New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Davis

  • People v. Davis, 19 N.Y.3d 265 (2012): Limits on De Facto Grand Jury Dismissals

    People v. Davis, 19 N.Y.3d 265 (2012)

    A prosecutor’s withdrawal of a case from a grand jury due to witness unavailability is not a de facto dismissal requiring court authorization for re-presentation unless the grand jury has fully considered the evidence and charges.

    Summary

    Defendants Davis and McIntosh were indicted for assault after an incident at a nightclub. The prosecution initially presented evidence to a grand jury against McIntosh only, as Davis had not yet been apprehended, but withdrew the case due to witness unavailability. Later, both Davis and McIntosh were indicted by a second grand jury. The Court of Appeals held that the withdrawal from the first grand jury was not the functional equivalent of a dismissal requiring court authorization before re-presentation, because the first grand jury had not fully considered the evidence and charges against both defendants.

    Facts

    Lynn Walker was severely injured in an altercation at a nightclub, allegedly instigated by Davis and joined by McIntosh. McIntosh was arrested shortly after the incident, while Davis was apprehended later. The People began presenting evidence to a grand jury against McIntosh before Davis was arrested, advising the jury that it was a “continued case.” Walker testified that both Davis and McIntosh assaulted her. The People withdrew the case due to witness unavailability and the grand jury’s term expiring. Later, the People presented evidence to another grand jury against both Davis and McIntosh, who were subsequently indicted.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss the indictment. Davis was convicted of assault, while McIntosh was acquitted of first-degree assault but convicted of second-degree assault. The Appellate Division reversed the judgments, holding that the withdrawal from the first grand jury was the functional equivalent of a dismissal under People v. Wilkins, requiring court permission before re-presentment. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and reversed the Appellate Division’s orders.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s withdrawal of their case from the first grand jury presentation, due to witness unavailability, constituted the functional equivalent of a dismissal pursuant to CPL 190.75, requiring court authorization before re-presentment to a second grand jury.

    Holding

    Yes for McIntosh; No for Davis. The order is reversed because the People had instructed the first grand jury that only McIntosh was the target of the proceedings. As to McIntosh, no, because the proceedings before the first grand jury had not progressed to the point where it had fully considered the evidence and the charges against McIntosh.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Wilkins, which held that a pre-vote withdrawal of charges after the presentation was complete was the functional equivalent of a dismissal. The Court emphasized that Wilkins applies only in limited circumstances where the withdrawal is “fundamentally inconsistent with the objectives underlying CPL 190.75,” such as curtailing prosecutorial excess and maintaining grand jury independence (People v. Gelman, 93 N.Y.2d 314, 319 (1999)). For Davis, since the People never sought an indictment from the first grand jury against Davis, Wilkins is irrelevant since there were no charges against Davis to be withdrawn (see People v Santmyer, 255 AD2d 871, 871 [4th Dept 1998]). The Court found that the first grand jury had not fully considered the evidence and charges against McIntosh because the People intended to present additional witnesses and had informed the grand jury that it was a continuing case. The Court emphasized that there was no evidence that the People withdrew their case to find a more compliant grand jury. The court reasoned that the focus should be on “the extent to which the Grand Jury considered the evidence and the charge” (Wilkins, 68 NY2d at 274). Because the People withdrew the charges before fully presenting their case, it did not constitute a de facto dismissal requiring court authorization.

  • People v. Davis, 14 N.Y.3d 20 (2009): When Criminal Possession is Not a Lesser Included Offense of Criminal Sale

    14 N.Y.3d 20 (2009)

    Criminal possession of a controlled substance is not a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance under New York law, even when an agency defense is presented, because it is theoretically possible to commit the sale crime without necessarily committing the possession crime.

    Summary

    George Davis was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. At trial, he requested a jury instruction on the agency defense (arguing he acted as the buyer’s agent) and also requested that the court charge criminal possession as a lesser included offense. The trial court granted the agency defense instruction but denied the lesser included offense charge. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that criminal possession is not a lesser included offense of criminal sale, even when the agency defense is raised, because the theoretical possibility exists to sell without possessing. This decision emphasizes a strict application of the ‘impossibility’ test for lesser included offenses.

