New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Bowman

  • People v. Bowman, 6 N.Y.3d 144 (2005): Filing New Informations with Additional Facts and Charges

    People v. Bowman, 6 N.Y.3d 144 (2005)

    The Criminal Procedure Law authorizes the prosecution to file a new information that alleges additional facts or charges offenses not included in a previously filed information, provided they stem from the same criminal transaction.

    Summary

    This case addresses the permissible scope of amending or supplementing a criminal information. The Court of Appeals held that prosecutors are not limited to using a prosecutor’s information when adding new charges or facts. They can file a new, separate information. The court reasoned that CPL 100.50(1) permits filing “another information” without restricting the type of crimes included. This implies new facts can be alleged to support additional offenses. The decision aligns with the legislative intent to allow prosecutors flexibility in pursuing charges based on evolving evidence and mirrors the freedom to obtain new grand jury indictments. The court also clarified that hearsay statements can be used to establish reasonable cause for arrest, even if inadmissible to prove guilt.

    Facts

    Police responded to a domestic violence report. The alleged victim stated Bowman assaulted her and requested his removal from the home. Bowman refused to leave, allegedly threatened an officer, struck him with a bag, and resisted arrest. The victim later declined to press assault charges.

    Procedural History

    Bowman was initially charged with assault and resisting arrest. After the victim refused to cooperate on the assault charge, the prosecution filed a superseding information elaborating on the resisting arrest charge and a successive information charging second-degree harassment. The original assault and resisting arrest informations were dismissed. The District Court dismissed the new informations, arguing CPL 100.50 prohibited the harassment charge and that both new informations were defective due to new, unsupported factual allegations. The Appellate Term modified, reinstating the informations. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Term’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether CPL 100.50 prohibits the People from charging a new crime (harassment) in a successive information when that crime was not charged in the original information.
    2. Whether a superseding information charging resisting arrest is defective if it relies on hearsay statements to establish reasonable cause for the arrest.

    Holding

    1. No, because CPL 100.50(1) authorizes the People to file “another information” prior to the entry of a plea or commencement of a trial, without restrictions on the type of crimes included. This implies new facts can be alleged to support additional offenses.
    2. No, because the information was not used to prove the truth of the victim’s assertion but to demonstrate that there was reasonable cause to arrest the defendant.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court interpreted CPL 100.50(1) to permit filing a new information with new charges and facts. The statute does not restrict the crimes that may be included. The court reasoned that the legislative intent behind CPL 100.50(1) was to establish authority for superseding informations, mirroring the rules for superseding indictments. Quoting People v. Franco, 86 NY2d 493, 500 (1995), the court noted that a prosecutor has freedom to obtain a new grand jury indictment with charges not considered by the first grand jury, based on additional proof. The court stated that “the Legislature intended that prosecutors should also be able to issue an information that charges new, joinable crimes premised on factual allegations that were not included in the original information.” Regarding the hearsay issue, the court cited People v. Huertas, 75 NY2d 487, 492 (1990) and People v. Felder, 37 NY2d 779, 780-781 (1975) to support the principle that hearsay can be used to establish reasonable cause.

  • People v. Bowman, 84 N.Y.2d 923 (1994): Superseding Indictments Require Arraignment for Dismissal of Prior Charges

    People v. Bowman, 84 N.Y.2d 923 (1994)

    Under New York Criminal Procedure Law, a prior accusatory instrument is not automatically dismissed upon the filing of a subsequent instrument covering the same offenses; dismissal is contingent upon the defendant’s arraignment on the subsequent instrument.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of 20 counts of violating the General Municipal Law related to junkyard regulations. He argued that the filing of a subsequent information, alleging similar offenses, should have resulted in the dismissal of all prior informations under CPL 100.50. The Court of Appeals held that because the defendant was never arraigned on the subsequent information, the statutory requirement to dismiss the preceding informations was not triggered. Therefore, the defendant’s conviction on the earlier informations was valid.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged with 20 counts of violating General Municipal Law § 136 in 1990. These charges were outlined in 20 separate prosecutor’s informations. While these charges were pending, another information was filed against the defendant in April 1992, alleging some of the same offenses. The defendant was never arraigned on this subsequent information.

    Procedural History

    The defendant unsuccessfully moved for dismissal of all but one of the informations filed before the April 1992 information. The defendant was then convicted of 20 counts of violating the General Municipal Law. The Court of Appeals affirmed the County Court’s order, upholding the conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the filing of a subsequent accusatory instrument automatically requires the dismissal of prior accusatory instruments charging the same offenses, even if the defendant is never arraigned on the subsequent instrument?

    Holding

    No, because under CPL 100.50(1), the dismissal of the first accusatory instrument is contingent upon the defendant’s arraignment on the latter instrument.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals based its decision on a strict interpretation of CPL 100.50(1), which states that the first instrument is superseded by the second, and dismissal of the first instrument’s count charging the offense is required “upon the defendant’s arraignment upon the latter.” Because the defendant was never arraigned on the April 1992 information, the statutory trigger for dismissing the prior informations never occurred. The Court emphasized the importance of arraignment as the event that activates the dismissal requirement. The Court found that without arraignment, there was no statutory basis to dismiss the earlier informations, and thus the defendant’s conviction on those informations was not jurisdictionally barred. The court also summarily dismissed the defendant’s remaining arguments as without merit.