New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Couser

  • People v. Couser, 37 N.Y.3d 370 (2021): Consecutive Sentences for Robbery and Attempted Robbery; Concurrent Sentencing for Felony Murder

    People v. Couser, 37 N.Y.3d 370 (2021)

    Under New York law, consecutive sentences for robbery and attempted robbery are only permissible if the acts constituting the crimes are separate and distinct; sentencing for felony murder must run concurrently with the underlying felony.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed two consolidated appeals concerning sentencing for robbery and attempted robbery, and for attempted felony murder. In the first appeal, the court considered whether consecutive sentences were permissible where a defendant committed both a completed robbery and several attempted robberies. The court held that because the taking of the victim’s purse was not a separate and distinct act of force, the sentences for robbery and attempted robbery must run concurrently. In the second appeal, the court addressed whether the sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder could run consecutively to the sentences imposed on the underlying felonies. The court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that a concurrent sentence was required. The court rejected the People’s argument that the attempted felony murder sentence could run consecutively to the sentences imposed on the underlying felony.

    Facts

    In the first appeal, the defendant was convicted of robbery in the first degree and three counts of attempted robbery in the first degree. During the commission of the crimes, the defendant displayed what appeared to be a firearm and demanded money from the victims. One victim, complying with the defendant’s demands, placed her purse on the ground, which the defendant then directed his accomplice to take. The People sought consecutive sentences for the robbery and the attempted robberies, arguing that the taking of the purse constituted a separate act. In the second appeal, the defendant was also convicted of attempted first-degree felony murder. The People did not specify which underlying felony supported this charge.

    Procedural History

    The trial court sentenced the defendant to consecutive sentences for the robbery and attempted robberies. The Appellate Division modified the sentence, ruling that concurrent sentences were required. In the second appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, where they were consolidated.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s act of taking a victim’s purse authorized consecutive sentences for robbery and attempted robbery.
    2. Whether the sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder should run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony.

    Holding

    1. No, because the taking of the purse was not a separate and distinct act, the sentences must run concurrently.
    2. Yes, a sentence for attempted first-degree felony murder must run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the first issue, the court relied on the New York Penal Law § 70.25 (2) which states that sentences imposed for multiple offenses committed through a single act or omission must run concurrently. The court also discussed the two-part test established in People v. Laureano, 87 N.Y.2d 640 (1996), determining whether consecutive sentences are permissible. The court found that the statutory elements of attempted robbery and robbery overlapped, and there was no separate and distinct act of force to warrant consecutive sentences. The taking of the purse was part of the same act of displaying a firearm to commit the robbery, and thus not a separate act. The court cited the case People v. Ramirez, 89 N.Y.2d 444 (1996) to support its conclusion that the mere taking of property, even through separate movements, did not justify consecutive sentences in this scenario. Regarding the second issue, the court held that, as a matter of law, a sentence imposed for attempted first-degree felony murder must run concurrently with the sentence imposed on the underlying felony. The court cited previous case law and statutory interpretation to support this. As the People could have corrected their failure to specify the underlying felony, the defendant’s plea was deemed rational and valid. The court emphasized that “it is the acts of the defendant, and not the intent with which he or she acted, that control for consecutive sentencing purposes.”

    Practical Implications

    This case provides guidance for practitioners on when consecutive sentences are permissible in New York. It clarifies the requirements for separate and distinct acts in robbery and attempted robbery cases. Lawyers should be mindful that a single act of force or threat of force that accomplishes the taking of multiple items of property from different individuals, or multiple attempts to rob multiple individuals, does not permit consecutive sentences. This case also affirms the long-standing rule that sentences for felony murder and the underlying felony should run concurrently. It also underscores the importance of properly charging and specifying underlying felonies in indictments, particularly in the context of plea bargains. The failure to specify the underlying felony will result in concurrent sentences for the felony murder and underlying felony charges.

  • People v. Couser, 94 N.Y.2d 633 (2000): Defining “Commanded” in Accomplice Liability for First-Degree Murder

    People v. Couser, 94 N.Y.2d 633 (2000)

    The term “commanded” in the context of accomplice liability for first-degree murder, as defined in New York Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(vii), is not unconstitutionally vague because it has a commonly understood meaning: to direct authoritatively.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether the term “commanded,” as used in the first-degree murder statute regarding accomplice liability, is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause. Couser, while incarcerated, allegedly “commanded” Stanback to murder a material witness. The court held that the term “commanded” has a commonly accepted meaning, “to direct authoritatively,” and thus is not unconstitutionally vague. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, allowing the murder count against Couser to proceed to trial, finding sufficient evidence was presented to the grand jury to support the indictment.

    Facts

    Defendant Couser, while in jail, allegedly “commanded” James Stanback to murder a material witness in Syracuse. Stanback and others attempted to carry out the murder, but mistakenly killed a relative of the witness and shot others. A Grand Jury witness, associated with Couser and Stanback, testified that Stanback said he was going to Syracuse to “take care of something” for Couser. This witness also testified he knew Couser directed Stanback to gather people to go to Syracuse to carry out the plan. Later, while incarcerated with Couser, the witness testified Couser was upset the material witness wasn’t killed and instructed the witness to deny Stanback acted on Couser’s orders.

    Procedural History

    The County Court dismissed the second count of the indictment against Couser, finding the term “command” unconstitutionally vague. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the term has a commonly understood meaning and meets due process standards. The Appellate Division reinstated the second count and remitted for further proceedings. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the term “commanded” in Penal Law § 125.27(1)(a)(vii) is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
    2. Whether there was sufficient evidence presented to the Grand Jury that Couser commanded Stanback to commit the murders.

    Holding

    1. No, because the word “commanded” has a commonly accepted meaning: to direct authoritatively.
    2. Yes, because sufficient evidence was adduced before the Grand Jury to support the indictment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if it fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what conduct is prohibited or if it is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The Court relied on the common understanding of the word “command,” defining it as “to direct authoritatively”. The Court highlighted the Legislature’s specific use of “command” as distinct from other terms like “solicits,” “requests,” or “importunes,” indicating a deliberate choice to use a term with a distinct and understood meaning. The court also pointed to the lack of judicial interpretation of the term “command” over time, suggesting it is a term that is easily understood. Citing People v. Foley, 94 N.Y.2d 668, 681, the Court stated that a term is not impermissibly vague if it ” ‘conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.’ ” The Court rejected the argument that the death penalty’s involvement necessitates a stricter Eighth Amendment analysis, as the death penalty was no longer a possibility in this case. Finally, the Court determined that sufficient evidence was presented to the Grand Jury to establish that Couser commanded Stanback to commit the murders, satisfying the requirements for indictment.