New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Borrero

  • People v. Borrero, 47 N.Y.2d 929 (1979): Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence for Attempted Burglary

    People v. Borrero, 47 N.Y.2d 929 (1979)

    Circumstantial evidence, when sufficiently compelling and indicative of intent, can be used to support a conviction for attempted burglary.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s conviction for attempted burglary in the third degree. The conviction was based on circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s presence near a broken-in business at night in a desolate area, his flight from the police, and his attempt to hide. The Court found that this evidence provided ample basis for the trier of fact to infer an attempted burglary, and that the conviction was not tainted by evidence related to possessory crimes for which the defendant’s convictions were reversed on appeal.

    Facts

    Police officers observed Borrero and another individual within five feet of the doorway of a business building on Staten Island. The business was closed for the night, and the area was desolate. As the officers approached, Borrero and his companion fled the scene. They then hid under a nearby car across the street but were quickly apprehended. Upon inspection, the officers found evidence of a forced entry at the door of the business premises.

    Procedural History

    Borrero was convicted of attempted burglary in the third degree, as well as possessory crimes related to burglar’s tools and unlawful possession of radio devices. The Appellate Division reversed the convictions for the possessory crimes. Borrero appealed the attempted burglary conviction, arguing that it was tainted by the evidence related to the reversed possessory crime convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed the attempted burglary conviction.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the circumstantial evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the defendant’s conviction for attempted burglary in the third degree, despite the reversal of convictions on related possessory crimes.

    Holding

    Yes, because there was ample circumstantial evidence, independent of the possessory crime evidence, from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that Borrero and his companion were attempting to burglarize the building.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to support the conviction. The Court emphasized the following facts: (1) Borrero’s presence near the business building; (2) the business being closed for the night and located in a desolate area; (3) Borrero’s flight upon the approach of the police; (4) Borrero’s attempt to hide under a car; and (5) the evidence of a forced entry at the door of the business. The court reasoned that, taken together, these facts provided a sufficient basis for the trier of fact to infer that Borrero and his companion were attempting a burglary. The court distinguished this case from People v. Almestica, 42 NY2d 222. The Court held that the enumerated evidence was adequately independent of that relating to the possessory crimes so that the conviction was not tainted by proof concerning possession of burglar’s tools and unlawful possession of radio devices.

  • People v. Borrero, 26 N.Y.2d 430 (1970): Establishing Intent for Burglar’s Tools Possession

    People v. Borrero, 26 N.Y.2d 430 (1970)

    Circumstantial evidence can establish the intent to use an instrument for an unlawful purpose in a charge of possession of burglar’s tools, even without direct proof of ownership of the property targeted.

    Summary

    This case addresses the level of proof required to convict someone for possession of burglar’s tools, specifically concerning intent. Borrero was observed prying at a car window with a screwdriver, and Lugo was seen using a wire to try to enter a car. The court held that while screwdrivers and wires are not inherently burglar’s tools, their use under suspicious circumstances can provide sufficient circumstantial evidence to infer intent to commit a crime, even if the prosecution doesn’t directly prove the defendant didn’t own the car. The court emphasized that the evidence, viewed through “common human experience,” must lead a reasonable person to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

    Facts

    In Borrero, a detective saw Borrero using a screwdriver on a car vent window. After a brief conversation with another man, Borrero hid the screwdriver and walked away. He was arrested and found to possess heroin. In Lugo, Lugo and an accomplice were observed looking into cars. Lugo inserted a wire into a car window while his accomplice acted as a lookout. They stopped when people approached the car with keys and walked away. Lugo confessed to possessing the tool.

    Procedural History

    Borrero was convicted of possession of burglar’s tools and narcotics. The Appellate Term reversed the burglar’s tools conviction. Lugo was convicted of possession of burglar’s tools, and the Appellate Term affirmed.

    Issue(s)

    Whether circumstantial evidence, in the absence of direct proof of ownership of the targeted vehicle, can sufficiently establish the intent to use possessed tools in the commission of a larceny offense, thus warranting a conviction for possession of burglar’s tools under New York Penal Law § 140.35.

