New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Carter

  • People v. Brown, Harris, and Carter, 22 N.Y.3d 744 (2014): Consecutive Sentences for Weapon Possession

    People v. Brown, 22 N.Y.3d 744 (2014)

    A defendant’s sentence for unlawful weapon possession can run consecutively to the sentence for a crime committed with the same weapon if the act of possessing the weapon was completed before the commission of the other crime.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether sentences for unlawful weapon possession should run consecutively or concurrently with sentences for other crimes committed using the same weapon. The New York Court of Appeals held that consecutive sentences are permissible if the act of possessing the weapon was completed before the defendant formed the intent to commit, or committed, the other crime. The Court reasoned that the crime of weapon possession is complete when the defendant knowingly and unlawfully possesses a loaded firearm, independent of any later use of the weapon. The court affirmed the consecutive sentences in People v. Brown and People v. Harris, and reversed the appellate division’s order in People v. Carter, finding consecutive sentencing was permissible in all three cases.

    Facts

    Thomas Brown: Brown argued with Bradford at a club, retrieved a gun from his van, followed Bradford to a McDonald’s, and shot him. Brown was convicted of second-degree murder and third-degree criminal possession of a weapon.
    Joseph Harris: Harris spoke with a group of people, including Lewis, for about 20 minutes before approaching Lewis and shooting him. He was convicted of attempted murder, assault, and criminal possession of a weapon.
    Darnell Carter: Carter was given a gun before entering a convenience store, where he spoke with acquaintances. He and others then chased and murdered Briggs. Carter was convicted of murder, robbery, criminal possession of a weapon, and criminal use of a firearm. He initially told police he went along for a robbery in case there was a fight.

    Procedural History

    Brown: Convicted in Supreme Court, consecutive sentences imposed. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
    Harris: Convicted in Supreme Court, consecutive sentences imposed. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
    Carter: Convicted in County Court, consecutive sentences imposed. The Appellate Division initially modified the sentence to run concurrently. On reargument, the Appellate Division affirmed the original sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendants’ sentences for “simple” knowing, unlawful possession of a loaded weapon should run consecutively to the sentences for other crimes committed with the same weapon, where the possession was not with the intent to use the weapon unlawfully against another.

    Holding

    Yes, because each defendant completed the crime of unlawful possession of a loaded weapon independently of their commission of the later crimes. The act of possession was separate and distinct from the act of using the weapon during the commission of the other crimes.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on Penal Law § 70.25 (2), which prohibits consecutive sentences when a single act constitutes two offenses, or when a single act constitutes one offense and a material element of another. The Court distinguished between cases involving “intent to use” weapon possession and “simple” possession. In “intent to use” cases, like People v. Wright, the focus is on when the defendant formed the intent to use the weapon unlawfully. In “simple” possession cases, the focus is on the separateness of acts. The Court explained that for “simple” possession, the mens rea is knowing unlawful possession of a loaded firearm. “So long as a defendant knowingly unlawfully possesses a loaded firearm before forming the intent to cause a crime with that weapon, the possessory crime has already been completed, and consecutive sentencing is permissible.”
    The court found that in Brown, Harris and Carter, the defendants possessed the guns before the commission of the other crimes. Brown had the gun in his van. Harris possessed the gun for at least 20 minutes before shooting Lewis. Carter was handed the gun before entering the convenience store. The Court emphasized the Legislature’s intent in creating the “simple” weapon possession crime was to toughen punishment for gun crimes, in order to address the problem of illegal guns on the streets. The Court distinguished People v. Sturkey, where the defendant seized a police officer’s gun during a scuffle; there, the subsequent robbery and possession charges arose from the same single act.

  • People v. Carter, 91 N.Y.2d 792 (1998): Validity of Pre-Arraignment Readiness Statements

    91 N.Y.2d 792 (1998)

    A statement of readiness for trial, made before the defendant’s arraignment, is valid if the People have completed all required actions to bring the case to trial and the arraignment and trial can occur within the statutory speedy trial period.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether the People’s pre-arraignment statement of readiness for trial was valid under CPL 30.30. The Court of Appeals held that the statement of readiness, made when the People had done everything required to bring the case to trial, tolled the speedy trial clock, even though the defendants had not yet been arraigned. The Court emphasized that the responsibility for securing the defendant’s appearance rests with the court, not the prosecution. The Court reversed the lower court’s dismissal of the indictment.

