New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Cohen

  • People v. Cohen, 90 N.Y.2d 632 (1997): Interrogation Tactics & Right to Counsel

    People v. Cohen, 90 N.Y.2d 632 (1997)

    When police question a suspect about a crime for which they know the suspect has retained counsel, any confession obtained, even regarding an unrelated crime, is inadmissible if the questioning on the represented crime was not discrete or fairly separable from the questioning on the unrepresented crime and was purposely exploited to elicit statements on the unrelated matter.

    Summary

    Cohen was a suspect in a garage burglary. He had retained counsel regarding the burglary. Later, Cohen was arrested and interrogated about a robbery-murder at a Citgo station. Police knew Cohen was represented on the burglary charge but questioned him about it anyway, intermingling questions about the burglary with questions about the robbery-murder. Cohen confessed to the robbery-murder. The New York Court of Appeals held that Cohen’s confession should have been suppressed because the police violated his right to counsel by questioning him about the burglary after he had retained counsel for that charge, and they exploited that violation to obtain the confession to the robbery-murder.

    Facts

    A Citgo station mini-mart was robbed, and the store clerk was murdered. Police recovered a bullet from the scene, determined to be from a .22 caliber older model gun. An informant, Mackrodt, told police that Cohen, along with codefendants McCulloch and Anderson, had shown him an older .22 caliber revolver, a .357 caliber revolver, and a third unidentified gun at McCulloch’s residence. Mackrodt further stated that Cohen, McCulloch, and Anderson had admitted to stealing these guns from Thompson’s Garage and were planning to rob the Citgo station.

    Procedural History

    Cohen was indicted for intentional and felony murder and robbery. He moved to suppress physical evidence and his confession, arguing the search warrant was invalid due to the informant’s arrest and that his confession violated his right to counsel. The County Court denied the motion. Cohen pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the informant’s arrest did not invalidate the warrant and that the two crimes were unrelated. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the search warrant was invalid based on the subsequent arrest of the informant, Mackrodt, for the Thompson’s Garage crimes.
    2. Whether Cohen’s confession should be suppressed because police questioned him about the Thompson’s Garage crimes after he had retained counsel for those crimes.

    Holding

    1. No, because the record lacks evidence that the investigator knowingly or recklessly disregarded evidence that Mackrodt participated in the Thompson’s Garage burglary and weapons theft when applying for the search warrant.
    2. Yes, because the police exploited their questioning regarding the Thompson’s Garage crimes, for which Cohen had retained counsel, to obtain his confession for the Citgo robbery-homicide.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the search warrant, the Court of Appeals held that the warrant was valid because there was no evidence that the investigator knew or recklessly disregarded evidence that Mackrodt was involved in the Thompson’s Garage burglary when applying for the warrant. The court emphasized that suppression is designed to deter deliberate falsity by law enforcement, not to impeach their sources.

    Regarding the confession, the Court of Appeals distinguished its prior cases involving police interrogation after the right to counsel had attached. The Court stated, “Our case law involving police interrogation of a suspect on the subject of one crime after the right to counsel had indelibly attached by the actual appearance of an attorney representing that suspect in another crime falls into two relevant categories.” First, the Court discussed cases where the two crimes are so closely related that questioning on one inevitably elicits incriminating responses on the other. Second, the Court discussed cases where the police are aware that the defendant is represented by counsel in one of the matters, and the interrogation entails questioning on the represented crime.

    The Court found this case fell into the second category. The Court emphasized that the Appellate Division used the wrong legal standard by focusing on whether the questions regarding the Thompson’s Garage crimes were the crucial element in securing Cohen’s confession, stating that the proper inquiry is whether the impermissible questioning was “discrete or fairly separable.” The Court also stated it was critical whether the police purposely “exploited concededly impermissible questioning” to get a confession in the unrepresented matter.

    The Court found that the police intentionally interfered with Cohen’s right to counsel, as they acknowledged knowing they had been instructed not to question him about the Thompson’s Garage crimes. Moreover, the questioning was completely interrelated. Therefore, the court concluded that the police exploited the questioning regarding the Thompson’s Garage crimes to add pressure on Cohen to confess to the Citgo robbery-homicide, and the confession should have been suppressed.

  • People v. Cohen, 58 N.Y.2d 844 (1983): Warrantless Re-entry and Search After Initial Consent

    People v. Cohen, 58 N.Y.2d 844 (1983)

    Once initial consent to enter premises is withdrawn or expires, subsequent re-entries by police without a warrant or valid emergency justification are unlawful, even during a homicide investigation.

