Tag: People v. Burroughs

  • People v. Burroughs, 669 N.E.2d 286 (N.Y. 1996): Depraved Indifference Murder and Accomplice Liability in a Gun Battle

    People v. Burroughs, 88 N.Y.2d 171, 669 N.E.2d 286 (1996)

    When multiple actors engage in a gun battle with depraved indifference to human life, each can be held liable for the death of a bystander as an accomplice, even if it is uncertain which actor fired the fatal shot.

    Summary

    Defendants Burroughs, Russell, and Bekka engaged in a gun battle in a public area, resulting in the death of a bystander, Daly. Although it was unclear which defendant fired the fatal shot, all three were convicted of depraved indifference murder under accomplice liability. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the finding that each defendant acted with the required mental culpability and intentionally aided in creating a lethal situation. The court reasoned that their mutual combat demonstrated a shared depraved indifference to human life, making each accountable for the foreseeable consequences of their actions, regardless of which bullet struck the victim.

    Facts

    On December 17, 1992, Burroughs, Russell, and Bekka engaged in a gun battle in the Centre Mall of the Red Hook Housing Project in Brooklyn. Principal Patrick Daly was fatally struck by a stray bullet during the shootout. Witnesses described the event as sounding “like a war,” with nine to twenty shots fired. The gunfight occurred in a public concourse used by 7,000 residents, placing numerous bystanders at risk.

    Procedural History

    Burroughs, Bekka, and Russell were charged with second-degree murder. Two separate juries, one for Burroughs and one for Russell and Bekka, were impaneled. Both juries convicted the defendants of second-degree, depraved indifference murder. The Appellate Division sustained all three convictions. The defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that each defendant acted with the mental culpability required for depraved indifference murder, and whether each defendant intentionally aided the defendant who fired the fatal shot, thereby satisfying the requirements for accomplice liability, despite not knowing who fired the fatal bullet.

    Holding

    Yes, because the evidence demonstrated that each defendant consciously disregarded a grave risk of death by engaging in a gun battle in a public area, and they intentionally aided each other in creating a zone of danger, thus establishing accomplice liability for depraved indifference murder.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the prosecution did not need to prove which defendant fired the fatal shot if the evidence established that each defendant acted with the mental culpability required for depraved indifference murder and intentionally aided the shooter. The court emphasized that depraved indifference requires conduct that is ” ‘so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to warrant the same criminal liability as that which the law imposes upon a person who intentionally causes the death of another.’ ” The court analogized the case to People v. Abbott, where two defendants engaged in a drag race, and one caused a fatal accident; both were held culpable. The Court found that by engaging in a gun battle in a public concourse, the defendants tacitly agreed to create a zone of danger. Even though each defendant was shooting at the others, they shared a “community of purpose” in engaging in mutual combat that foreseeably endangered innocent bystanders. The court noted that the defendants had opportunities to retreat safely but chose instead to engage in the gunfight. This demonstrated a depraved indifference to human life, justifying their convictions for depraved indifference murder under accomplice liability. The court emphasized the jury instruction that if the defendants “took up each other’s challenge, shared in the venture and unjustifiably, voluntarily and jointly created a zone of danger, then each is responsible for his own acts and the acts of the others.”