    Facts

    A felony complaint was filed against the defendants on May 31, 1995. The People sent letters to the defendants on November 16, 1995, notifying them of their right to testify before the grand jury; however, these letters were returned undelivered. On November 22, 1995, the People filed an indictment and announced their readiness for trial in open court and again sent letters to the defendants, informing them of the indictment and their scheduled arraignment. The defendants failed to appear for arraignment, and bench warrants were issued. The defendants were eventually arraigned in December 1995 and January 1996.

    Procedural History

    The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the People’s readiness statement was premature because they were not present and had not been arraigned. The Judicial Hearing Officer recommended granting the motion, and the Supreme Court confirmed the recommendation. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the People’s pre-arraignment statement of readiness on November 22, 1995, was effective to toll the speedy trial clock under CPL 30.30, given that the defendants had not yet been arraigned.

    Holding

    Yes, because the People had done everything required of them to bring the case to trial, and the arraignment and trial could occur within the six-month speedy trial period. The delay in arraignment is attributable to the court, not the People.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that, under CPL 30.30 (1)(a), the People must be ready for trial within six months of the commencement of a criminal action. A statement of readiness must be communicated on the record when the People are truly ready to proceed. The Court cited People v. Goss, noting that a pre-arraignment statement of readiness can be valid where it is possible for the defendant to be arraigned and the trial to go forward within the six-month period. The Court emphasized that there is no requirement that a defendant be present to establish readiness for trial.

    The Court found that the People made an effective statement of readiness by filing the indictment, announcing their readiness on the record, and attempting to notify the defendants. Absent proof that the readiness statement was inaccurate or made in bad faith, the People discharged their duty under CPL 30.30. The Court distinguished pre-readiness delay from post-readiness delay, stating that the responsibility for scheduling the arraignment and securing the defendant’s appearance lies with the court, not the People. The Court noted, “Responsibility for scheduling an arraignment date and securing a defendant’s appearance lies with the court, not the People.”

    The Court distinguished People v. Bolden, which the defendants cited for the proposition that the People were required to exercise due diligence in locating them, noting that Bolden relates to pre-readiness computation of time, while this case involved a valid declaration of readiness. The Court emphasized the importance of the People’s demonstrating readiness within the statutory time frame when they have diligently taken steps to ensure the defendant’s presence, but the ultimate responsibility for arraignment rests with the court. This distinction clarifies the prosecutor’s obligations and the court’s role in managing the arraignment process after the People declare readiness.

  • People v. Carter, 86 N.Y.2d 721 (1995): Preserving Fourth Amendment Claims on Appeal

    86 N.Y.2d 721 (1995)

    A defendant’s failure to assert standing to challenge a search at the suppression hearing forfeits the right to raise that Fourth Amendment claim on appeal.

    Summary

    Defendant Carter was convicted of drug offenses. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding Carter lacked standing to contest the search of a vehicle. Carter appealed, arguing he had standing under the “automatic standing” rule of People v. Millan. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because Carter failed to raise the standing issue at the suppression hearing, the claim was unpreserved for appellate review. A defendant must assert standing to challenge a search and seizure to preserve the issue for appeal.

    Facts

    Police stopped a vehicle for a traffic violation. Carter was a passenger. A search of the vehicle, conducted with the driver’s consent, revealed a small quantity of powder cocaine in the back seat. All occupants, including Carter, were arrested. A subsequent search of another passenger, Porter, revealed a large amount of crack cocaine. Porter pleaded to a reduced charge and testified before the grand jury. Carter, along with others, was indicted on conspiracy and felony possession charges related to the crack cocaine. Carter was also charged with possession of the powder cocaine found in the car.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Carter. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, holding Carter lacked standing to contest the vehicle search. Carter appealed to the New York Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a defendant, who fails to assert standing to challenge a vehicle search at the suppression hearing, can raise that Fourth Amendment claim for the first time on appeal.