    Facts

    An undercover officer approached Davis outside a building known for drug sales, requesting two bags of crack cocaine and providing $60. Davis entered the building, returned, and handed the officer the drugs. At trial, Davis testified that the officer solicited his help in purchasing crack, promising to “look out for” him. Davis claimed he led the officer to the building, took $40, purchased the crack inside, and gave it to the officer, receiving no payment for his services. He argued he was merely acting as an agent for the buyer.

    Procedural History

    Davis was indicted for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree. At trial, he requested and received an agency defense instruction. He also requested a charge for criminal possession of a controlled substance as a lesser included offense, which was denied. He was convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s ruling.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge criminal possession of a controlled substance in the seventh degree as a lesser included offense of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, when an agency defense was properly submitted to the jury.

    Holding

    No, because it is theoretically possible to commit the crime of criminal sale of a controlled substance without, by the same conduct, committing the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The agency defense does not alter this analysis.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the two-pronged test established in People v. Glover to determine whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense charge. The first prong requires that it be theoretically impossible to commit the greater crime without committing the lesser. The Court emphasized that this determination is made by a “comparative examination of the statutes defining the two crimes, in the abstract” (Glover). Here, the court reasoned that one can “offer or agree to” sell drugs without having physical possession or control over them. The court dismissed the argument that the agency defense changes this analysis. The agency defense is an interpretation of the definition of “sell.” The Court stated, “Although ‘[r]eading the statute literally, any passing of drugs from one person to another would constitute a sale,’ we have held that ‘[o]ne who acts solely as the agent of the buyer cannot be convicted of the crime of selling narcotics’.” Because the agency defense is still a defense to sale, the Court reasoned that the Glover test remains applicable and an exception to the test is not warranted. As such, the Court affirmed the lower court’s conclusion. The dissenting opinion argued for an exception to the Glover test when the agency defense is invoked. The dissent contended that because a defendant asserting the agency defense essentially admits to possessing the drugs on behalf of the buyer, a charge of simple possession should be included to avoid coercing the jury into either acquitting a defendant who admits to criminal conduct or convicting them of a greater crime.

  • People v. Davis, 5 N.Y.3d 496 (2005): Limits on Prosecutorial Appeal Rights in New York

    People v. Davis, 5 N.Y.3d 496 (2005)

    In New York, the People can only appeal from a criminal proceeding order if specifically authorized by statute, and a trial court’s sua sponte order setting aside a verdict based on Judiciary Law § 2-b (3) is not directly appealable under CPL 450.20; the proper remedy is a CPLR article 78 proceeding.

    Summary

    This case concerns the appealability of a trial court’s order setting aside a guilty verdict. Davis was convicted of murder, but the trial court, acting sua sponte under Judiciary Law § 2-b (3), overturned the verdict due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The People appealed, but the Appellate Division dismissed the appeal, holding that the Criminal Procedure Law doesn’t authorize an appeal from an order made on the court’s own motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that because the order was based on Judiciary Law § 2-b (3) instead of CPL 330.30, it wasn’t directly appealable under CPL 450.20, and the People’s proper remedy was a CPLR article 78 proceeding.

    Facts

    Defendant Davis was charged with murder and related offenses. She was convicted of second-degree murder. Davis moved to set aside the verdict under CPL 330.30, but the Supreme Court denied this motion. The trial court then, sua sponte, overturned the verdict based on Judiciary Law § 2-b (3), citing ineffective assistance of counsel.

    Procedural History

    The People appealed the trial court’s order to the Appellate Division. The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal, finding no statutory authorization for an appeal from a sua sponte order. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 450.20 allows the People to appeal from a sua sponte order of a trial court setting aside a verdict pursuant to Judiciary Law § 2-b (3).