    Holding

    Yes, because the surrounding circumstances can reasonably lead to the inference that the defendant intended to use the tools for an unlawful purpose. In Borrero, the Appellate Term’s judgment was reversed and remitted for factual determination. In Lugo, the judgment was affirmed.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that while items like screwdrivers and wires are not inherently burglar’s tools, their use in suspicious circumstances can establish the necessary intent for a conviction under Penal Law § 140.35. The court acknowledged the standard for circumstantial evidence, stating that the hypothesis of guilt should flow naturally from the facts and be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence. However, the court clarified that this test should not replace reasoned thought, quoting People v. Wachowicz, “In the end, it is a question whether common human experience would lead a reasonable man, putting his mind to it, to reject or accept the inferences asserted for the established facts.” The court distinguished these cases from mere possession, noting the defendants were essentially “caught in the act.” While direct proof of ownership is preferable, the court held that lack of ownership could be inferred from the circumstances. Regarding Borrero, the court stated that the defendant’s actions, including ceasing his actions and hiding the screwdriver, suggest intent to break into another’s car, as “common experience would suggest the owner of the car would have a locksmith or mechanic open the car, rather than pay the cost of a new window and its installation.” Regarding Lugo, the court found it “ludicrous” to believe his actions were consistent with innocence.

  • People v. Borrero, 21 N.Y.2d 333 (1968): Criminal Responsibility and the Narcotics Addiction Defense

    21 N.Y.2d 333 (1968)

    A narcotics addict is not absolved from criminal responsibility for crimes committed to procure drugs unless the addiction renders the individual incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of their actions or that such conduct was wrong.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether narcotics addicts who commit crimes solely to obtain money for drugs should be exempt from criminal responsibility under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. The court held that addiction, in itself, does not excuse criminal behavior. The defendants, both long-time narcotics users with criminal records, argued their addiction drove them to commit larceny and burglary, thus negating their criminal culpability. The court affirmed their convictions, distinguishing their situation from being punished for the status of addiction itself, as deemed unconstitutional in Robinson v. California. The court emphasized the state’s power to punish antisocial behavior, even when motivated by addiction, unless the addiction eliminates the capacity to understand the wrongfulness of the conduct.

    Facts

    Defendant Walton was involved in a purse snatching and Defendant Borrero in a burglary. Both defendants were long-time narcotics users with prior criminal records largely consisting of narcotics offenses and larceny. Walton pleaded guilty to petit larceny, and Borrero pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny.

    Procedural History

    Both defendants were convicted in trial court and sentenced to indeterminate prison terms. The Appellate Division affirmed both convictions. The cases were then consolidated for appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the imposition of a prison sentence or other penal sanction upon a narcotics addict who commits crimes solely for the purpose of procuring money to make drug purchases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and the New York Constitution.

    Holding

    No, because being a narcotics addict does not automatically absolve a person from criminal responsibility for their actions; the state has the power to punish antisocial behavior by drug addicts, so long as the addiction has not rendered the individual incapable of understanding the nature of their actions or that the actions were wrong.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court distinguished the case from Robinson v. California, which prohibited punishing someone for the status of being a narcotics addict. Here, the defendants were punished for the distinct crimes of larceny and burglary, not for their addiction. The court recognized that extreme cases of drug addiction could render individuals incompetent, absolving them of criminal responsibility, but “mere * * * narcotics addiction will not * * * of [itself] justify acquittal.” The court cited the Penal Law, stating the defendants did not assert they lacked the substantial capacity to know or appreciate the nature and consequence of their conduct or that their conduct was wrong. The court acknowledged the inadequacy of prison confinement as a means of rehabilitation but upheld the legislature’s power to punish theft and robbery, stating imprisonment was not cruel or unusual punishment. The court noted the state’s comprehensive program to combat drug addiction, including civil commitments and treatment options for addicts accused or convicted of crimes, but found that neither defendant qualified for such treatment due to prior felony convictions. The court referenced a Wisconsin case, De Vougas v. State, which held that it was up to the legislature to determine whether to empower a court to commit a person for treatment for drug addiction rather than sentence them to prison as punishment for the crime. Ultimately, the court deferred to the legislature’s judgment in addressing drug addiction and affirmed the convictions.