New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Cunningham

  • People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980): Attachment of Right to Counsel Upon Retention

    People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980)

    When a suspect, even if not in custody, informs the police that they have retained an attorney and wish to have the attorney present during questioning, the right to counsel attaches, and any statements made in the absence of counsel are inadmissible.

    Summary

    Cunningham, a suspect in a homicide investigation, informed the police that he had retained an attorney and would report for questioning with his attorney. Upon arriving at the precinct without his attorney, he reiterated his desire to have his attorney present. The police, after informing him of his Miranda rights, proceeded to question him, eliciting inculpatory statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that Cunningham’s statements should have been suppressed because his right to counsel had attached when he informed the police he had retained an attorney and wished the attorney to be present, and this right could not be waived outside the presence of his counsel.

    Facts

    Police were investigating a homicide. Cunningham, a suspect, contacted the local precinct and said he would report for questioning accompanied by his attorney. Upon arrival, Cunningham inquired about his attorney’s presence and was informed the attorney had not yet arrived. Cunningham met with the officer in charge, informing him he was awaiting his attorney and providing the attorney’s business card. Despite this, the officer advised Cunningham of his Miranda rights and proceeded to question him, resulting in inculpatory statements.

    Procedural History

    Cunningham was convicted of manslaughter in the first degree. Before trial, Cunningham moved to suppress the statements he made at the precinct. The trial court denied the motion. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Cunningham appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s statements to police should have been suppressed because his right to counsel had attached when he informed the police he had retained an attorney and wished the attorney to be present during questioning, even though he was not in custody?

    Holding

    Yes, because the defendant adequately informed the police he had retained an attorney regarding the matter under investigation and wanted the attorney present during questioning; therefore, his right to counsel had attached and could not be waived in the absence of counsel.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that Cunningham’s actions clearly indicated that he had retained an attorney and wished the attorney to be present during questioning. This affirmative act to interpose an attorney between himself and the police triggered his right to counsel. The Court relied on its prior decision in People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, which established that once the right to counsel attaches, it cannot be waived in the absence of counsel. The Court found it immaterial that Cunningham’s attorney had not explicitly directed the police to cease interrogation, distinguishing it from the precise facts of Skinner. The crucial point was that Cunningham had clearly indicated he had an attorney and wanted that attorney present. The Court emphasized the importance of protecting a defendant’s right to counsel once it has been invoked, even outside the context of custodial interrogation. The Court stated, “Defendant’s acts adequately apprised the police that he had retained an attorney with respect to the matter under investigation and that he wished his attorney to be present during questioning… Inasmuch as defendant’s right to counsel had attached, and the right could not be waived in the absence of counsel, defendant’s statements made in response to the police interrogation were improperly obtained and should have been suppressed.” Although Skinner was decided after the trial court’s ruling, the Court applied it retroactively per People v. Pepper, 53 N.Y.2d 213. The Court did, however, uphold the admissibility of a spontaneous statement Cunningham made later while in a holding pen, finding no basis to disturb the lower courts’ finding that it was truly spontaneous.

  • People v. Cunningham, 54 N.Y.2d 813 (1981): Invocation of Right to Counsel Requires Suppression of Subsequent Statements

    People v. Cunningham, 54 N.Y.2d 813 (1981)

    A statement made by a defendant in custody who has invoked their right to counsel must be suppressed unless it is demonstrably spontaneous and not the product of any inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence, however subtle.

    Summary

    Cunningham was indicted for criminal possession of a weapon and criminal trespass. After being given Miranda warnings, he stated he did not wish to answer questions without an attorney. Subsequently, while at the precinct, an officer suggested that Cunningham’s aunt, the car’s registered owner, might be arrested. Cunningham then made a statement about finding the gun. The Court of Appeals held that the statement should have been suppressed because it was obtained after Cunningham invoked his right to counsel and was not spontaneous.

