defendant went to the police station to file a complaint against Dotson. At the station, an officer asked for her handbag, which she surrendered. A search of the handbag revealed a loaded .22 caliber revolver, for which she admitted she had no permit.

    Procedural History

    The defendant moved to suppress the revolver as evidence, arguing it was obtained through an illegal search. The suppression motion was denied after a hearing. The defendant pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a dangerous weapon. The Appellate Term, Second Department, affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a warrantless search of the defendant’s handbag, which led to the discovery of a loaded revolver, violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

    Holding

    No, because under the totality of the circumstances, the police officer had a reasonable suspicion based on reliable information that the defendant was carrying a concealed weapon, justifying the search of her handbag.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court balanced the need to seize weapons and the individual’s right to privacy, referencing Terry v. Ohio. Reasonable suspicion can be based on personal observation or information from another person. When the information comes from an informant, it must have sufficient indicia of reliability. Here, the informant (Dotson) had just been involved in an altercation with the defendant, involving a knife. He claimed the defendant had a gun. The court distinguished this case from those involving anonymous informants, noting Dotson’s information was immediately verifiable, and he would be subject to charges for falsely reporting an incident. The court emphasized the immediate danger posed by concealed weapons, stating, “Concealed weapons present an immediate and real danger to the public. Although that danger would not warrant a routine weapons check, it should support an appropriate police response on less than a probability.” Given the totality of the circumstances, including the report of a concealed weapon, the court found the search of the defendant’s handbag to be a reasonable, limited intrusion.

  • People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976): Justification for Police Intrusion Based on Reasonable Suspicion

    People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210 (1976)

    Police encounters with citizens are governed by a four-tiered framework, where the degree of permissible intrusion is directly related to the degree of articulable suspicion that justifies the encounter.

    Summary

    This case outlines the permissible scope of police interaction with private citizens. The New York Court of Appeals established a four-tiered framework: (1) a mere request for information requires only an objective credible reason; (2) a common-law right to inquire requires a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot; (3) a forcible stop and detention requires a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime; and (4) an arrest requires probable cause. The court held that the officer’s initial approach to De Bour to request information was justified, but the subsequent actions exceeded the permissible scope of intrusion given the level of suspicion.

    Facts

    At 12:15 a.m., two police officers were patrolling a street in Brooklyn known for its high incidence of crime. They observed De Bour walking towards them. As they passed, one of the officers crossed the street and asked De Bour if he could speak with him. De Bour agreed. The officer asked De Bour what he was doing in the neighborhood. De Bour stated that he had just parked his car and was walking to a friend’s house. The officer asked De Bour for identification. As De Bour was answering, the officer noticed a bulge in De Bour’s jacket. The officer, fearing that De Bour was armed, reached into the jacket and discovered a loaded handgun. De Bour was arrested and charged with possession of a weapon.

    Procedural History

    De Bour was convicted of possession of a weapon in criminal court. He appealed, arguing that the gun should have been suppressed as the product of an unlawful search. The Appellate Term affirmed the conviction. The case then went to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police officer’s intrusion upon De Bour was justified at each stage of the encounter, considering the officer’s initial request for information, the subsequent request for identification, and the final search of De Bour’s jacket.

    Holding

    No, because the officer’s escalating actions were not justified by a sufficient level of suspicion at each stage of the encounter. The initial request for information was permissible, but the subsequent intrusion of requesting identification and searching his jacket were not, because the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that De Bour was engaged in criminal activity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals articulated a four-tiered method for evaluating the propriety of police encounters. The court said, “The greater the intrusion, the greater must be the reason for it.” The first tier involves a simple request for information, which requires only some objective credible reason, not necessarily indicative of criminality. The second tier, the common-law right to inquire, requires a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The third tier, a forcible stop and detention, requires a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. The fourth tier, an arrest, requires probable cause.

    The court found that the initial request for information was justified, as the officer had an objective credible reason to approach De Bour given the high crime rate in the area. However, the subsequent request for identification and the search of De Bour’s jacket were not justified, as the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that De Bour was engaged in criminal activity. The court noted that the bulge in De Bour’s jacket, without more, did not provide reasonable suspicion to justify the search. The court emphasized that to justify such an intrusion, the officer must have a reasonable belief that his safety or that of others is threatened. The court stated, “Before the police officer places a hand on the person of a citizen in search of anything, he must have constitutionally adequate reasonable grounds for doing so.”

    The court emphasized the importance of balancing the government’s interest in law enforcement with the individual’s right to privacy and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. The court reversed the conviction and suppressed the weapon.