People v. Dais, 19 N.Y.3d 337 (2012)
In resentencing proceedings under the Drug Law Reform Act of 2009 (DLRA), both the prosecution and the defendant can litigate de novo whether the defendant’s prior felony conviction was for a violent felony, regardless of prior predicate felony adjudications.
Summary
These consolidated appeals address whether, in a resentencing proceeding under the 2009 Drug Law Reform Act, the prosecution can introduce a new predicate felony statement alleging a prior violent felony (People v. Dais), or whether the defendant can challenge the nonviolent designation of a prior felony (People v. Stanley). The New York Court of Appeals held that a de novo review of whether a defendant’s prior felony was violent or nonviolent is proper in a 2009 DLRA resentencing proceeding. This ruling ensures that resentencing reflects the distinction between violent and non-violent offenders as intended by the DLRA.
Facts
In People v. Dais, Dais was originally sentenced as a second felony offender based on a prior nonviolent drug offense. He later sought resentencing under the 2009 DLRA. The prosecution then sought to introduce a prior violent felony (robbery) to enhance his sentence. In People v. Stanley, Stanley was originally sentenced as a second felony offender. He later sought resentencing and tried to challenge the classification of a prior Florida robbery conviction as equivalent to a New York violent felony.
Procedural History
In Dais, the Supreme Court allowed the prosecution to file the new predicate felony statement, and the Appellate Division affirmed. In Stanley, the Supreme Court resentenced Stanley as a second felony offender with a prior violent felony. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that Stanley was not entitled to a de novo determination of his predicate felony status. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals.
Issue(s)
- Whether, in a resentencing proceeding under the 2009 DLRA, the prosecution can introduce a new predicate felony statement to demonstrate that the defendant has a prior violent felony conviction, despite the defendant previously being adjudicated a second felony offender based on a nonviolent felony.
- Whether, in a resentencing proceeding under the 2009 DLRA, the defendant can challenge whether a prior felony conviction was for a nonviolent felony, even if it was not challenged in the original sentencing.
Holding
- Yes, because the 2009 DLRA directs resentencing courts to resentence eligible individuals in accordance with Penal Law § 70.70, which distinguishes between violent and nonviolent prior felonies.
- Yes, because the ameliorative purpose of the 2009 DLRA is to ensure that second felony drug offenders with prior nonviolent felonies receive potentially more lenient sentences than those who have a history of violent felonies.
Court’s Reasoning
The Court of Appeals reasoned that the 2009 DLRA, in conjunction with Penal Law § 70.70, requires a distinction between second felony drug offenders with prior violent felonies and those with prior nonviolent felonies. The court emphasized CPL 400.21(2), which mandates that the prosecution file a predicate felony statement indicating whether a prior felony conviction was violent when such information is available. The court noted that prior to the 2004 DLRA, there was no distinction made regarding the violent nature of the predicate felony, which incentivized a de novo review in resentencing proceedings. As the Court stated, “[w]hen information available to the court or to the people prior to sentencing for a felony indicates that the defendant may have previously been subjected to a predicate felony conviction . . . a statement must be filed by the prosecutor…setting forth…whether the predicate felony conviction was a violent felony”. Regarding Stanley, the Court held that he should have the opportunity to argue that his prior Florida convictions would not be considered violent felonies in New York for the purpose of resentencing. However, Stanley could not relitigate his basic predicate felony status.