    Facts

    Cunningham was arrested and charged with criminal possession of a weapon and criminal trespass. After receiving Miranda warnings, Cunningham stated that he did not want to answer questions without an attorney present. While at the police precinct, and in Cunningham’s presence, one officer suggested to another that since Cunningham denied knowledge of the gun and the car was registered to his aunt, perhaps she should be arrested for possession of the weapon. Cunningham then stated that he had found the weapon in an abandoned car.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Cunningham’s motion to suppress the weapon and the statement, finding the statement voluntary and the seizure of the pistol lawful. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision without issuing an opinion. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a statement made by a defendant in custody, after invoking their right to counsel, is admissible if it is not spontaneous and is made following police conduct that could be construed as inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence.

    Holding

    No, because a statement made by a defendant in custody who has invoked their right to counsel must be suppressed unless it is in fact spontaneous and not the product of any inducement, provocation, encouragement, or acquiescence, no matter how subtle.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court reasoned that while the hearing judge found the statement voluntary in the sense that it was not the result of intimidation or coercion, the judge did not determine whether it was spontaneous. The court emphasized that “the spontaneity has to be genuine and not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed.” Since the statement was made after Cunningham invoked his right to counsel and was prompted by the officer’s remark about potentially arresting Cunningham’s aunt, it could not be considered spontaneous. As such, the statement was inadmissible and should have been suppressed. The court cited People v. Maerling, stating that “the spontaneity has to be genuine and not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed.” The Court also noted that even though the right to counsel issue was not raised in the lower courts, it is so fundamental that the court could consider it.

  • People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980): Right to Counsel After Request

    People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980)

    Once a suspect in custody requests the assistance of counsel, they may not be questioned further in the absence of an attorney, and any subsequent uncounseled waiver of constitutional rights will not be deemed voluntary.

    Summary

    Frederick Cunningham was convicted of second-degree murder. A key piece of evidence was a statement he gave to police after invoking his right to counsel. Cunningham initially agreed to speak with police but then requested an attorney. Later, he initiated contact with the police and, after speaking with his wife, waived his rights and made incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding that once a suspect in custody requests counsel, any subsequent waiver made outside the presence of an attorney is invalid. The court reasoned that this rule protects the individual’s right against self-incrimination and ensures a knowing and voluntary waiver.

    Facts

    Frederick Cunningham was arrested at his home at 7:00 p.m. on March 7, 1975, and taken to police headquarters. He was given Miranda warnings and initially agreed to speak with the police, but did not provide any incriminating information. Around 10:30 p.m., after being formally arrested and re-Mirandized, Cunningham stated he would not sign a waiver and wanted to consult an attorney. The police ceased questioning and booked him. At 1:30 a.m., Cunningham called the police to his cell stating he wished to make a statement. He was given Miranda warnings again, but again declined to sign a waiver, reiterating his desire for counsel. As police were returning him to his cell, he saw his wife, conferred with her, and then stated he would speak without an attorney. He then signed a waiver and made incriminating statements.

    Procedural History

    Cunningham moved to suppress the statement, arguing it was involuntary. The trial court denied the motion, finding the statement voluntary. Cunningham was convicted of second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a suspect in custody, who has invoked the right to counsel, may validly waive that right and make admissible statements to police in the absence of an attorney.

    Holding

    No, because once a suspect in custody requests the assistance of counsel, any subsequent uncounseled waiver of their constitutional rights is not deemed voluntary under New York State’s constitutional and statutory guarantees.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized New York State’s strong protection of the right to counsel, holding that it includes the right to advice of counsel before deciding to waive the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to an attorney. The court distinguished between situations where formal adversary proceedings have commenced (e.g., indictment, arraignment) and where a suspect has retained counsel. The court extended its existing protections, stating that even if a suspect has not yet secured an attorney but requests one, they are “expressing] his own view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice.” The court explicitly rejected the idea that the right to counsel should depend on whether a defendant had a prior relationship with an attorney. To hold otherwise would disadvantage those who are not affluent or have not previously required legal assistance. Therefore, once the right to counsel is invoked, all guarantees implicit in that right come into play, and a subsequent waiver outside the presence of counsel is invalid. The court stated: “[W]e reaffirm our position that the right to counsel in this State includes the right of an accused to have the advice of counsel before making the decision to waive either his privilege against self incrimination or his right to the assistance of an attorney, so that once a defendant in custody invokes his right to counsel, all of the guarantees implicit in that right are brought into play, and a subsequent waiver of rights outside the presence of counsel cannot be given legal effect.”