    Holding

    No, because CPL 450.20 delineates the specific orders that the People can appeal, and an order based on Judiciary Law § 2-b (3) is not among them; the proper method for challenging such an order is a CPLR article 78 proceeding.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that appeals in criminal proceedings are only permitted when explicitly authorized by statute, citing People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d 8 (2002). CPL 450.20(3) allows appeals from orders setting aside a verdict under CPL 330.30 or 370.10. However, the trial court explicitly relied on Judiciary Law § 2-b (3), which empowers courts to “devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, necessary to carry into effect the powers and jurisdiction possessed by it.” The Court refused to construe the order as one made under CPL 330.30 simply because the basis for the order (ineffective assistance) could have been raised in a CPL 330.30 motion. The court reasoned that it would “ ‘not resort to interpretative contrivances to broaden the scope and application’ of CPL 450.20” (quoting People v. Hernandez, 98 N.Y.2d at 10). Instead, the Court pointed to the availability of a CPLR article 78 proceeding as the proper avenue for the People to challenge the trial court’s action, particularly a writ of prohibition, when a court acts in excess of its authorized powers and no other adequate legal remedy exists, citing Matter of Pirro v. Angiolillo, 89 N.Y.2d 351 (1996). This emphasizes the principle that Article 78 proceedings serve as a check against judicial overreach when standard appellate routes are unavailable. The decision reinforces the importance of adhering to statutory limitations on appellate rights, especially for the prosecution in criminal cases, and underscores the availability of alternative remedies like Article 78 proceedings to address perceived errors or abuses of power by trial courts.

  • People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 764 (1990): Peremptory Challenges Based on Highest Crime Charged

    People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 764 (1990)

    The number of peremptory challenges a defendant is entitled to during jury selection is determined by the highest crime charged in the indictment, regardless of the evidence’s sufficiency to support that charge.

    Summary

    Defendant was indicted for attempted robbery in the first degree, a class C felony, but the trial court found insufficient evidence for that charge, believing the evidence supported only attempted robbery in the second degree, a class D felony. Despite this, the People did not supersede the indictment. At trial, the court granted the defendant only 10 peremptory challenges, the number allowed for the lesser charge, instead of the 15 challenges for the higher charge in the indictment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the number of peremptory challenges is dictated by the highest crime formally charged in the indictment, not by the crime the court believes is supported by the evidence.

    Facts

    The defendant was indicted on a single count of attempted robbery in the first degree based on displaying what appeared to be a firearm during the crime. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing insufficient evidence to support the charge. The trial court agreed that the evidence was insufficient for attempted first-degree robbery but found sufficient evidence for the lesser included offense of attempted robbery in the second degree. However, the court did not dismiss the first-degree robbery charge.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied the defendant’s pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. The People did not attempt to supersede the indictment. The case proceeded to trial on the original charge of attempted robbery in the first degree. The trial court granted the defendant only 10 peremptory challenges. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the case.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the number of peremptory challenges allowed to a defendant is determined by the highest crime charged in the indictment, or by the crime the trial court believes is supported by sufficient evidence presented to the Grand Jury.

    Holding

    Yes, because CPL 270.25(2) clearly states that the number of peremptory challenges is based on the degree of the highest crime charged in the indictment, regardless of the evidence’s strength regarding that charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the plain language of CPL 270.25(2), which explicitly ties the number of peremptory challenges to the highest crime charged in the indictment. The court rejected the argument that the trial court could effectively “amend” the indictment to reflect the lesser charge. The court stated, “Although the court made it clear that if the People’s case proceeded as expected, attempted first degree robbery would not be submitted to the jury, that was no substitute for compliance with the clear statutory directive of CPL 270.25 (2), which bases the number of peremptory challenges each party must be allowed on the degree of the highest crime charged.” The court acknowledged the trial court’s frustration with the situation but stressed that such procedural matters are for legislative action, not judicial improvisation. Because the defendant was formally charged with a class C felony, attempted robbery in the first degree, he was entitled to 15 peremptory challenges, regardless of the trial court’s assessment of the evidence.

  • People v. Davis, 67 N.Y.2d 514 (1986): Waiver of Counsel After Non-Custodial Request

    People v. Davis, 67 N.Y.2d 514 (1986)

    An individual who requests counsel during a non-custodial interrogation can later waive that right, even outside the presence of counsel, provided the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.

    Summary

    Brenda Davis was convicted of felony murder. Prior to her guilty plea, she moved to suppress statements made to police, arguing that they were obtained in violation of her right to counsel. She initially requested counsel during a non-custodial interview, but later waived her rights during a custodial interrogation the following day. The County Court suppressed the first statement, but admitted the second. The Appellate Division reversed, suppressing the second statement as well. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a suspect who requested counsel while not in custody may later waive that right before formal proceedings begin, and remitted the case to the Appellate Division to determine the validity of the waiver.

