New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Cade

  • People v. Cade, 74 N.Y.2d 410 (1989): Limits on Grand Jury Re-Presentation After Withdrawal

    74 N.Y.2d 410 (1989)

    When the People withdraw a case from a grand jury before the grand jury has had an opportunity to fully consider the evidence and the charges, judicial approval is not required to resubmit the charges to a subsequent grand jury.

    Summary

    Cade was convicted of arson. Prior to trial, he argued that the indictment should be dismissed because the charges had been improperly submitted to the second grand jury without court approval, violating CPL 190.75 and People v. Wilkins. The first grand jury heard testimony from a firefighter and a fire inspector, but neither witness linked Cade to the crime. The prosecution withdrew the case because a key witness was unavailable and the grand jury refused to extend its term. The New York Court of Appeals held that because the first grand jury did not fully consider the evidence or charges against the defendant, the withdrawal was not equivalent to a dismissal, and judicial approval wasn’t needed to resubmit to a second grand jury.

    Facts

    Cade was convicted of first-degree arson for allegedly hiring four men to set fire to an apartment building he owned. The building was subject to rent control, and Cade sought to convert it into condominiums.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Cade’s motion to dismiss the indictment. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecutor’s withdrawal of a case from a grand jury, after presenting minimal evidence that does not link the defendant to the crime, constitutes a dismissal requiring judicial approval before resubmitting the case to another grand jury under CPL 190.75.

    Holding

    No, because the key factor in determining whether an unauthorized withdrawal of the case must be treated as a dismissal is the extent to which the grand jury considered the evidence and the charge. Here, the grand jury did not have the opportunity to fully evaluate the evidence or charges against an identified defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court emphasized that CPL 190.75 aims to prevent repeated resubmissions of charges to successive grand juries after a dismissal. The court distinguished People v. Wilkins, where the prosecution’s presentation to the first grand jury was complete, and all witnesses had testified. In that case, withdrawal was deemed equivalent to a dismissal. Here, the court reasoned that because the first grand jury heard limited evidence that did not link Cade to the crime, and the case was withdrawn due to witness unavailability, the grand jury did not have an adequate opportunity to consider the evidence and charges. The court stated, “[T]he key factor in determining whether an unauthorized withdrawal of the case must be treated as a dismissal is the extent to which the Grand Jury considered the evidence and the charge.” The court concluded that allowing resubmission without judicial approval in this context did not undermine the integrity of the grand jury proceedings or the purpose of CPL 190.75. The court also found that a remark by the judge’s law clerk did not render Cade’s waiver of his right to a jury trial involuntary, because there was no promise of favorable treatment.

  • People v. Cade, 74 N.Y.2d 410 (1989): Resubmission of Charges to Grand Jury After True Bill

    People v. Cade, 74 N.Y.2d 410 (1989)

    A prosecutor may resubmit charges to the same Grand Jury after a true bill has been voted, to introduce additional evidence, without obtaining court authorization, as long as the action does not impair the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings or risk prejudice to the defendant.

    Summary

    The Grand Jury initially voted a true bill charging the defendant with murder and weapons possession, but then vacated the vote at the prosecutor’s request to hear additional evidence. After hearing the additional evidence, the Grand Jury voted a second true bill, and the defendant was indicted. The trial court dismissed the indictment, arguing that the second submission required court authorization. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that court authorization is not required for resubmission to the same Grand Jury after a true bill has been voted, as long as the proceedings’ integrity is maintained and the defendant is not prejudiced. The purpose of requiring court authorization is to prevent prosecutorial abuse when a Grand Jury has rejected the evidence.

    Facts

    On April 1 and 3, 1987, a Grand Jury heard evidence regarding the murder of Darrell Richardson and the defendant’s alleged involvement.
    On April 3, the Grand Jury voted a true bill, charging the defendant with second-degree murder and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon.
    However, the indictment was not immediately filed.
    On April 9, 1987, at the prosecutor’s request, the Grand Jury vacated its earlier vote to consider new testimony.
    The new testimony concerned the shotgun used in the murder, establishing that the defendant had exclusive possession of it on the day of the murder.
    After hearing this additional evidence, the Grand Jury voted a second true bill containing the same two counts.

    Procedural History

    The trial court dismissed the indictment, with leave to the District Attorney to resubmit the charges to another Grand Jury.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.
    The People were granted leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prosecutor needs court authorization to resubmit charges to the same Grand Jury after the Grand Jury has already voted a true bill, but before the indictment is filed, in order to present additional evidence.

    Holding

    No, because court authorization is not required for resubmission to the same Grand Jury after a true bill has been voted, as long as the action does not impair the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings or risk prejudice to the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that CPL 190.75 (1) and (3) apply only to prior “dismissals” and require judicial permission to resubmit charges when the first Grand Jury hearing the evidence has rejected it as insufficient. The court emphasized that nothing in the Criminal Procedure Law was intended to change the existing rule that a superseding indictment may be obtained without court authorization. The court noted, “If the Grand Jury has voted favorably on the charges, the District Attorney is at liberty to resubmit the matter to the same Grand Jury…without court approval and obtain a superseding indictment.” The court emphasized that the key is whether the action impairs the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings or risks prejudice to the defendant under CPL 210.35 (5). In this case, neither was at risk, so the indictment against the defendant could stand.

    The court distinguished its prior holding in People v. Wilkins, where it held that when the prosecutor unilaterally withdrew a case from the grand jurors before they had an opportunity to vote, he could not resubmit the matter without court authorization. In this case, the Grand Jury *did* vote to indict; thus, the District Attorney had no need to “forum shop” for a more compliant Grand Jury.

    The court rejected the argument that the failure to file the April 3 indictment immediately was a jurisdictional defect, stating that the provision is only directory, and its requirements were met when the indictment voted April 9 encompassing all the proceedings on the charges was filed with the court.

    The court also noted the impracticality of requiring a superseding indictment in this circumstance. The court stated, “Unless the proceedings have been flawed or the District Attorney’s actions have risked some prejudice on defendant within the meaning of CPL 210.35 (5), and we see none, he was free to act as he did.”