  • People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980): Right to Counsel Must Be Scrupulously Honored After Invocation

    People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980)

    Once a suspect in custody unequivocally requests the assistance of counsel, both the police and the prosecutor have a duty to scrupulously honor that request and refrain from further questioning until counsel is provided; a subsequent waiver of rights obtained without honoring the initial request is invalid.

    Summary

    Cunningham, while in police custody, explicitly refused to make a statement without an attorney. Instead of assisting him in obtaining counsel, the police returned him to a holding pen. Several hours later, after some cooperation from Cunningham, they obtained a waiver of his rights and proceeded with questioning. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the plea, and granted the motion to suppress, holding that Cunningham’s initial request for counsel was not scrupulously honored, rendering the subsequent waiver invalid, even if the error wasn’t adequately preserved at trial.

    Facts

    The defendant, Cunningham, was in police custody and being questioned by an Assistant District Attorney. During the questioning, Cunningham explicitly stated that he would not make a statement without the presence of an attorney. Instead of assisting Cunningham in obtaining legal representation, the police returned him to a holding pen. Hours later, after the defendant cooperated to some extent, the police sought and obtained a waiver of his rights, and continued questioning him.

    Procedural History

    The defendant entered a plea, presumably based on evidence obtained during the questioning. The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division, vacated the plea, and granted the motion to suppress the evidence obtained during the questioning. The case was remitted to the Supreme Court, Bronx County, for further proceedings.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police and prosecutor scrupulously honored the defendant’s right to counsel when, after the defendant refused to make a statement without an attorney, they failed to assist him in obtaining counsel and instead obtained a waiver of his rights hours later.

    Holding

    No, because the police and prosecutor became duty bound not to question defendant without first scrupulously honoring his right to counsel. The police failed to do so by not taking steps to assist defendant in obtaining counsel and instead obtaining a waiver of his rights hours later.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on established precedent holding that when a defendant in custody requests counsel, the police and prosecutor have a duty to scrupulously honor that request. The Court emphasized that this duty requires more than simply ceasing questioning temporarily. It necessitates actively assisting the defendant in obtaining legal representation, or at the very least, refraining from any actions that undermine the defendant’s ability to secure counsel. The court found that merely returning Cunningham to a holding pen after he invoked his right to counsel, and then later obtaining a waiver, did not meet the standard of “scrupulously honoring” his request. The court stated, “In these circumstances, it cannot be said that defendant’s refusal to answer questions without the aid of counsel was scrupulously honored.” The Court also noted that a violation of the right to counsel may be reviewed even in the absence of a formal objection at trial, underscoring the fundamental importance of protecting this right.

  • People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980): Re-Interrogation After Invocation of Right to Counsel

    People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980)

    Once a suspect in custody invokes their right to counsel, police must scrupulously honor that request, and cannot resume interrogation about the same crime shortly thereafter without counsel present, even if Miranda rights are re-administered.

    Summary

    Cunningham was arrested for attempted burglary with two others. After initially being questioned without Miranda warnings, he invoked his right to counsel. Shortly after, a different officer re-initiated questioning about the same crime, obtained incriminating statements, and a written confession after confronting Cunningham with a co-defendant’s statement. The New York Court of Appeals held that the confession was inadmissible because the police failed to scrupulously honor Cunningham’s prior request for counsel. This case clarifies the obligations of law enforcement following a suspect’s invocation of their right to counsel during custodial interrogation.

    Facts

    Cunningham was arrested with Harvey and Eason for attempted burglary. At the time of his arrest, the police seized evidence from their car and obtained statements from Cunningham without advising him of his Miranda rights. Later, at the police station, after being advised of his rights, Cunningham stated he wanted an attorney and did not wish to answer questions without counsel. The initial questioning ceased, and he was allowed to call his mother and ask her to contact an attorney.

