New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Calvano

  • People v. Calvano, 76 N.Y.2d 862 (1990): Entrapment Defense Requires More Than Opportunity to Commit a Crime

    People v. Calvano, 76 N.Y.2d 862 (1990)

    Merely providing a defendant with the opportunity to commit a crime is insufficient to warrant a jury instruction on the affirmative defense of entrapment; the defendant must demonstrate active inducement or encouragement creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to do so.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for patronizing a prostitute, holding that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant’s request for a jury charge on the affirmative defense of entrapment. The Court reasoned that the evidence presented, even when viewed most favorably to the defendant, did not reasonably support the defense. The interaction between the undercover officer and the defendant merely presented an opportunity to commit the crime, which is insufficient to establish entrapment. The defendant failed to demonstrate active inducement or encouragement by law enforcement.

    Facts

    An undercover police sergeant, dressed as a woman, was standing on a street corner in Syracuse. The defendant drove up to the curb and the officer approached the car. The officer asked if the defendant was looking for a date and the defendant replied affirmatively. After a brief negotiation about price and services, the defendant agreed to pay $25 for oral sodomy. The officer directed the defendant to drive around the corner, where he was arrested by backup units. An undercover lieutenant overheard and corroborated the conversation. The defendant testified that the officer approached him and offered oral sodomy for money, but he did not respond. He denied agreeing to exchange money for sex.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted in Syracuse City Court of patronizing a prostitute. The Onondaga County Court affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial judge erred by denying his request for a jury charge on the affirmative defense of entrapment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s request for a jury charge on the affirmative defense of entrapment, where the evidence showed that an undercover officer offered the defendant the opportunity to engage in prostitution.

    Holding

    No, because the evidence did not demonstrate active inducement or encouragement by a public official creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it. Merely providing an opportunity to commit a crime is insufficient to establish entrapment.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that a trial court must charge entrapment if the evidence, viewed favorably to the defendant, reasonably supports the defense. The defendant bears the burden of proving entrapment by a preponderance of the evidence, showing: (1) active inducement or encouragement by a public official; and (2) a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person not otherwise disposed to commit it. The court emphasized that the officers merely afforded the defendant an opportunity to commit the offense, which is insufficient for entrapment. “Merely asking a defendant to commit a crime is not such inducement or encouragement as to constitute entrapment.” The Court cited Penal Law § 40.05 and People v. Thompson, 47 N.Y.2d 940, 941 (1979), to support this conclusion. The court distinguished between providing an opportunity and actively inducing someone to commit a crime they were not predisposed to commit. The court noted that denying the crime doesn’t automatically support or defeat an entrapment defense. Quoting Mathews v. United States, 485 US 58, 62, the court acknowledged this allowance. The critical factor was the lack of evidence suggesting the defendant was actively persuaded or coerced into committing the offense.

  • People v. Calvano, 70 N.Y.2d 762 (1987): Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence for Entrapment Defense

    People v. Calvano, 70 N.Y.2d 762 (1987)

    Hearsay evidence is admissible to demonstrate inducement and a defendant’s state of mind when asserting an entrapment defense.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of selling drugs to an undercover officer. At trial, Calvano argued entrapment, attempting to introduce statements made to him by a paid police informant who introduced him to the officer. The trial court sustained the prosecutor’s hearsay objections and directed the jury to disregard the informant’s statements. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the informant’s statements were admissible to show inducement and the defendant’s state of mind, both critical to the entrapment defense. This case highlights the importance of allowing defendants to present evidence relevant to their state of mind when claiming entrapment.

    Facts

    The defendant, Calvano, was charged with selling drugs to an undercover police officer.
    A paid police informant introduced Calvano to the undercover officer.
    Calvano attempted to testify about statements made to him by the informant to support his entrapment defense.

    Procedural History

    Calvano was indicted for selling drugs.
    At trial, the court sustained the prosecutor’s hearsay objections, preventing Calvano from presenting the informant’s statements.
    Calvano was convicted.
    The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court’s decision and ordered a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements made by a police informant to the defendant are admissible as evidence to support an entrapment defense, specifically to demonstrate inducement and the defendant’s state of mind, even if such statements would otherwise be considered hearsay.