    Facts

    Brenda Davis lived on a farm with her daughter, James Davis, and Jessie White. Elizabeth Schlitt, James Davis’s girlfriend, died on the farm. Initially, Davis and the codefendant claimed Schlitt died from a fall in the barn. An autopsy revealed she died from multiple injuries, including sexual assault. During a non-custodial interview at the farm, after being read her Miranda rights, Davis requested a lawyer after being confronted with James Davis’s confession. The deputies ceased questioning at that time but told her they would return the next day. The next day, deputies found a note from Davis and met her at her sister’s house, asking her to come to the Sheriff’s office for questioning. She voluntarily accompanied them. She was given Miranda warnings, waived her rights, and gave incriminating statements.

    Procedural History

    The County Court suppressed statements Davis made after requesting counsel on August 25 but denied suppression of those made on August 26, finding a valid waiver. The Appellate Division reversed, suppressing the August 26 statements. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a suspect who has requested counsel during a non-custodial interrogation may subsequently waive that right, without counsel present, during a later custodial interrogation?

    Holding

    Yes, because the protections afforded to suspects who request counsel are different in custodial versus non-custodial settings. The coercive atmosphere of custodial interrogation necessitates stricter protections.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the robust right to counsel in New York, extending beyond the federal constitutional right. It identified two scenarios where the right to counsel attaches indelibly, requiring counsel’s presence for a valid waiver: (1) after formal proceedings commence, and (2) when a suspect in custody has retained or requested an attorney. However, this case did not fall within either of these rules. The court distinguished People v. Cunningham, noting that Davis was not in custody when she initially requested counsel. The court reasoned that during a non-custodial interview, the coercive power of the state is limited because the suspect can refuse to answer questions or leave. The court stated: “In a noncustodial interview, however, a witness or suspect is not constrained by police influence and does not suffer ‘the disadvantage’ of being ‘directly confronted with the awesome law enforcement machinery possessed by the State.’” The court emphasized that the ultimate question is whether the People met their burden of proving a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. Factors relevant to this determination include whether the defendant was fully advised of their rights, whether the defendant initiated further communication with police, and whether there was a break in interrogation providing a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney. The court remitted the case to the Appellate Division to consider the unreviewed factual question of whether Davis’s waiver was indeed knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The Court noted that it is always desirable to remind the defendant of the earlier request and obtain an express withdrawal.

  • People v. Davis, 72 N.Y.2d 32 (1988): Reckless Endangerment Requires Actual Risk, Not Just Intent

    People v. Davis, 72 N.Y.2d 32 (1988)

    Reckless endangerment requires proof that the defendant’s conduct created a grave risk of death to another; factual impossibility that eliminates the risk precludes conviction, even if the defendant intended to create such risk.

    Summary

    Davis was convicted of first-degree reckless endangerment for pointing a gun at police officers and pulling the trigger, even though the gun was jammed and did not fire. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the reckless endangerment conviction, holding that because the gun was inoperable at the time of the incident, the defendant’s actions did not create a “grave risk of death” as required by the statute. The Court distinguished reckless endangerment from attempted intentional acts, where impossibility is not a defense because the offense focuses on the defendant’s intent, not the resulting risk. The court affirmed the conviction for criminal possession of a weapon, finding the indictment was not duplicitous as clarified by the bill of particulars.

    Facts

    Ian Shillingford was confronted by Davis and another man who demanded money from him. A scuffle ensued, and Davis produced a pistol, which he dropped. The gun fired upon hitting the ground. Shillingford escaped to his apartment. Police officers responding to the scene were alerted by a bystander who identified Davis. As the officers approached in their patrol car, Davis pointed the gun at the windshield, assumed a “combat stance,” and pulled the trigger, but the gun did not fire due to a spent shell in the chamber. Davis was apprehended after a foot chase during which he again pointed the gun at the officers; he was shot and wounded by an officer during the chase.

