People v. Catalanotte, 67 N.Y.2d 15 (1986)

For purposes of determining whether a prior conviction “was unconstitutionally obtained” and thus may not be counted for predicate felony purposes, the proper inquiry is whether the conviction was obtained in violation of the defendant’s rights as defined by the law at the time of the conviction or by present law which is properly applied to it under recognized principles of retroactivity.

Summary

Catalanotte was convicted of attempted robbery and sentenced as a second felony offender. He challenged the use of a 1971 drug conviction as a predicate felony, arguing that the courtroom closure during his 1971 trial, a practice later deemed unconstitutional in People v. Jones, rendered the conviction invalid for enhancement purposes. The New York Court of Appeals held that the validity of a prior conviction for predicate felony purposes is determined by the law at the time it was entered, or by subsequent law applied retroactively. Because Catalanotte’s 1971 conviction was constitutional under the law at the time, and Jones was not retroactive, the conviction could be used as a predicate felony.

Facts

On March 5, 1971, Catalanotte, then a New York City police officer, sold heroin to an undercover officer.
Six days later, he was arrested and found to be in possession of heroin and methadone.
He was subsequently convicted of drug-related felonies.
During the trial, the court summarily closed the courtroom to the public before the undercover officer testified, citing the hazards to undercover officers. Catalanotte appealed, arguing a violation of his right to a public trial, but his conviction was affirmed.
In 1986, Catalanotte was convicted of attempted robbery.

Procedural History

Catalanotte was convicted in 1971; the Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed.
In 1986, he was convicted of attempted robbery and sentenced as a second felony offender based on the 1971 conviction. He objected to the predicate felony status. He moved to vacate the 1971 conviction, arguing that People v. Jones should be applied retroactively; the court denied the motion, and Catalanotte did not appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed the 1986 conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

Issue(s)

Whether a prior conviction, valid when obtained but based on procedures later deemed unconstitutional, can be used as a predicate felony for enhanced sentencing.

Holding

No, because the validity of a conviction for predicate felony purposes is determined by the law at the time of the conviction, or by subsequent law applied retroactively, and the rule announced in People v Jones was not retroactive.

Court’s Reasoning

The court reasoned that CPL 400.21(7)(b), which states that a prior conviction “obtained in violation of the rights of the defendant under the applicable provisions of the constitution of the United States must not be counted,” implies that the validity of the conviction is determined at the time it was entered. A conviction becomes unconstitutional only if it violated the defendant’s rights as defined by the law at the time or by subsequent law applicable under principles of retroactivity. The court emphasized that the predicate felony statute operates upon the prior conviction itself. The court stated that “[a]n unconstitutional conviction is, by definition, a conviction which was obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, i.e., his rights as defined by the law existing at the time the conviction was obtained or by subsequent law applicable to the judgment under principles of retroactivity. The conviction does not become unconstitutional merely because the law has changed subsequent to the defendant’s direct appeal of that conviction”.

The court distinguished People v. Love, where the prior conviction was vacated because it violated the defendant’s constitutional rights under the law at the time of the conviction. In Catalanotte’s case, his rights were respected under the law at the time of his 1971 conviction.

The court also addressed the implications of a contrary ruling, noting that retroactively applying changes in constitutional interpretation could jeopardize numerous convictions and sentences. “To apply such changes retroactively when the court has not declared them retroactive, may open to question hundreds of convictions and enhanced sentences based upon them”.