    Holding

    Yes, because the statements were offered to show inducement and the defendant’s state of mind, which are relevant to the entrapment defense as defined in Penal Law § 40.05.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the trial court erred in excluding the informant’s statements as hearsay. The statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted within them, but rather to demonstrate the informant’s inducement and its effect on Calvano’s state of mind. The court referred to Penal Law § 40.05, which defines entrapment as engaging in proscribed conduct because induced or encouraged to do so by a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, seeking to obtain evidence against him for purposes of criminal prosecution. “As defense counsel noted at trial, the statements were admissible to show inducement and defendant’s state of mind, which was relevant to his contention that he ‘engaged in the proscribed conduct because he was induced or encouraged to do so by * * * a person acting in cooperation with a public servant, seeking to obtain evidence against him for purpose of criminal prosecution’ (Penal Law § 40.05).” Because the statements were critical to establishing the entrapment defense, their exclusion was prejudicial to the defendant, warranting a new trial. The court emphasized that all arguments relevant to the admissibility of the evidence were presented to the court during the trial, preserving the issue for appellate review.

  • People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 255 (1972): Admissibility of Prior Crimes Evidence in Entrapment Defense

    People v. Calvano, 30 N.Y.2d 255 (1972)

    When a defendant raises the defense of entrapment, the prosecution may introduce evidence of the defendant’s prior crimes and criminal predisposition as part of its direct case if it is clear the entrapment defense will be invoked.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether evidence of prior crimes is admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief when the defendant pleads entrapment. Larry Calvano was convicted of illegally taking deer. He argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction and improperly admitted evidence of prior crimes to rebut his entrapment defense. The Court of Appeals held that the Justice Court had jurisdiction and that evidence of Calvano’s prior crimes was admissible on the People’s direct case because Calvano raised the defense of entrapment before trial and during the People’s case through cross-examination of the People’s witnesses. The court reasoned that excluding such evidence until the defense presents its case would unduly prejudice the prosecution.

    Facts

    Deputy Sheriff Butrico testified that Larry Calvano admitted to taking three white-tailed deer and arranged their delivery. On January 14, 1969, Calvano led Butrico and two conservation officers to an abandoned bungalow where he presented three white-tailed deer. Calvano was then arrested. The hunting season was closed at the time. On cross-examination, defense counsel questioned Butrico extensively, suggesting Butrico induced Calvano to commit the crime. Butrico admitted discussing with Calvano the possibility of Calvano “getting” deer for him on numerous occasions.

    Procedural History

    Calvano was convicted in Justice Court, Town of Ramapo, for violating the Conservation Law. The People introduced evidence of Calvano’s prior admissions of killing 181 deer and prior convictions for illegally taking wildlife, which the trial court admitted solely on the issue of entrapment. Calvano appealed, arguing the trial court lacked jurisdiction and improperly admitted the evidence. The appellate division affirmed the conviction, and Calvano appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the Justice Court had jurisdiction to hear and determine the misdemeanor of which the defendant was convicted, given the provisions of the Conservation Law.

    2. Whether the defense of entrapment may be properly rebutted upon the People’s case in chief through the introduction of evidence of prior crimes and criminal disposition.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because the Uniform Justice Court Act (UJCA) impliedly repealed conflicting provisions of the Conservation Law, granting town and village courts jurisdiction over all misdemeanors.

    2. Yes, because when it is clear that the defense of entrapment will be invoked, the prosecution may introduce competent proof of criminal disposition and prior convictions as part of its direct case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court addressed the jurisdictional argument first, noting the conflict between the Conservation Law and the UJCA. The court stated, “In determining whether one statute impliedly repeals an earlier one, the primary and fundamental question to be resolved is what did the Legislature intend.” It emphasized that repeals by implication are disfavored, but will be found where the intent to effect such a repeal is clear, as manifested by an inconsistency between the statutes that precludes giving effect to both. Because the statutes conflicted on the jurisdiction of the Justice Court, the court held that the UJCA, as the later and more general statute, impliedly repealed the conflicting provisions of the Conservation Law.

    Turning to the entrapment issue, the court acknowledged the general rule that evidence of other criminal acts is inadmissible but noted exceptions exist. Citing People v. Molineux, the court referenced its recent holding in People v. Calvano that such evidence is admissible to refute the defense of entrapment. The court quoted Sorrells v. United States, stating, “The predisposition and criminal design of the defendant are relevant…if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue.”

    The court rejected the argument that evidence of predisposition may only be introduced in rebuttal, finding this would “emasculate the rule and work grave prejudice” to the prosecution. The court held that “competent proof of criminal disposition and prior convictions” is admissible in the People’s case in chief when “it is clear that the defense of entrapment will be invoked.” The court reasoned that Calvano had raised the defense of entrapment via pretrial pleading, opening statements, and cross-examination, so the evidence was admissible.