    Holding

    No, because a defendant must assert standing to challenge a search and seizure in order to preserve the issue for appellate review.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the established rule that a defendant seeking to suppress evidence obtained via an illegal search must allege standing to challenge the search. If standing is disputed, the defendant bears the burden of establishing it. The Court cited Jones v. United States, People v. Ponder, and People v. Gonzalez in support of this principle. The Court noted that Carter never asserted standing in his omnibus motion or at any point during the suppression proceedings, despite the prosecution consistently contesting his standing. Because Carter failed to raise the standing issue at the trial level, the Court deemed the argument unpreserved for appellate review. The court stated, “In general, a defendant seeking to suppress evidence, on the basis that it was obtained by means of an illegal search, must allege standing to challenge the search and, if the allegation is disputed, must establish standing”. The court emphasized that appellate courts are generally limited to reviewing issues that were properly raised and preserved in the lower courts. The Court considered Carter’s remaining arguments and found them to be without merit, thus affirming the lower court’s decision.

  • People v. Carter, 77 N.Y.2d 95 (1991): Validity of Indictment When Prosecutor Was Not Admitted to the Bar

    People v. Carter, 77 N.Y.2d 95 (1991)

    An indictment is not invalid simply because the assistant district attorney presenting the case to the grand jury was not admitted to the bar, so long as that person was appointed by an authority with subject matter jurisdiction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that an indictment was valid even though the Assistant District Attorney (ADA) who presented the case to the grand jury was not a licensed attorney. The court reasoned that as long as the ADA was appointed by a prosecutor with subject matter jurisdiction and had taken the oath of office, the indictment was valid. The court emphasized that neither the constitution nor statute mandates an ADA be a lawyer. The dissent argued that allowing a non-lawyer to present a case to a grand jury undermines the integrity of the legal process.

    Facts

    Daniel Penofsky, posing as an Assistant District Attorney, presented evidence to a grand jury that led to the indictment of the defendant, Carter. Penofsky was never admitted to the bar and had fraudulently represented himself as an attorney for 16 years. After his deception was discovered, the defendant challenged the validity of the indictment.

    Procedural History

    The trial court upheld the indictment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the indictment was invalid because the prosecutor was not a licensed attorney. The appellate division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the appellate division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether an indictment is invalid because the Assistant District Attorney presenting the case to the grand jury was not a licensed attorney.

    Holding

    No, because the Assistant District Attorney was appointed by an authority with subject matter jurisdiction, had the permission of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor and had taken the oath of office; therefore, the indictment was valid.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that neither the Constitution nor any statute requires a District Attorney or an Assistant District Attorney to be an admitted lawyer. The critical factor is whether the person presenting the case had the authority to do so. Here, Penofsky was appointed by the Special Narcotics Prosecutor, who had subject matter jurisdiction over the case. The court distinguished this situation from cases where the prosecutor lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court found that Penofsky’s lack of a law license did not negate the Special Narcotics Prosecutor’s grant of authority. The court emphasized that Penofsky “duly executed the oath of office” and was “regularly assigned as an Assistant District Attorney.” The court also noted that concerns about Penofsky’s competence were mitigated by the fact that he worked within an office with supervisory structures. The dissent argued that allowing an unadmitted layperson to practice law and to present a criminal case to a grand jury compromises the integrity of the Grand Jury system and violates Judiciary Law provisions concerning the practice of law.

  • People v. Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 580 (1984): Trial Judge’s Authority to Reconsider a Guilty Verdict in a Non-Jury Trial

    People v. Carter, 63 N.Y.2d 580 (1984)

    A trial judge in a non-jury trial lacks the authority to reconsider a factual determination and change a guilty verdict to not guilty after the verdict has been rendered, except to correct clerical or ministerial errors.

    Summary

    Following a non-jury trial, the County Court Judge found Carter guilty of criminal possession of a weapon. On the sentencing day, the judge granted Carter’s motion to set aside the verdict, believing the prosecution’s witness testimony was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Division affirmed, asserting the trial judge’s inherent power to correct errors before the proceedings terminated. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a trial judge lacks inherent power or statutory authority to reassess facts and change a guilty verdict to not guilty after it has been rendered, as that power was not granted by the Criminal Procedure Law.

    Facts

    Two police officers witnessed James Spann telling them that Carter had a gun and was going to shoot. Carter fled in a car, and the officers pursued. During the chase, the officers saw a handgun thrown from the driver’s side window. Carter was arrested after he voluntarily stopped the car. At trial, Spann testified that Carter slapped him and pulled out a gun. Carter claimed he picked up the gun after Spann dropped it and panicked when Spann pointed him out to police, so he threw the gun from the car. A witness’s testimony was equivocal.