    Procedural History

    Davis was charged with attempted robbery, reckless endangerment, and criminal possession of a weapon. At trial, he moved to dismiss the weapons possession charge as duplicitous. The trial court denied the motion and convicted Davis of reckless endangerment and weapons possession. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reversing the reckless endangerment conviction but affirming the weapons possession conviction. The People appealed the reversal of the reckless endangerment conviction, and Davis cross-appealed the weapons possession conviction.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether pointing a gun at another and pulling the trigger constitutes reckless endangerment when a jammed cartridge prevents the gun from firing?

    2. Whether the count in the indictment charging Davis with second-degree criminal possession of a weapon was duplicitous.

    Holding

    1. No, because the conduct did not “create a grave risk of death to another” as required by the reckless endangerment statute.

    2. No, because the indictment, as supplemented by the bill of particulars, charged Davis with only one offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that reckless endangerment requires an objective assessment of the risk created by the defendant’s conduct. While the crime does not require a specific intent to cause harm, it does require the creation of a grave risk of death. In this case, because the gun was jammed and incapable of firing, Davis’s actions could not have created the necessary risk. The Court distinguished this situation from attempted intentional acts, where the focus is on the defendant’s intent, and impossibility is not a defense. The court emphasized that “reckless endangerment is defined in terms of the risk produced by defendant’s conduct, not intent, and factual impossibility eliminates the risk essential to commission of the crime.”

    Regarding the duplicity argument, the Court found that while the indictment might have initially been unclear as to whether Davis was being charged with possession of the weapon during the altercation with Shillingford or during the confrontation with the police, the bill of particulars clarified that the charge related only to the latter incident. Therefore, the indictment was not duplicitous, and the motion to dismiss was properly denied. The Court noted that CPL 200.50 requires an indictment to provide fair notice of the charges against the accused and to establish the defense of double jeopardy.

  • People v. Davis, 61 N.Y.2d 202 (1984): Admissibility of Prior Consistent Statements to Rehabilitate Witness Testimony

    People v. Davis, 61 N.Y.2d 202 (1984)

    A witness’s prior consistent statements are inadmissible to bolster their testimony unless the cross-examiner specifically alleges recent fabrication of the testimony, and the prior statements were made before the alleged motive to fabricate arose.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery based largely on accomplice testimony. The prosecution introduced prior consistent statements from the accomplices to bolster their credibility after defense counsel suggested their testimony was a recent fabrication to gain leniency. The New York Court of Appeals held that the prior consistent statements were improperly admitted because the motive to fabricate existed when the statements were made. The court emphasized that such statements are admissible only to rebut a claim of recent fabrication, and only if the statements predate the alleged motive.

    Facts

    Ricky Cuff and Jacob Whitbeck were accomplices in the robbery of King’s Variety Store. Cuff posed as a customer, and Whitbeck drove the getaway car. Initially, neither Cuff nor Whitbeck admitted their involvement or identified the defendant, Davis. Later, after police told Cuff that Whitbeck implicated him, Cuff confessed and identified Davis. Whitbeck then confessed after being told Cuff implicated him and being threatened with a long prison term. Both accomplices provided written statements consistent with their trial testimony identifying Davis as the gunman.

    Procedural History

    Davis was convicted of robbery, largely on the testimony of Cuff and Whitbeck. The Appellate Division reversed the judgment and ordered a new trial, finding the prior consistent statements were improperly admitted to bolster the accomplice testimony. The dissenting Justice granted the People leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prior consistent statements of accomplices, made after their arrest and being informed they were implicated in the crime, are admissible to rehabilitate their testimony after defense counsel alleges recent fabrication to obtain leniency.

    Holding

    No, because the accomplices’ motive to fabricate existed at the time the prior consistent statements were made; thus, the statements were inadmissible to rehabilitate their testimony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s reversal, holding that the prior consistent statements were inadmissible. The court reiterated the general rule that a witness’s testimony cannot be bolstered by prior consistent statements. An exception exists when the testimony is challenged as a recent fabrication, but the prior statements must predate the motive to fabricate. Here, the motive to fabricate (hope for leniency) arose when the accomplices were arrested and charged. Because the written statements were given after this motive arose, they were inadmissible to bolster the accomplices’ credibility. The court distinguished People v. Baker, where the accomplice’s motive to falsify was influenced not only by a desire to avoid prosecution but also by subsequent gifts of money and food. In Davis, the court noted, “The hope for preferred treatment…was precisely the same at the time of arrest as it was at the time of trial.” Allowing the statements was prejudicial and not harmless error, as the accomplices’ identification was critical to the case.

