6 N.Y.3d 231 (2005)

A trial court has discretion to limit cross-examination of a witness when the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the risk of confusing the jury, misleading them, or causing undue prejudice, and where the witness’s bias has been explored through other means.

Summary

Norcott Corby was convicted of murder and robbery. On appeal, he argued that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of the prosecution’s primary witness, Xanderia Burnett, regarding the circumstances under which she implicated him in the crime. Corby contended this violated his right to confront witnesses. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in limiting the cross-examination because the potential for jury confusion and speculation outweighed the probative value, and the witness’s bias and motive to lie were already evident to the jury through other testimony.

Facts

Corby paid Burnett to use her apartment for a drug transaction. While awaiting the arrival of heroin from San Francisco, Burnett saw Corby with a handgun. Yousef Mohammed arrived with the heroin and visited Burnett’s apartment. Later, Corby, along with others, went to Mohammed’s hotel, retrieved heroin, and returned to Burnett’s apartment. Burnett witnessed Corby and others entering a bedroom, after which she found Mohammed dead. The group, including Burnett, disposed of the body. Initially, Burnett denied knowledge of the murder to the police. Later, after Corby suggested to the DEA that Burnett was involved in Mohammed’s murder, police told Burnett that Corby had implicated her. Burnett then implicated Corby and others.

Procedural History

Corby was convicted of murder and robbery in Supreme Court. He appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly limited his cross-examination of Burnett. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. A dissenting Justice granted Corby permission to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court abused its discretion and violated the defendant’s right to confront witnesses by precluding cross-examination of the prosecution’s primary witness regarding the circumstances under which she implicated the defendant, specifically, that she only did so after being told the defendant had implicated her in the same crime?

Holding

No, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion as a matter of law, and no constitutional violation occurred. The potential for jury confusion and speculation outweighed the probative value of the evidence, and the witness’s bias and motive to lie were already evident to the jury.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the right to cross-examine witnesses is not absolute and that trial courts have discretion to determine the scope of cross-examination. This discretion involves weighing the probative value of evidence against the possibility of jury confusion, misleading the jury, or causing undue prejudice. The court cited People v Williams, 81 NY2d 303, 313 (1993), stating that an accused’s right to cross-examine witnesses is not absolute. The Court stated that the defendant had been given wide latitude to show Burnett’s motive to lie, noting that Burnett’s testimony established her presence at the scene of the crime, her assistance in disposing of the body, and her initial denial of any knowledge of the murder. Further, other evidence implicated Corby, including phone records and notes found in Mohammed’s hotel room linking him to Burnett’s apartment.

The court distinguished the case from People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40 (1988), which held that evidence of a witness’s bias is never collateral. The court stated, “[i]f bias or interest has been fully explored through other means, or the precluded area involved cumulative matter already presented, there generally has been no infringement of the right of confrontation” (People v Chin, 67 NY2d 22, 29 [1986]). Here, additional evidence of bias would have been cumulative and of little probative value. A dissenting judge argued that precluding the cross-examination was a constitutional violation. However, the majority concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope of cross-examination under the circumstances.