    Procedural History

    Carter was indicted for criminal possession of a weapon. He waived a jury trial and was tried before a judge in Oneida County Court, who initially found him guilty. The judge later granted Carter’s motion to set aside the verdict and dismissed the indictment, citing insufficient evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the Trial Judge had “inherent power to correct any errors in its own rulings, provided such correction is made prior to the termination of the proceedings.” The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial judge who has rendered a guilty verdict after a nonjury trial has the authority to reconsider the factual determination and change the guilty verdict to not guilty based on a reassessment of the evidence.

    Holding

    No, because a trial judge lacks the inherent power or statutory authority to reassess the facts and change a guilty verdict to not guilty, except to correct clerical or ministerial errors.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 330.30 defines the grounds for a trial judge to set aside a guilty verdict before sentencing. The court emphasized that the trial court’s power is limited to determining if the evidence was legally insufficient to establish guilt. While an appellate court can reverse a judgment when the verdict is against the weight of the evidence or in the interest of justice, trial judges do not have such powers. The court found that the victim’s testimony, coupled with police testimony, was sufficient to establish every element of the crime. The court distinguished this case from People v. Reed, noting no clear exculpatory evidence existed. Regarding inherent power, the court stated that while judges can correct clerical errors, they cannot alter a guilty verdict to not guilty based on factual reassessment. The court noted that under the Criminal Procedure Law, a conviction occurs upon the entry of a guilty verdict. Furthermore, the court emphasized that the legislature did not intend for judges in non-jury trials to have the power to change a factual determination after rendering a verdict, noting, “Were we to recognize such an inherent power in a Trial Judge in nonjury cases, that would mean that although he is in no better position to weigh the evidence in one case than in the other, he would be empowered to do so in nonjury cases but not after a jury verdict.” The court also found no defect in the original verdict, as the trial judge adequately considered the case. The judge’s concern about other potential witnesses was merely speculation, and a judge is not required to state the factual basis for the verdict, just as a jury is not.

  • People v. Carter, 53 N.Y.2d 695 (1981): Establishing Assault in the Third Degree

    People v. Carter, 53 N.Y.2d 695 (1981)

    A conviction for assault in the third degree requires proof of physical injury, which can be established through the victim’s testimony and corroborating medical evidence, and a defendant is not entitled to a lesser included offense charge unless there is a reasonable view of the evidence to support it.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for assault in the third degree. The charges stemmed from an altercation in a shopping center parking lot between the defendant, a young dental surgeon, and the complainant, an elderly man. The court found that the complainant’s testimony, supported by medical evidence, sufficiently established physical injury. The court also upheld the trial court’s refusal to charge harassment as a lesser included offense, as the defendant’s version of events did not reasonably support a finding of harassment instead of assault.

    Facts

    The incident occurred in a Manhasset shopping center parking area. The complainant, an 82-year-old man, advised the defendant, a 28-year-old dental surgeon, that he was parked in a restricted zone. According to the complainant, the defendant then approached him while he was sitting in his car, smashed the car door against his foot as he tried to exit, struck him in the ribs after he got out of the car, and knocked him to the ground. The complainant testified to sustaining a concussion, lacerations, severe bruises, and a severely bruised and swollen foot. Two physicians testified, confirming the complainant’s injuries and pain, which persisted for three to five weeks. The defendant presented a substantially different version of the incident.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted of assault in the third degree after a jury trial. He appealed to the Appellate Term, which affirmed the conviction. He then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support a conviction for assault in the third degree.

    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to charge harassment as a lesser included offense.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the complainant’s testimony and corroborating medical evidence established the element of physical injury required for assault in the third degree.

    2. No, because the defendant’s version of the incident did not provide a reasonable basis for the jury to find harassment instead of assault.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant committed assault in the third degree. The court relied on the complainant’s detailed testimony of the incident and the corroborating testimony of the two physicians who treated him. This evidence established that the complainant suffered physical injury as a result of the defendant’s actions, satisfying the requirements of Penal Law § 120.00(1). Regarding the lesser included offense, the court cited People v. Glover, 57 NY2d 61, and People v. Moyer, 27 NY2d 252, emphasizing that a defendant is only entitled to a charge on a lesser included offense if there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater. Here, the defendant’s version of events, while potentially supporting a factual finding of harassment, did not preclude a finding of assault. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to charge harassment as a lesser included offense. The court implicitly emphasized the jury’s role in assessing witness credibility and resolving conflicting factual accounts.