  • People v. Davis, 61 N.Y.2d 202 (1984): Use of Post-Arrest Silence When Defendant Testifies to It

    People v. Davis, 61 N.Y.2d 202 (1984)

    A prosecutor’s comments on a defendant’s post-arrest silence are permissible when the defendant testifies about that silence and contradicts prosecution witnesses regarding statements made at the time of arrest.

    Summary

    Davis was convicted of attempted murder and weapons charges. At trial, police testified that Davis made inculpatory statements upon arrest, while Davis testified he remained silent. The prosecutor, during summation, challenged Davis’s credibility based on this alleged silence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that because Davis testified about his silence, contradicting the prosecution’s witnesses, the prosecutor’s comments were permissible and did not violate the rule against using post-arrest silence for impeachment established in People v. Conyers. A curative instruction, though not given due to the defendant’s objection, could have further mitigated any potential prejudice.

    Facts

    Police were called to an apartment building after John Puig reported that Davis was carrying a revolver. There was an outstanding warrant for Davis’s arrest. When Davis emerged, Puig alerted the police, and Davis fled. After a chase and an exchange of gunfire, Davis was wounded and arrested. At trial, police testified that Davis stated, “I should have killed you when I had the chance,” and spat on an officer’s shoe. Davis testified that he believed his pursuers were Puig’s friends, not police, and he fired out of fear. He claimed he said nothing to the police at the time of his arrest.

    Procedural History

    Davis was convicted of attempted murder in the second degree, attempted assault in the first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon. He appealed, arguing that the prosecutor improperly used his post-arrest silence against him during summation. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Davis then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor’s comments during summation regarding Davis’s post-arrest silence constituted reversible error, given that Davis testified about his silence and contradicted the prosecution’s witnesses regarding statements made at the time of his arrest.

    Holding

    No, because Davis testified about his post-arrest silence, contradicting the prosecution’s witnesses, and the prosecutor’s comments concerned a key issue of fact: whether Davis made the incriminating statements attributed to him by the police.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. Conyers, where it was undisputed that the defendant remained silent. In Conyers, the Court held that the defendant’s silence at the time of arrest was ambiguous and inadmissible to impeach later exculpatory testimony. Here, the Court emphasized that Davis himself testified about his silence, directly contradicting the officers’ testimony that he made inculpatory statements. Therefore, the prosecutor’s comments were not an attempt to use the *fact* of Davis’s silence against him, but rather to challenge the *veracity* of his testimony regarding his silence. The Court noted that while the prosecutor’s comments improperly invited the jury to draw an inference of guilt from Davis’s testimony, a curative instruction could have mitigated the prejudice. However, Davis objected to such an instruction, precluding him from using its absence as grounds for appeal. The Court stated, “[T]his is not a case, like Conyers, where the prosecution tried to use evidence of the fact of a defendant’s postarrest silence against him by contending that such silence itself renders a later exculpatory version of events incredible.” The key distinction is that Davis opened the door by testifying about his silence, making it a contested issue of fact. The court concluded that, “Given these circumstances, the mistrial demanded by defendant was in no event required.”

  • People v. Davis, 46 N.Y.2d 780 (1978): Admissibility of Statements to Show They Were Made, Not for Their Truth

    People v. Davis, 46 N.Y.2d 780 (1978)

    Testimony offered to prove that a statement was made, rather than to prove the truth of its content, is not considered hearsay and is admissible.

    Summary

    In a case where the defendants claimed the victim’s wife shot him during a struggle after he yelled, “Shoot the bastards,” the trial court erred in excluding the defendants’ version of the events. The Court of Appeals held that this testimony was not hearsay because it was offered to show the statement was made, not to prove its truth. This error was not harmless, especially since the prosecution presented the wife’s version of the victim’s statement and argued that she wouldn’t have fired the gun under those circumstances. The Court emphasized that credibility is a jury function and that the court’s instruction to disregard the defendants’ statements could not be ignored.

