New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Blair

  • People v. Blair, 19 N.Y.3d 343 (2012): Admissibility of ‘Familiarity and Access’ Evidence Under Molineux

    People v. Blair, 19 N.Y.3d 343 (2012)

    Evidence of a defendant’s prior bad acts is admissible only if it is probative of some fact at issue other than the defendant’s criminal propensity; however, even if improperly admitted, a conviction will stand if the error is harmless.

    Summary

    Defendant was convicted of robbery, grand larceny, and criminal impersonation for two incidents where he impersonated a police officer. The prosecution introduced evidence that the defendant possessed a handcuff key while incarcerated awaiting trial, arguing it showed his “access to handcuffs.” The Court of Appeals held that admitting the handcuff key evidence was error because it was not sufficiently relevant and was prejudicial. However, the Court affirmed the conviction, finding the error harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of the defendant’s guilt, including eyewitness testimony and corroborating evidence.

    Facts

    In the first incident, the defendant displayed a badge, claimed to be a police officer, and demanded money from the victim. He pushed the victim and threatened him with handcuffs, ultimately obtaining money from an ATM. In the second incident, the defendant, while driving, impersonated an officer during a traffic stop of a cab driver. Police officers arrived, discovered the ruse, and found fake badges and toy handcuffs in the defendant’s car. Several weeks after the incidents, a corrections officer found a handcuff key on the defendant while he was incarcerated at Riker’s Island awaiting trial.

    Procedural History

    The trial court granted the People’s Molineux application, allowing testimony about the handcuff key. The defendant was convicted. His motion to set aside the verdict was denied. The Appellate Division affirmed, finding the evidence of the handcuff key properly admitted. The Court of Appeals reviewed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the handcuff key to show “familiarity and access” to the tools of the crime, and if so, whether this error requires reversal of the conviction.

    Holding

    No, although the trial court erred in admitting the handcuff key evidence because its probative value was outweighed by its potential for prejudice, the error was harmless because the proof of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming and there was no significant probability that the jury would have acquitted the defendant had the evidence been excluded.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals cited People v. Molineux, stating that evidence of uncharged crimes is admissible only if probative of a fact at issue other than the defendant’s criminal propensity. Such evidence may be admitted to establish motive, intent, absence of mistake, a common scheme, or identity. The Court acknowledged that the Molineux list is not exhaustive, but stressed that the evidence must be more probative than prejudicial. The Court found the handcuff key evidence had little relevance, noting the handcuffs were never used in the first incident and not directly involved in the second. Quoting People v. Richardson, the court stated the evidence’s “limited probative value when compared to its potential for prejudice and the unacceptable danger that the jury might condemn defendant because of his past criminal behavior…makes this evidence inadmissible.” However, the Court found the error harmless, citing People v. Crimmins. The Court noted the overwhelming evidence of guilt regarding both incidents, including the victim’s account, the ATM surveillance video, and the arresting officer’s testimony. Because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, the Court concluded there was no significant probability that the verdict would have been different had the handcuff key evidence been excluded. The Court also found a single improper statement during the prosecutor’s summation was cured by a curative instruction.

  • People v. Blair, 90 N.Y.2d 1003 (1997): Admissibility of Prior Uncharged Crimes as Rebuttal Evidence

    People v. Blair, 90 N.Y.2d 1003 (1997)

    Evidence of a prior uncharged crime is inadmissible to demonstrate a defendant’s bad character or criminal propensity unless it is linked to a specific material issue relating to the charged crime and its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact; additionally, rebuttal evidence must counter some affirmative fact the defendant attempted to prove.

    Summary

    The defendant was convicted of drug-related crimes. His defense was that an informant planted the drugs in his closet. The prosecution called a rebuttal witness who testified that eight months prior, the defendant had sold her drugs from his apartment. The Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, finding that the rebuttal testimony was inadmissible because it only demonstrated the defendant’s propensity to sell drugs and did not refute his claim that he had been framed. The Court held that the prior uncharged crime evidence was inadmissible because it didn’t address a material issue raised by the defense.

    Facts

    Police, assisted by an informant, obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s apartment. During the search, police found drugs in the defendant’s bedroom closet. At trial, the defendant claimed that the informant planted the drugs to frame him. After the defense rested, the People called a rebuttal witness. The witness testified that approximately eight months before the search, the defendant had sold her drugs, retrieving them from a back room of his apartment. The defendant objected, arguing that the testimony lacked probative value and was unduly prejudicial. The trial court overruled the objection, finding the evidence relevant to “the issue of knowledge and weight.”

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted on narcotics-related charges in the trial court. He appealed to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the trial court erred in admitting rebuttal testimony regarding a prior uncharged drug transaction when the defendant’s defense was that the drugs were planted, and the testimony served only to demonstrate the defendant’s propensity to sell drugs rather than to rebut a specific fact affirmatively asserted by the defendant.

