New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Cantor

  • People v. Cantor, 50 N.Y.2d 770 (1980): Attenuation Doctrine and Spontaneous Reactions to Illegal Police Conduct

    People v. Cantor, 50 N.Y.2d 770 (1980)

    Evidence obtained as a direct consequence of unlawful police conduct must be suppressed unless the defendant’s subsequent actions are a calculated response independent of the initial illegality, thereby attenuating the taint.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, vacated the defendant’s conviction, granted the motion to suppress, and dismissed the indictment. The court held that the gun found in the defendant’s waistband should have been suppressed because his act of reaching for it was a spontaneous reaction to unlawful police conduct, not an independent act that attenuated the taint of the illegal stop. The police lacked justification for their initial stop, and the defendant’s immediate response to their command did not provide a basis for admitting the evidence.

    Facts

    Two plainclothes police officers in an unmarked car saw two men passing an object in Aqueduct Park. As the officers approached, the men fled. A short time later, the officers saw the defendant, who matched the description of one of the men, a few blocks from the park. The officers approached the defendant from behind and yelled, “Police, don’t move!” As the defendant turned to face them, he reached into his waistband. The officers grabbed his hand, threw him against the car, and found a revolver in his waistband.

    Procedural History

    The trial court found the police stop unlawful but denied the motion to suppress, reasoning that the defendant’s reaching for the gun dissipated the taint of the illegal stop. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant’s action of reaching into his waistband was a spontaneous reaction to unlawful police conduct or a calculated act independent of that conduct, thus determining whether the evidence (the revolver) should be suppressed.

    Holding

    No, because the defendant’s action was a spontaneous reaction to the unlawful police command and was not sufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop. Therefore, the evidence should have been suppressed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals applied the attenuation doctrine, which dictates that evidence obtained as a direct consequence of unlawful police conduct must be suppressed. The court emphasized that the key question is whether the defendant’s action was “spontaneous and precipitated by the illegality or whether it was a calculated act not provoked by the unlawful police activity and thus attenuated from it.” The court distinguished this case from People v. Townes, where the defendant moved away from the officers and then pointed a gun at them, which was considered an attenuated response. In Cantor, the defendant immediately reached for his waistband upon hearing the police command. The court found no evidence to support the lower court’s finding that the defendant’s actions were a calculated response. The Court stated, “On the contrary, the only evidence in the record was that he reacted spontaneously to the police command by reaching immediately into his waistband”. The court reasoned that allowing the admission of the gun would effectively validate an illegal stop, undermining the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Since the discovery of the weapon was a direct result of the unlawful stop and the defendant’s spontaneous reaction to it, the evidence should have been suppressed.

  • People v. Cantor, 369 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1975): Limits on Police Power to Stop and Inquire

    People v. Cantor, 369 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1975)

    The common-law right of a police officer to inquire does not include the right to unlawfully seize an individual; a seizure requires reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

    Summary

    Cantor was convicted of attempted possession of a weapon. The New York Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the police unlawfully seized Cantor when they encircled him with their car and persons, lacking reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The court reasoned that this seizure violated Cantor’s Fourth Amendment rights, rendering the subsequent discovery of the weapon inadmissible. This case clarifies that police investigative powers are limited by constitutional protections against unreasonable seizure, requiring at least a founded suspicion of criminal activity before a person can be detained.

    Facts

    Plainclothes officers observed Cantor and a companion smoking what they believed to be marijuana in Brooklyn. The officers followed Cantor to his home in Queens. After Cantor parked, the officers blocked his car with their unmarked vehicle and approached him from multiple directions. Before the officers identified themselves, Cantor allegedly removed a pistol from his back pocket and pointed it at the officers. The officers then identified themselves, ordered Cantor to freeze, and seized the pistol, subsequently arresting him after he admitted to not having a permit. A search revealed barbiturates and marijuana on Cantor’s person and marijuana residue in his car.

    Procedural History

    Cantor was charged with possession of weapons as a felony and reckless endangerment. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing his constitutional rights were violated. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Cantor voluntarily produced the weapon. Cantor then pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a weapon. He appealed, arguing the stop and search were unlawful. The appellate division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the appellate division and dismissed the accusatory instruments.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the police action of encircling Cantor’s car and approaching him in a non-identified manner constituted an unlawful seizure under the Fourth Amendment, requiring suppression of the evidence subsequently obtained.

    Holding

    Yes, because Cantor was effectively seized when the police surrounded him and his vehicle, significantly interrupting his freedom of movement, and this seizure was not justified by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that a seizure occurs when an individual’s liberty of movement is significantly interrupted by police action. In this case, Cantor was seized when he was surrounded by officers and his car was blocked, preventing him from leaving. The court emphasized that constitutional protections apply regardless of whether the individual knows they are being accosted by police officers. The court stated, “Whenever a street encounter amounts to a seizure it must pass constitutional muster.”

    The court distinguished between the stop-and-frisk law (CPL 140.50) and the common-law power to inquire, noting that both are limited by constitutional protections. A lawful detention requires a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. The court found that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop Cantor, as their observations were remote and unreliable, and they had no independent knowledge of criminal activity. “The minimum requirement for a lawful detention stop is a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”

    Because the initial seizure was unlawful, the subsequent discovery of the pistol was deemed a fruit of the poisonous tree and thus inadmissible. The court concluded that the police action exceeded permissible bounds because there was no justification for surrounding Cantor in a manner constituting a seizure.