    Facts

    The defendants were involved in an incident where the victim was shot by his wife. The defendants claimed that during a struggle, the victim yelled to his wife, “Shoot the bastards.” This statement was central to the defense, suggesting the wife shot the victim during the altercation and not as part of any premeditated plan by the defendants.

    Procedural History

    The trial court excluded the defendant’s testimony about the victim’s statement, ruling it inadmissible. The Appellate Division’s orders were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s orders, finding the trial court’s exclusion of the testimony was prejudicial error.

    Issue(s)

    Whether testimony offered to evidence that a statement was made, rather than to prove the truth of its content, constitutes hearsay and is therefore inadmissible.

    Holding

    No, because testimony offered not for the truth of its content but to evidence the fact that the statement was made is not hearsay.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the defendants’ version of the events was crucial to their defense. The victim’s alleged statement to his wife, “Shoot the bastards,” was offered to demonstrate the circumstances of the shooting, not to prove the truth of the statement itself. The court emphasized that excluding this testimony was prejudicial because it prevented the jury from fully considering the defendants’ account of what happened. The court stated, “Testimony offered not for the truth of its content but to evidence the fact that the statement was made is not hearsay.” The court also noted that the prosecution presented the wife’s version of the victim’s statement, which made the exclusion of the defendant’s version even more prejudicial. The court stated that credibility is a jury function, and the inconsistencies in the wife’s testimony made the error in excluding defendant’s version not harmless. Even though the defendants had, in some instances, answered questions designed to elicit the excluded statements before the Trial Judge ruled, the court found that the jurors would not disregard the Trial Judge’s instruction that they could not consider those statements in reaching their verdict.

  • People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 663 (1977): Prohibition and Mandamus in Criminal Cases

    People v. Davis, 43 N.Y.2d 663 (1977)

    Prohibition and mandamus do not lie to review errors of law in pending criminal actions, even if those errors are egregious and unreviewable by direct appeal.

    Summary

    In an Attica-related criminal prosecution, the trial court granted the defendants more peremptory jury challenges than allowed by statute. The prosecution sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from exceeding its statutory authority. The New York Court of Appeals held that prohibition (and mandamus) are extraordinary remedies that do not lie to correct mere errors of law in criminal cases, even if those errors are unreviewable on appeal. Allowing such collateral review would create undue delays and undermine the policy of limiting appeals in criminal matters.

    Facts

    Two inmates were charged with murder stemming from the Attica prison riot. Prior to jury selection, the defendants moved for an order allowing them more than the 20 peremptory challenges prescribed by CPL 270.25. The trial court granted the defendants 30 peremptory challenges and denied the People an equal increase. The prosecution argued that the trial court’s action was without statutory authority and violated precedent. The prosecution also argued that the ruling would never be reviewable on appeal due to statutory limitations on appeals in criminal actions.

    Procedural History

    The People commenced an Article 78 proceeding seeking a writ of prohibition to prevent the trial court from granting the defendants more peremptory challenges than statutorily allowed. The Appellate Division granted the People’s petition. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether prohibition or mandamus under CPLR article 78 may lie to undo what may be assumed to be an egregious error of law in a criminal action, and which, for the purposes of the present review, may also be assumed to have been prejudicial to the rights of the People.

    Holding

    No, because the extraordinary remedies of prohibition and mandamus do not lie to correct errors of law in pending criminal actions, even if those errors are egregious and unreviewable by direct appeal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that prohibition and mandamus are extraordinary remedies available only where there is a clear legal right, and in the case of prohibition, only when a court acts without jurisdiction or exceeds its authorized powers. Errors of law, even if verbalized as excesses of jurisdiction, are not a proper basis for using the extraordinary writ. Nonreviewability by appeal alone does not provide a basis for collateral review via prohibition or mandamus. The court emphasized that the right of review by appeal in criminal matters is determined exclusively by statute, reflecting a policy to limit appellate proliferation and ensure speedy trials. Allowing collateral proceedings to review errors of law would lead to undue delays and frustrate the efficient administration of justice. The Court distinguished cases where prohibition or mandamus were appropriate, noting that those cases involved an unlawful use or abuse of the entire criminal action, as opposed to an error within the proceeding related to its proper purpose. The court warned that allowing such proceedings would “make speedy trial a legal impossibility.”