New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Buford

  • People v. Buford, 94 N.Y.2d 976 (2000): Admissibility of Hearsay Statements Against Penal Interest

    94 N.Y.2d 976 (2000)

    A declaration against penal interest is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule only if the declarant was aware at the time of making the statement that it was against their penal interest, and portions of the statement that are not against the declarant’s penal interest are inadmissible.

    Summary

    Defendant Buford appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in discharging a juror and refusing to admit a defense witness’s testimony regarding out-of-court statements. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the trial court properly discharged the juror and correctly concluded that the out-of-court statements were inadmissible hearsay because the defendant failed to establish that the declarant knew the statements were against their penal interest when made, and because portions of the statement were not against the declarant’s penal interest.

    Facts

    The defendant was convicted of a crime, and during the trial, a juror was discharged. The defendant sought to introduce testimony from a defense witness about out-of-court statements made by another person to support a duress defense. The trial court refused to admit this testimony.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court erred in discharging the juror.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to permit a defense witness to testify regarding the out-of-court statements of another person.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court did not err in discharging the subject juror using the “for cause” standard. The Court of Appeals deferred to the trial court’s assessment of the juror’s demeanor indicating a state of mind that would preclude an impartial verdict.
    2. No, because the trial court correctly concluded that the statements were inadmissible hearsay, and the defendant did not meet his burden of showing that the declarant was aware at the time he made the statements that they were against his penal interest; furthermore, the portions of the statement supporting the duress defense were not against the declarant’s penal interest when made.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that the defendant’s argument regarding the “grossly unqualified” standard for juror discharge was unpreserved because it was first raised in a motion to set aside the verdict. Applying the “for cause” standard of CPL 270.20 (1) (b), the court deferred to the trial court’s assessment of the juror’s demeanor. As to the hearsay statements, the Court cited People v. Fields, 66 NY2d 876, 877-878 and concluded that the defendant failed to show the declarant was aware that the statements were against their penal interest when made. The court further explained that even if some parts of the statement were against the declarant’s penal interest, the portions supporting the defendant’s duress defense were not and, therefore, were inadmissible. The court noted that “careful parsing of the various parts of the declarant’s statements is required, and those portions of the declarant’s statement that arguably support defendant’s duress defense were not against the declarant’s penal interest when made and thus were not admissible.” This principle underscores the importance of assessing each part of a statement separately to determine admissibility under the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule, citing People v. Brensic, 70 NY2d 9, 16 and People v. Thomas, 68 NY2d 194, 198.

  • People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290 (1987): Standard for Dismissing a Sworn Juror During Trial

    People v. Buford, 69 N.Y.2d 290 (1987)

    A sworn juror in a criminal trial may only be dismissed over the defendant’s objection if the court finds the juror is “grossly unqualified” to serve, meaning the juror possesses a state of mind that would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict.

    Summary

    This case addresses the standard for dismissing a sworn juror during a criminal trial under New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 270.35. The Court of Appeals held that a juror can only be dismissed if “grossly unqualified,” meaning the juror’s state of mind prevents an impartial verdict. The Court reversed the convictions in two separate cases, finding that the trial courts applied an improper, less stringent standard in excusing jurors. The key factor is whether the juror’s impartiality is clearly compromised, not merely questionable. Speculation about possible bias is insufficient for dismissal.

    Facts

    People v. Buford: During Buford’s murder trial, a forewoman saw two prosecution witnesses leaving the courthouse together and expressed concern about a possible conspiracy. The court questioned her, and she stated she could still be fair. The court excused her over the defendant’s objection.
    People v. Smitherman: During Smitherman’s weapon possession trial, a juror revealed she had personal knowledge of the shooting of the defendant’s friend, which the defendant claimed was the reason he wore a bulletproof vest. Initially, she indicated this knowledge might affect her judgment, but later stated she could still be fair and impartial. The court excused her over the defendant’s objection.

    Procedural History

    Both Buford and Smitherman were convicted in their respective trials. In both cases, the Appellate Divisions affirmed the convictions. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and reversed the orders of the Appellate Divisions, ordering new trials for both defendants.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court in People v. Buford applied the correct standard in excusing the forewoman from the jury over the defendant’s objection.
    2. Whether the trial court in People v. Smitherman applied the correct standard in excusing the juror with personal knowledge of the defendant’s friend’s shooting over the defendant’s objection.

    Holding

    1. No, because the trial court did not apply the “grossly unqualified” standard established in CPL 270.35, instead relying on speculation about possible partiality.
    2. No, because the trial court did not apply the “grossly unqualified” standard established in CPL 270.35, instead relying on the juror’s particular knowledge, even though the juror stated she could be fair.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that dismissing a sworn juror after the trial has begun requires a showing that the juror is “grossly unqualified” under CPL 270.35. This standard is higher than the standard for challenging a juror for cause during jury selection. The Court reasoned that a defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by a particular jury chosen according to law. The Court stated, “This statutory test places a greater burden upon the moving party than if the juror was challenged for cause”.

    In Buford, the forewoman’s initial concern about a conspiracy was alleviated after being informed that the witnesses’ conduct was proper. Her subsequent statements indicated she could remain fair and impartial. Therefore, it was not “obvious” that she possessed a state of mind that would prevent an impartial verdict.

    In Smitherman, the juror’s knowledge of the shooting of defendant’s friend pertained to a collateral matter, not to material facts in issue. Although the juror initially stated her knowledge would affect her deliberations, she later indicated she could convict if the prosecution proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The court emphasized that the trial court must be convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict, and the court may not speculate. “In concluding that a juror is grossly unqualified, the court may not speculate as to possible partiality of the juror based on her equivocal responses. Instead, it must be convinced that the juror’s knowledge will prevent her from rendering an impartial verdict.” The Court found that the trial court applied a standard other than “grossly unqualified” by focusing on the juror’s “particular knowledge” rather than her actual ability to be impartial. The Court reiterated that each case must be evaluated on its unique facts and stated that the trial court’s reasons for its ruling should be placed on the record.