    Procedural History

    Cunningham moved to suppress his statements and the physical evidence. The County Court suppressed statements made before Miranda warnings but denied the rest of the motion. Cunningham pleaded guilty to criminal facilitation. The Appellate Term reversed, set aside the plea, and suppressed the confession. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a confession obtained after a suspect invokes the right to counsel, but is subsequently re-interrogated shortly thereafter about the same crime without counsel present, is admissible, when police briefly complied with the request but then resumed questioning and confronted the suspect with a co-defendant’s statement?

    Holding

    No, because the police did not scrupulously honor Cunningham’s request for counsel before re-initiating interrogation about the same criminal offense.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that when a defendant invokes their right to counsel, Miranda imposes additional obligations on the police, beyond simply advising the defendant of their rights. While the police briefly complied with Cunningham’s request by terminating the interrogation and allowing him to attempt to contact a lawyer, they almost immediately re-initiated questioning about the same crime before he had an opportunity to consult with counsel and without re-advising him of his rights. Confronting Cunningham with Harvey’s statement was coercive, designed to induce him to change his mind and respond to questioning without an attorney. The court emphasized that “[t]his type of conduct cannot be said to be consistent with the obligation of the police to scrupulously honor the defendant’s request for counsel and his refusal to answer questions about the attempted burglary without an attorney’s assistance.” The court distinguished this situation from a permissible break in questioning. This case underscores the importance of respecting a suspect’s right to counsel once invoked, preventing immediate resumption of interrogation on the same matter.

  • People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980): The Effect of Requesting Counsel Through a Third Party

    People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203 (1980)

    When a suspect indicates a desire for an attorney to a third party in the presence of law enforcement, that constitutes a sufficient invocation of the right to counsel, and subsequent interrogation without honoring that request renders any waiver of rights invalid.

    Summary

    Cunningham was arrested as a suspect in a rape investigation. During his arrest, Cunningham asked his supervisor, in the presence of police officers, to call his wife and lawyer. After arriving at the police station and receiving Miranda warnings, Cunningham waived his rights and made incriminating statements. The New York Court of Appeals held that the statements were inadmissible because Cunningham’s request for counsel, even though made to a third party, was made in the presence of the police, and therefore triggered the requirement that interrogation cease until counsel was present. The court emphasized that once a suspect requests an attorney, any subsequent waiver obtained through immediate police action is invalid.

    Facts

    Police officers arrived at the Masonic Home where Cunningham worked, as he was a suspect in a rape investigation. Cunningham refused to enter the police car, leading to a struggle. During the struggle, Cunningham requested that his supervisor call his wife and lawyer, in the presence of the officers. After this request, Cunningham ceased resisting and was taken to police headquarters. Upon arrival, he was informed of his Miranda rights, waived them, and made incriminating statements.

    Procedural History

    The County Court denied Cunningham’s motion to suppress his statements. He was subsequently convicted, upon a guilty plea, of attempted rape and sexual abuse. The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. Cunningham appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether a suspect’s request for an attorney made to a third party in the presence of police officers constitutes a sufficient invocation of the right to counsel.
    2. Whether a waiver of the right to counsel obtained shortly after the suspect’s request for counsel is valid.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because a request for counsel made to a third party in the presence of law enforcement is sufficient to invoke the right to counsel.
    2. No, because when a suspect requests an attorney, interrogation must cease, and a subsequent waiver obtained shortly thereafter is ineffective.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that Cunningham’s request for counsel, made to his supervisor in the presence of the police, was sufficient to trigger his right to have counsel present during questioning. The court emphasized that it would be an “absurd formality” to require the request to be made directly to the police when they were present during the request. The court cited Miranda v. Arizona, stating that if a suspect “indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.” The court distinguished between asserting the right to remain silent and requesting an attorney, noting that once an attorney is requested, interrogation must cease. While a suspect can make a spontaneous admission or voluntarily change their mind, this was not the case here. “For the same underlying reason—that a waiver must be voluntary—we now hold that when a suspect makes known his desire for an attorney at the time of his arrest, upon reaching the station house the police may not immediately and actively seek a waiver of this right and then proceed to interrogate him in the absence of counsel.” The court found that the police violated Cunningham’s constitutional rights by immediately seeking a waiver and commencing questioning without honoring his request for counsel, rendering his subsequent statements inadmissible.