  • People v. Carter, 53 N.Y.2d 113 (1981): Determining ‘Dangerous Instrument’ Based on Use

    People v. Carter, 53 N.Y.2d 113 (1981)

    An object, not inherently dangerous, can be deemed a ‘dangerous instrument’ under the Penal Law if it is used in a manner readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.

    Summary

    Defendant Carter was convicted of first-degree assault for stomping on his girlfriend’s head with rubber boots, causing her to lapse into a coma. The central issue was whether the boots constituted a ‘dangerous instrument’ under New York Penal Law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that an object’s status as a ‘dangerous instrument’ depends on its use and whether that use renders it readily capable of causing serious physical injury, regardless of its inherent nature. The court emphasized that the manner of use transformed the ordinary boots into a dangerous instrument.

    Facts

    Defendant Carter and his girlfriend, Frances Coleman, were arguing while driving. Coleman exited the vehicle and began walking away. Carter then physically assaulted her, striking her with his fists until she fell to the ground. While she was on the ground, Carter kicked and “stomped” her head and face with his rubber boots. Coleman suffered severe injuries and lapsed into a coma from which she was not expected to recover.

    Procedural History

    Carter was indicted on charges of attempted murder and first-degree assault. The assault charge was based on the intentional causation of serious physical injury using a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument. The jury acquitted Carter of attempted murder but convicted him of first-degree assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, rejecting Carter’s argument that the rubber boots were not a ‘dangerous instrument.’ Carter then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether rubber boots, not inherently dangerous, can be considered a ‘dangerous instrument’ within the meaning of New York Penal Law when used to stomp on a person’s head, causing serious physical injury?

    Holding

    Yes, because the statute defines a dangerous instrument as any instrument, article, or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury, irrespective of its inherent nature.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals relied on the statutory definition of ‘dangerous instrument’ found in Penal Law § 10.00(13), which focuses on the use of the object rather than its inherent nature. The court emphasized that any object can become a dangerous instrument if used in a way that makes it readily capable of causing serious physical injury. The court cited previous cases, such as People v. Cwikla, where a handkerchief used to asphyxiate a victim was deemed a dangerous instrument. The court distinguished between the inherent nature of an object and its temporary use as a weapon. “The object itself need not be inherently dangerous. It is the temporary use rather than the inherent vice of the object which brings it within the purview of the statute.” In Carter’s case, the court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s conclusion that the rubber boots, when used to stomp on the victim’s head with tremendous force, were readily capable of causing serious physical injury. Therefore, the boots qualified as a ‘dangerous instrument’ in this specific context. The court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order and upheld the conviction.

  • People v. Carter, 30 N.Y.2d 451 (1972): The Requirement of a Reasonably Prompt Verdict in Non-Jury Trials

    People v. Carter, 30 N.Y.2d 451 (1972)

    In a non-jury trial, the court must render a verdict within a reasonable time after the case is submitted, and a significant, unexplained delay may warrant reversal of the conviction.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed a youthful offender adjudication because the Town Court Justice, sitting without a jury, did not render a verdict until 58 days after the close of the trial. The court held that this delay was unreasonable under the circumstances, violating the statutory mandate for a prompt verdict under CPL 350.10(3)(d). The court emphasized the importance of a timely verdict to ensure that the judge’s recollection of the evidence is fresh, thus protecting the defendant’s right to a fair trial.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with assault in the third degree following a fight with another high school student. A trial was held in Town Court before a Justice sitting without a jury. At the close of the four-hour trial on the evening of October 2, 1973, the Justice reserved decision and requested a transcript of the proceedings. The verdict of guilty was not rendered until November 29, 1973, 58 days after the trial’s conclusion.

    Procedural History

    The Town Court found the defendant guilty and sentenced him as a youthful offender with a conditional discharge. The defendant appealed, arguing that the delay in rendering a verdict terminated the court’s jurisdiction. The County Court rejected the defendant’s arguments. The case then went before the New York Court of Appeals by leave granted.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a 58-day delay between the close of a non-jury trial and the rendering of a verdict constitutes an unreasonable delay, thereby warranting reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    Yes, because the delay of 58 days was unreasonable under the circumstances of this case, violating the statutory mandate for a prompt verdict in CPL 350.10(3)(d).