    Summary

    Following a reversal of the defendant’s conviction due to evidentiary errors, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained during multiple searches of her home. The initial entry was consensual, but subsequent entries the following day were conducted without a warrant. The County Court granted the motion to suppress, finding no emergency justified the re-entries and that the initial consent did not extend to later searches. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that absent a warrant or valid emergency, the re-entry and subsequent search were unlawful, even in a homicide investigation.

    Facts

    Police officers initially entered the defendant’s home with her consent. The next morning, and on subsequent occasions, police re-entered the premises without obtaining a warrant. The defendant had been convicted, but that conviction was reversed due to evidentiary errors committed at trial.

    Procedural History

    The County Court initially convicted the defendant, but the Court of Appeals reversed the conviction (50 N.Y.2d 908). Upon remand, the defendant moved to suppress evidence obtained during the searches. The County Court granted the motion to suppress. The Appellate Division affirmed the County Court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals then reviewed the Appellate Division’s affirmance.

    Issue(s)

    Whether, absent a warrant or exigent circumstances, police re-entry into a home after an initial consensual entry is permissible solely on the basis that a homicide investigation is underway.

    Holding

    No, because absent a warrant, the re-entry was not sanctioned, without more, by the mere fact that a homicide was being investigated.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that the County Court had expressly found that the defendant’s consent to the initial entry did not extend to subsequent entries and that there was no emergency justifying the re-entry. These findings were supported by the record and affirmed by the Appellate Division, precluding further review by the Court of Appeals. The Court relied on Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, and People v. Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d 689, 694, to support its holding that a homicide investigation, without more, does not justify a warrantless search. The court stated: “absent a warrant, the re-entry was not sanctioned, without more, by the mere fact that a homicide was being investigated”. The court explicitly declined to rule on the County Court’s alternative theory regarding the defendant’s ability to waive her rights without counsel present after retaining counsel, emphasizing that the suppression order was justified based on the unlawful re-entry alone. The court noted that there was no abuse of discretion in entertaining the motion to suppress for the first time upon remand (cf. People v. Fuentes, 53 NY2d 892).

  • People v. Cohen, 52 N.Y.2d 584 (1981): Sufficiency of Indictment After Guilty Plea

    People v. Cohen, 52 N.Y.2d 584 (1981)

    A guilty plea waives any argument that an indictment fails to meet the requirements of CPL 200.50 or fails to give more detailed notice of the offense charged if the indictment is jurisdictionally sufficient.

    Summary

    Defendant Cohen pleaded guilty to failure to file New York State and local sales and use tax returns. On appeal, he argued that the indictment was fatally defective because it failed to allege the element of willfulness. The Court of Appeals held that the indictment was jurisdictionally sufficient because it specifically alleged the failure to file a New York State tax form and the violation of a specific statute. The court further held that any argument that the indictment failed to meet the requirements of CPL 200.50 or failed to give more detailed notice of the offense was waived by the guilty plea.

    Facts

    The defendant, Jerry Cohen, was indicted for grand larceny and failure to file New York State and local sales and use tax returns. The indictment stated that Cohen failed to file a New York State and Local Sales and Use Tax Return (Form ST-100) covering the operation of Plaza Health Clubs, Inc. for a specific period. Cohen pleaded guilty to one count of failure to file a tax return.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted after pleading guilty in the trial court. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the indictment was fatally defective for failure to allege willfulness.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a guilty plea waives the right to challenge the sufficiency of an indictment under CPL 200.50 when the indictment is jurisdictionally sound but allegedly lacks specific details.

    Holding

    Yes, because a guilty plea waives any argument that the indictment failed to meet the requirements of CPL 200.50 or provide more detailed notice of the offense charged, provided the indictment is jurisdictionally sufficient.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the indictment fulfilled the jurisdictional requirements because it specifically alleged the failure to file a New York State tax form and the violation of a designated statute (Tax Law § 1145(b)). The court noted that incorporating the statute by reference includes all elements of the crime, whether explicit in the statute or established by judicial interpretation. The court emphasized that the defendant could have moved to dismiss the indictment for failing to meet the requirements of CPL 200.50 or sought a bill of particulars. However, by pleading guilty, the defendant waived any arguments regarding the indictment’s deficiency in providing detailed notice. The court stated that “Any argument, however, that the indictment in this case was deficient as failing to meet the requirements of CPL 200.50 or as failing to give more detailed notice of the offense charged than that furnished by the jurisdictionally sufficient indictment was waived by defendant’s plea of guilty”. The court also pointed out that the multicount indictment indicated an intent to prove willfulness, further undermining the defendant’s claim of lack of notice. The defendant’s attempt to plead to “unwillful failure” which was rejected by the court further showed he was aware of the willfulness element. This case underscores the principle that a guilty plea generally admits all the elements of the crime and waives non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings. It also highlights the importance of raising objections to the indictment’s form or content before entering a plea.