New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Brensic

  • People v. Brensic, 89 N.Y.2d 579 (1997): Corroboration of Underlying Felony in Hindering Prosecution

    People v. Brensic, 89 N.Y.2d 579 (1997)

    In a prosecution for hindering prosecution, CPL 60.50 requires independent corroborative evidence that the underlying felony occurred, but the threshold for such corroboration is low and can be satisfied by evidence such as the victim’s death, the suspect being a fugitive, and the suspect’s consciousness of guilt.

    Summary

    Brensic was convicted of hindering prosecution for assisting her common-law husband, Rivera, who she knew had committed a class A felony (murder). The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while CPL 60.50 requires corroboration of the underlying felony in hindering prosecution cases, the prosecution met this requirement. The court emphasized that the corroboration requirement exists to prevent convictions based solely on confessions when no crime has actually occurred. Here, testimony from investigating officers about the victim’s murder, Rivera’s status as a suspect and fugitive, and his violent flight from police provided sufficient corroboration.

    Facts

    Brensic provided a detailed statement to police that her common-law husband, Marcus Rivera, and others planned and carried out the murder of Roberto Corperone. She admitted to twice thwarting police efforts to apprehend Rivera by warning him in advance of their arrival. Detectives eventually apprehended Rivera in Philadelphia without Brensic’s knowledge after he violently resisted arrest and fled. Brensic was subsequently charged and convicted of hindering prosecution in the first degree.

    Procedural History

    Following a non-jury trial, Brensic was convicted of two counts of hindering prosecution in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Brensic appealed to the New York Court of Appeals by permission of an Appellate Division Justice.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to sustain Brensic’s conviction for hindering prosecution in the first degree.
    2. Whether the People provided sufficient corroboration under CPL 60.50 of Brensic’s statement that a class A felony (murder) had occurred.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because Brensic’s detailed statement provided an eyewitness account of the intentional murder of Corperone, and the detectives’ testimony supported the conclusion that Brensic warned Rivera of impending apprehension.
    2. Yes, because CPL 60.50 requires some independent evidence that the underlying felony occurred. Here, the testimony of the investigating officers regarding Corperone’s murder, Rivera’s status as a suspect and fugitive, his indictment, and his violent flight from police provided sufficient corroboration.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that to prove hindering prosecution in the first degree, the People must prove that the assisted person committed a class A felony. While the statute does not require proof of arrest or conviction, it does require proof of each element of the underlying felony. The court stated that the standard of review for legal sufficiency is “whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the People, could lead a rational trier of fact to conclude that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”

    Regarding corroboration, the court explained that CPL 60.50 requires “additional proof that the offense charged has been committed,” but does not mandate independent evidence of every component of the crime. The statute requires “some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone” to avert ” ‘the danger that a crime may have been confessed when no crime in any degree has been committed by anyone.’ ” The court distinguished felony murder cases, where corroboration of the underlying felony is not required, because in those cases, the felony serves as a substitute for malicious intent. In contrast, without the underlying felony in a hindering prosecution case, no crime has been committed at all.

    The court emphasized the relatively low threshold for corroboration under CPL 60.50. Here, the detectives’ testimony that Corperone had been murdered, that Rivera was the immediate suspect, that a fugitive warrant was issued for his arrest, and that Rivera violently resisted arrest and fled from police constituted sufficient corroboration. Specifically, the court pointed to Rivera’s “consciousness of guilt” as crucial corroborating evidence. As the Court stated, “proof of motive or flight, may ‘be held to constitute the essential additional proof.’ ”

  • People v. Brensic, 70 N.Y.2d 9 (1987): Admissibility of Accomplice Confessions Against a Defendant

    70 N.Y.2d 9 (1987)

    When the prosecution seeks to introduce an out-of-court statement of a non-testifying accomplice against a defendant, the statement must meet stringent reliability requirements to be admissible as a declaration against penal interest.

    Summary

    Robert Brensic and Douglas Young were convicted in separate trials, each involving the admission of custodial confessions from non-testifying accomplices. The New York Court of Appeals consolidated their appeals to address the common issue of whether these confessions were properly admitted as declarations against penal interest. The Court held that the confessions in both cases failed to meet the strict reliability standards required for admissibility, particularly because the declarants had potential motives to falsify their statements. The Court emphasized the importance of a pre-trial hearing to assess the circumstances and reliability of such confessions, and therefore reversed the convictions and ordered new trials.

    Facts

    In Brensic, Robert Brensic was convicted of murder and manslaughter in the death of John Pius. The prosecution introduced a confession from Peter Quartararo, a non-testifying accomplice, which implicated Brensic in the crime. Quartararo’s confession was obtained after hours of custodial questioning and multiple versions of the events. In Young, Douglas Young was convicted of rape and robbery. The prosecution introduced a redacted confession from David Littles, another suspect, who was unavailable to testify. Littles’ confession implicated Young in the attack. Littles made the confession after seeing Young in custody at the police station.

    Procedural History

    In Brensic, the trial court conducted a Settles hearing and ruled Peter Quartararo’s custodial confession made in his mother’s presence was admissible after redaction. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. In Young, the trial court did not conduct a Settles hearing but allowed David Littles’ confession into evidence. The Appellate Division affirmed Young’s conviction. Both cases were appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, which consolidated them to address the common legal issue.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial courts erred in admitting the confessions of non-testifying accomplices as declarations against penal interest, given the potential unreliability of such statements?

    2. Whether the admission of these confessions violated the defendants’ rights under the New York evidentiary law?

    Holding

    1. No, because the People failed to establish sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome the presumption of unreliability attached to custodial confessions from accomplices, especially when there is a motive to falsify.

    2. Yes, because the confessions did not meet the prerequisites for reliability as set forth in People v. Settles and People v. Maerling, making them inadmissible hearsay.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that out-of-court statements introduced to prove the truth of the matter asserted are hearsay and admissible only if they fall within a recognized exception, such as declarations against penal interest. When the prosecution seeks to introduce a non-testifying accomplice’s confession to inculpate the defendant, it must meet an even more exacting standard to protect the defendant’s due process rights. The Court stated, “[T]he trial court must find that the interest compromised is ‘of sufficient magnitude or consequence to the declarant to all but rule out any motive to falsify.’” The Court found significant flaws in the admission of the confessions in both cases. In Brensic, the Court emphasized that Quartararo’s confession was obtained after lengthy custodial questioning as a juvenile, with changing versions of events, which raised concerns about its reliability. The presence of Quartararo’s mother did not automatically ensure reliability. The Court noted that “[A] finding that a confession was voluntary for Fifth Amendment purposes does not bear on the question of whether the confession was also free of any desire, motive, or impulse to mitigate one’s own culpability by spreading blame or by overstating the involvement of an accomplice.”(citing Lee v. Illinois, 476 US 530) In Young, the trial court failed to conduct a proper hearing to assess the circumstances surrounding Littles’ confession. The Court emphasized, “The reliability of declarations against penal interest is predicated entirely on their disserving character and, as we have recognized many times, they may be uttered for a variety of motives, many of them for the declarant’s benefit.”