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court acknowledged that CPL 350.10(3)(d) mandates that the court “must then consider the case and render a verdict” after a nonjury trial. While this provision does not explicitly define a time limit, it implies that the verdict must be rendered within a reasonable time. The court drew an analogy to jury trials, where jurors are expected to return a verdict within a reasonable time under CPL Article 310. The court stated that while the definition of “reasonable” varies depending on the case, there exists a point beyond which the delay becomes unreasonable as a matter of law.

    In this case, the court found the 58-day delay unreasonable because the underlying event involved a simple fight between two students with no serious injuries, no complicated issues of fact, no unresolved evidentiary questions, no contested propositions of law, and no post-trial submissions. The court noted that the Town Justice was not required to write a detailed decision or make extensive findings of fact, only to render a verdict of “guilty” or “not guilty.” The court stated, “it seems highly improbable to me that the Legislature intended to give carte blanche to magistrates to withhold decision in any case for as long as they desire. It seems to me that such a rule has greater evil potential and can do more harm to the administration of justice than the old rule that such courts may not reserve decision but must render it forthwith.”

    The court also noted that the right to a speedy trial extends to the right to a prompt verdict, ensuring the judge’s recollection of the evidence is fresh. While basing their decision on statutory grounds, the court acknowledged that lengthy delays can undermine the fairness of the trial.

  • People v. Carter, 37 N.Y.2d 234 (1975): Examination of Out-of-State Witnesses on Commission

    People v. Carter, 37 N.Y.2d 234 (1975)

    A court’s decision to grant a commission to examine out-of-state witnesses is discretionary and should be exercised with great restraint, particularly when the defendant has not utilized other available means to secure the witnesses’ attendance.

    Summary

    Kenneth Carter was convicted of criminal sale of a dangerous drug. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in denying his request for a commission to examine ten out-of-state witnesses. Carter claimed these witnesses would support his alibi defense. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the decision to issue a commission is discretionary and, in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The Court emphasized the importance of live testimony and the defendant’s failure to use the Uniform Act to secure witness attendance.

    Facts

    Patrolman Hayes testified that he purchased heroin from Carter on May 10 and 11, 1971. Three other officers identified Carter as the seller. Carter presented an alibi defense, offering testimony from two grandparents that he was in Pennsylvania on those dates. Prior to trial, Carter sought a commission to examine ten witnesses in Pennsylvania, asserting they would corroborate his alibi. The motion was supported by a brief affidavit stating Carter was with these witnesses in Pennsylvania during the alleged crimes and they could not afford to travel to New York.

    Procedural History

    Carter was indicted in Queens County, New York, on June 15, 1971. He moved for a commission to examine out-of-state witnesses, which was denied. He was convicted at trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal and affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant’s pre-trial application for a commission to examine out-of-state witnesses pursuant to CPL 680.20.

    Holding

    No, because the decision to issue a commission rests in the sound discretion of the court, and the defendant’s supporting papers provided only a conclusory summary without sufficient factual support. Furthermore, the defendant failed to utilize other available means to secure the witnesses’ attendance at trial.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court held that CPL 680.20 grants the court discretion in deciding whether to issue a commission. The moving party must provide a “brief summary of facts” supporting the claim that the out-of-state witnesses possess material information. Carter’s papers offered only a “very brief conclusional summary” lacking specific factual details. The Court stated that, even if the technical requirements of the statute are met, courts should exercise great restraint in granting such applications, doing so “only in exceptional circumstances.” The Court emphasized the importance of live testimony, where the fact-finder can assess the witness’s demeanor and credibility. The use of interrogatories restricts examination and cross-examination, and prevents the judge and jury from asking questions. Furthermore, Carter failed to utilize CPL 640.10, the Uniform Act to secure the attendance of out-of-state witnesses, which provides a statutory means to compel witnesses to attend trial. The Court rejected Carter’s argument that his constitutional rights were violated. While the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to present witnesses, this right is limited by the State’s inability to compel attendance of out-of-state witnesses without a compact. CPL 640.10 fills this gap. The Court also dismissed the equal protection argument, noting that the Uniform Act provides for payment of witness fees and mileage.