New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Cosme

  • People v. Cosme, 80 N.Y.2d 790 (1992): Limits on Prosecution Appeals Based on Plea Agreements

    People v. Cosme, 80 N.Y.2d 790 (1992)

    A prosecutor cannot appeal a sentence solely to challenge the validity of the underlying conviction when the sentence itself is legal.

    Summary

    Cosme was convicted of burglary and resisting arrest. His conviction was vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel, after which the trial court accepted Cosme’s guilty plea over the People’s objection. The District Attorney sought a writ of prohibition, arguing the plea violated CPL 220.10(4)(a). After appeals and dismissal as moot, the People appealed the sentence imposed, challenging the underlying conviction’s validity. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s dismissal, holding that the People cannot use a sentencing appeal to challenge the validity of a conviction when the sentence itself is legal. The court emphasized that CPL 450.30(2) only allows appeals from illegal sentences, not illegal convictions.

    Facts

    Defendant Cosme was indicted on nine counts and convicted of burglary in the second degree and resisting arrest.
    Cosme’s motion to vacate his conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel was granted.
    The trial court then accepted Cosme’s guilty plea to burglary and resisting arrest, despite the People’s objection.

    Procedural History

    The District Attorney sought a writ of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the plea agreement, which was denied by the Appellate Division.
    The District Attorney’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was dismissed as moot because Cosme had already been sentenced.
    The People then appealed the sentence to the Appellate Division, arguing that the vacatur of the original conviction revived all counts of the indictment, requiring the District Attorney’s consent to a plea of guilty to less than the entire indictment.
    The Appellate Division dismissed the appeal, stating its focus was on the validity of the conviction, not the legality of the sentence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People can appeal a sentence when their true challenge concerns the validity of the underlying conviction, rather than the legality of the sentence itself.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 450.30(2) only allows the People to appeal from a sentence that is invalid as a matter of law, not from a conviction they believe to be invalid where the sentence itself is legal.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the scope of CPL 450.30(2), which authorizes the People to appeal a sentence that is invalid as a matter of law. The court noted that the People were not alleging the indeterminate sentence of four to eight years’ imprisonment was illegal for second-degree burglary and resisting arrest. Instead, the People were challenging the trial judge’s decision to accept Cosme’s plea over the prosecutor’s objection. The court stated, “Thus, in the guise of challenging the sentence imposed, the People are in essence attacking the validity of the defendant’s underlying conviction. This the statute does not permit them to do.”
    The court interpreted the statute narrowly, preventing the People from using a sentencing appeal as a backdoor to challenge a conviction’s validity. The decision underscores the importance of adhering to statutory limits on appeal rights. It also highlights the policy consideration of finality in criminal proceedings. Once a legal sentence is imposed, the prosecution’s opportunity to challenge the underlying conviction is limited. The ruling prevents the prosecution from circumventing restrictions on appealing convictions by framing their arguments as challenges to the sentence.

  • People v. Cosme, 48 N.Y.2d 286 (1979): Consent to Search by Co-Occupant

    48 N.Y.2d 286 (1979)

    When premises are jointly occupied, one co-occupant can consent to a search of the shared areas, and that consent is valid even if another co-occupant is present and objects to the search.

    Summary

    Cosme was convicted of criminal possession of a controlled substance. The police searched his apartment based on his fiancée’s consent, who also lived there, even though Cosme objected. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that when two individuals share a common right of access to property, either can consent to a search, and the other’s objection does not invalidate that consent. The court reasoned that co-occupants assume the risk that one of them might permit the common area to be searched.

    Facts

    Meyrle Hennessey, Cosme’s fiancée, called the police and reported that Cosme was storing a gun and cocaine in their shared apartment. Hennessey, who had been drinking, met the police outside the apartment, gave them a key, and explained how to disable the alarm. Upon entering, the police found Cosme and a companion. Despite Cosme’s protests, the police searched the apartment, finding a gun and cocaine in a bedroom closet shared by Cosme and Hennessey.

    Procedural History

    Cosme moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search was illegal because it lacked probable cause and his consent. The trial court denied the motion, finding Hennessey had the authority to consent based on her joint occupancy and access. Cosme pleaded guilty to a reduced charge after the denial of his suppression motion. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction, leading to this appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a co-occupant’s consent to a search of jointly occupied premises is valid when another co-occupant is present and expressly refuses to consent to the search.

    Holding

    Yes, because when individuals share common authority over premises, any one of them has the right to permit a search, and the others assume the risk that this might occur.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the agency theory, which posits that one co-tenant can waive another’s constitutional rights solely because they share an interest in the property. Instead, the court relied on the principle that an individual lacking exclusive control over premises has no reasonable expectation of privacy there. Quoting United States v. Matlock, the court stated that the authority to consent “rests…on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.” By giving Hennessey an unrestricted right to share the bedroom closet, Cosme assumed the risk that she would authorize a search. The court explicitly stated that a co-occupant has no constitutional ground for complaint when a co-occupant consents to a search. Since Hennessey had common authority over the apartment and voluntarily consented, Cosme’s objections were ineffective. The court did not address whether probable cause existed or if exigent circumstances were present, as Hennessey’s consent was sufficient to justify the search. The court also did not express an opinion on areas of exclusive use within a shared dwelling.