Tag: People v. Chan

  • People v. Chan, 68 N.Y.2d 233 (1986): Witness’s Assertion of Privilege and Right to Confrontation

    People v. Chan, 68 N.Y.2d 233 (1986)

    When a witness invokes their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during cross-examination, the direct testimony need only be stricken if the refusal to answer pertains to matters directly related to the direct examination, thereby creating a substantial risk of prejudice to the defendant.

    Summary

    Peter Chan and Billy Chin were convicted of attempted murder. The key issue was whether their constitutional right to confront a witness (the victim, Robert Hu) was violated when Hu invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination during cross-examination. The New York Court of Appeals held that the defendants’ right to confrontation was not violated because the areas Hu refused to answer were either collateral to his direct testimony or were sufficiently explored through other means, and therefore the trial court did not err in declining to strike Hu’s direct testimony.

    Facts

    Robert Hu, leader of the Ghost Shadows gang, was the target of a shooting stemming from a gang war with the White Tigers, a rival gang formed by Nickie Louie, a former member of the Ghost Shadows. Chan and Chin were members of the White Tigers. Hu met with Louie, where Louie demanded Hu relinquish control of the Mott Street rackets. Hu refused and left. Outside the coffee shop, Chin was observed with a gun. Shots were fired, and Hu identified Chan and Chin as the shooters. Hu had an extensive criminal record and pending charges.

    Procedural History

    The defendants, Chan and Chin, were convicted of attempted murder in the second degree in the Supreme Court, New York County. The Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the judgments. The case was appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing a violation of the right to confrontation.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendants were denied their constitutional right to confront an adverse witness when that witness invoked his privilege against self-incrimination on cross-examination.

    Holding

    No, because the witness’s invocation of the privilege concerned matters that were either collateral to his direct examination or sufficiently explored through other evidence, and did not prejudice the defendants.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged the fundamental right to confront witnesses through cross-examination, but clarified that this right is not unlimited. A witness may invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The court distinguished between invoking the privilege on collateral matters (not requiring the striking of direct testimony) and invoking it on matters directly related to the direct examination (potentially requiring the striking of direct testimony). The court stated that “the ultimate question must be whether the defendant’s inability to test the accuracy of the witness’ direct examination has been such as to create a substantial risk of prejudice.” Here, the court found that the areas of inquiry that were foreclosed were either collateral or cumulative. The defense was able to cross-examine Hu about the events of the shooting. The defense argued five specific areas where cross-examination was improperly limited: Hu’s possible involvement in another gang member’s murder, promises or threats made to Hu by law enforcement, Hu’s participation in the coffee shop conversation, Hu’s leadership of the Ghost Shadows, and Hu’s involvement in a later shooting of defendant Chin. The court found that defendants had ample opportunity to advance their theories. As to possible promises or threats, Hu confirmed he had no agreements with the People, other than the immunity granted for his testimony. The court determined that “all collateral facts relevant to Hu’s bias, credibility, and motive were established through the cross-examination of Hu and through the testimony of other witnesses.” Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to strike Hu’s direct testimony. The court also noted that New York’s immunity statutes grant full transactional immunity, which may understandably make prosecutors reluctant to request immunity.