New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Dawson

  • People v. Dawson, 64 N.Y.2d 1024 (1985): Scope of Cross-Examination on Prior Bad Acts

    64 N.Y.2d 1024 (1985)

    A defendant who testifies on their own behalf can be cross-examined regarding prior criminal or immoral acts that bear on credibility, provided the inquiry is made in good faith and has a reasonable basis in fact; the burden is on the defendant to seek a pretrial ruling to preclude such questioning if they believe it would be unduly prejudicial.

    Summary

    Dawson was convicted of robbery. On appeal, he argued that the prosecutor unfairly surprised him by questioning him about an unrelated bank robbery during cross-examination. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the prosecutor’s inquiry was permissible because Dawson was aware of the dismissed federal charges and could have sought a protective order before testifying. The court declined to shift the burden to the prosecutor to obtain prior court approval before questioning a defendant about unrelated criminal acts during cross-examination, distinguishing such situations from the introduction of evidence of other crimes as part of the prosecutor’s direct case.

    Facts

    Two men robbed a bar in Syracuse, New York. One of the men, identified as Dawson, took money from the bartender while the other robbed patrons. As they fled, Dawson fired at police officers. Dawson was arrested and indicted on multiple charges, including robbery and attempted murder. While awaiting trial, Dawson was released and subsequently charged in federal court with robbing a bank in Atlanta, Georgia. The federal charges were later dismissed pending the outcome of the New York indictment. The New York prosecutor was aware of the federal charges and informed Dawson’s attorney.

    Procedural History

    Dawson was convicted in the trial court on multiple counts of robbery and attempted aggravated assault. He appealed, arguing the prosecutor’s cross-examination regarding the Georgia bank robbery was prejudicial error. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Dawson then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor should be required to obtain prior court approval before cross-examining a defendant about unrelated criminal acts.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant is in control of the decision to testify and can seek a protective order to prevent prejudicial questioning.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished between the use of prior bad acts as evidence-in-chief and their use for impeachment purposes. When the prosecutor intends to introduce evidence of other crimes as part of the direct case, they must seek a ruling outside the jury’s presence, as established in People v. Ventimiglia. However, when the evidence is used for impeachment during cross-examination, the burden remains on the defendant to seek a protective order. The court reasoned that because the defendant controls the decision to testify, they can anticipate cross-examination on prior bad acts and seek a ruling to prevent prejudicial questioning before taking the stand. The court noted that Dawson knew about the Georgia robbery charge, even though it was dismissed, and could have raised an objection in a Sandoval motion before testifying. By failing to do so, he waived his right to an advance ruling. The court cited People v. Vidal, noting that the underlying act of a dismissed charge is a proper subject for inquiry on cross-examination. The court emphasized that a defendant cannot claim surprise when questioned about charges they were already aware of. The court found no reason to shift the burden to the prosecutor in cases where the evidence is used for impeachment purposes, as the defendant can generally prevent prejudice by seeking a pretrial ruling.

  • People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311 (1980): Permissibility of Cross-Examining Witness on Failure to Come Forward

    People v. Dawson, 50 N.Y.2d 311 (1980)

    A witness may be cross-examined regarding their failure to come forward with exculpatory information prior to trial only if the cross-examination satisfies a four-prong test designed to ensure reliability and fairness.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed the propriety of cross-examining a defense witness about their failure to come forward with exculpatory information before trial. The court established a four-prong test to determine the admissibility of such cross-examination, emphasizing the potential for prejudice and unreliability. The test considers whether the witness was aware of the means to furnish the exculpatory information, had a motive to protect the defendant, was familiar with the nature of the charges, and had reason to recognize they possessed exculpatory information. This case highlights the balance between the prosecution’s right to challenge witness credibility and the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of robbery. At trial, a defense witness testified, providing information that, if believed, would have exculpated the defendant. The prosecution cross-examined the witness about why he had not come forward with this information before trial. The witness stated he had not contacted the police or the district attorney. No foundational inquiry was made regarding the witness’s awareness of how to provide this information or his reasons for remaining silent.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. The appellate division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the propriety of the cross-examination of the defense witness.

    Issue(s)

    Whether it is proper for the prosecution to cross-examine a defense witness about their failure to come forward with exculpatory information prior to trial, and if so, under what conditions is such cross-examination permissible?

    Holding

    No, because the prosecution failed to lay a proper foundation establishing that the witness’s silence was inconsistent with their trial testimony, and the potential for prejudice outweighed the probative value. Such cross-examination is permissible only when a four-prong test is met.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that a witness has no legal duty to volunteer exculpatory information to law enforcement authorities. Therefore, the witness’s prior silence has minimal probative value. The court recognized the significant potential for prejudice, as a jury might improperly infer guilt from the witness’s silence or unfairly discredit their testimony. The court stated, “Absent unusual circumstances, it is natural for a potential witness in a criminal case to come forward and speak up. In most instances, therefore, it is unnatural for such a person to remain silent if he is in possession of knowledge that would exonerate the accused. It follows that evidence of such silence may be introduced at trial for impeachment purposes.” However, it outlined a four-prong test to determine the admissibility of such cross-examination:

    1. The witness was aware of the means of furnishing the exculpatory information to law enforcement;
    2. The witness had a motive to protect the defendant;
    3. The witness was familiar with the nature of the charges pending against the defendant; and
    4. The witness had reason to recognize that they possessed exculpatory information.

    The court concluded that without establishing these foundational elements, the cross-examination was improper. Judge Wachtler, in a concurring opinion, highlighted the risk to the defendant’s right to a fair trial posed by such inquiry, noting that a witness’s failure to appear before a grand jury often reflects a lack of legal knowledge, not credibility. He suggested that this type of cross-examination should be employed rarely and with careful observance of the court’s restrictions.