People v. Daniel, 48 N.Y.2d 302 (1979)

When a confidential informant, once under the control of law enforcement, becomes unavailable, the prosecution must make diligent efforts to produce the informant for the defense, but dismissal of the charges is only warranted if the defendant demonstrates the informant’s testimony would likely be exculpatory or create reasonable doubt.

Summary

Defendants Daniel and Jenkins were convicted of narcotics sales. A confidential informant, Pat Adams, was involved in the case but moved to Florida with the DEA’s assistance due to safety concerns. The defendants sought the informant’s production at trial, which the court denied. The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the prosecution had a duty to produce the unavailable informant. The court held that while the prosecution has a duty to make diligent efforts to produce a former informant, dismissal of charges is only required if the defendant demonstrates that the informant’s testimony would likely be exculpatory or significantly impeach the prosecution’s case. The court found the defendants failed to meet this burden.

Facts

Defendants Daniel and Jenkins were tried together on charges stemming from the same narcotics sale. Pat Adams, a confidential informant, played a role in the events leading to their arrest.
During cross-examination, the informant’s identity was revealed. It was also revealed that she had relocated to Florida with a plane ticket provided by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) due to safety concerns. Adams later disappeared after arriving in Florida.

Procedural History

The defendants requested the production of the informant at trial. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendants were convicted.
The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to determine the extent of the prosecution’s duty to produce the informant.

Issue(s)

Whether the People are required to produce a confidential informant who was once under their control but has become unavailable through no bad faith on the part of the prosecution, or, in the alternative, forfeit their case against the defendants?

Holding

No, because while the People have a duty to make diligent efforts to produce a former informant, dismissal of charges or a new trial is only required if the defendant demonstrates the informant’s testimony would likely be exculpatory or create reasonable doubt as to the reliability of the prosecution’s case.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals acknowledged the defendant’s rights to confrontation, due process, and fairness, as previously articulated in People v. Goggins. However, the court also recognized that the People should not be penalized when an informant disappears on their own initiative after being released from government control.
The court distinguished the case from situations involving bad faith removal of a witness by the prosecution, inadequate efforts to locate a missing witness, or the suppression of exculpatory evidence.
The court established a higher burden for the defendant in cases where diligent efforts have been made to locate the informant. In such cases, the defendant must demonstrate that the informant’s testimony would likely be favorable to the defense by tending to exculpate the defendant or by creating a doubt as to the reliability of the prosecution’s case. The court referenced United States v. Agurs and Brady v. Maryland, applying a similar standard used for non-testimonial exculpatory evidence.
The court emphasized, “if it is demonstrated that the prosecutor once had the informant under his control and was responsible for his disappearance, there should be a duty to produce and if this be impossible of accomplishment, then he may be faced with dismissal of the charge, or a new trial may be appropriate. However, if the prosecutor exerts reasonable good faith efforts to make the witness available, then neither dismissal of the charges may be ordered nor a new trial directed unless the defendant demonstrates affirmatively that the testimony of the informant was not only relevant but also that it is likely to have been favorable to some degree in tending to exculpate the defendant or, alternatively, he must show the existence of a significant likelihood that the witness’ testimony could be impeached to a meaningful degree creating a doubt as to the reliability of the prosecutor’s case.”
The court found that the defendants failed to satisfy the higher burden of demonstrating that the informant’s testimony would tend to be exculpatory or weaken the prosecution’s case. For example, regarding defendant Jenkins, the court noted, “there was only minimal contact between Jenkins and the informer and it is not alleged in what manner the testimony of Miss Adams could have assisted him in demonstrating his lack of knowledge of the nature of the transaction in which he was concededly engaged.”