    Holding

    Yes, because the rebuttal testimony concerning an alleged drug transaction eight months before the events for which he was convicted did nothing to refute defendant’s claim that he had been framed, but merely tended to show his propensity to sell drugs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals stated that evidence of a prior uncharged crime is inadmissible solely to demonstrate a defendant’s bad character or criminal propensity. However, such evidence may be admissible if it is linked to a specific material issue relating to the charged crime and if its probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact. Furthermore, evidence offered in rebuttal must counter “’some affirmative fact’” which defendant attempted to prove (quoting People v. Harris, 57 N.Y.2d 335, 345, quoting Marshall v. Davies, 78 N.Y. 414, 420). In this case, the defendant’s defense was that he never possessed the drugs found in his closet; he claimed they were planted. The Court found that while evidence of prior uncharged crimes may be relevant to show intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake, these elements were not at issue in the defendant’s case. The Court reasoned that “whether defendant intended to sell the drugs, knew of their weight, or mistakenly or accidentally sold or possessed the drugs was never placed in issue by defendant.” The Court concluded that the rebuttal testimony did not refute the defendant’s claim of being framed and instead, merely demonstrated his propensity to sell drugs, violating the rule against using prior uncharged crimes as propensity evidence. The court cited People v. Crandall, 67 N.Y.2d 111, 118-119.

  • People v. Blair, 73 N.Y.2d 779 (1988): Prosecutor’s Duty to Disclose Promises of Leniency

    People v. Blair, 73 N.Y.2d 779 (1988)

    A prosecutor has a duty to disclose any promises of leniency made to a witness in exchange for their testimony, and this duty extends to correcting false testimony by a witness on the subject, even if the trial assistants were unaware of the specific promises made by a superior within the same office.

    Summary

    Defendants were convicted of manslaughter and criminal possession of a weapon based largely on the testimony of Tony Malloy, a witness with a criminal history and pending charges. Prior to trial, the defense requested disclosure of any promises made to Malloy in exchange for his testimony. While the prosecution revealed some arrangements, it failed to disclose an agreement between an Assistant District Attorney (ADA) and Malloy’s attorney that Malloy would avoid prison on his pending charges if he testified against the defendants. The New York Court of Appeals held that this nondisclosure was a Brady violation requiring a new trial, emphasizing the prosecutor’s duty to disclose promises of leniency and correct false testimony, regardless of internal knowledge within the prosecutor’s office.

    Facts

    Tony Malloy was the prosecution’s primary witness against the defendants, identifying them in connection with the death of Maxine Peterson.
    Malloy had a history of drug use and prior felony convictions, and at the time of the trial, he had three open felony charges pending against him.
    Before trial, the defense requested any promises of leniency made to Malloy in exchange for his testimony.
    The prosecution disclosed that it had purchased airplane tickets to Virginia for Malloy and his girlfriend, paid their first month’s rent, and gave Malloy $1,500 in cash.
    The pending charges against Malloy were adjourned until after the defendants’ trial.
    At trial, Malloy testified that no promises of leniency had been made regarding his pending charges, despite admitting that he had spoken with ADA McCarthy multiple times.

    Procedural History

    The defendants were convicted of manslaughter, second degree, and criminal possession of a weapon, second degree in the trial court.
    During trial, the defense learned of an agreement between ADA McCarthy and Malloy’s attorney, Jonathan Latimer, that Malloy would avoid incarceration if he testified truthfully.
    The defendants moved for dismissal or a new trial based on the Brady violation (failure to disclose exculpatory evidence).
    The trial court ruled that a Brady violation occurred but determined it did not deprive the defendants of a fair trial.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision.
    The New York Court of Appeals reversed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the prosecution’s failure to disclose the agreement required a new trial.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the prosecution’s failure to disclose the agreement between ADA McCarthy and Malloy’s attorney, promising leniency to Malloy in exchange for his testimony, constituted a Brady violation requiring a new trial.
    Whether the Brady violation was excused because the defense learned of the agreement during trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the prosecution has a duty to disclose any promises of leniency made to a witness in exchange for their testimony, and this duty extends to correcting false testimony by a witness on the subject. The studied effort by the prosecution to avoid these accepted standards of conduct and to undermine the rule of Savvides cannot be condoned.
    No, because there was no full disclosure by an informed prosecutor here. The court and defense counsel were kept in ignorance of what the material is.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized the prosecutor’s dual role as an advocate and a public officer, requiring fairness to the accused and candor with the courts.
    The Court cited Brady v. Maryland, highlighting the prosecution’s duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused, including promises of leniency to witnesses.
    ADA McCarthy’s deliberate attempt to shield the trial assistants and Malloy from knowledge of the agreement undermined the purposes of the Brady and Savvides rules.
    “In the final analysis, however, it does not matter whether the trial assistants were genuinely unaware of the arrangement or not. A prosecutor’s obligations to correct false testimony given by prosecution witnesses and to disclose Brady material are duties exercised by individual prosecutors and shared by the prosecutor’s office as a whole.”
    The trial assistants were chargeable with knowledge of McCarthy’s promises to Malloy’s attorney, and they had a responsibility to clarify the record after Malloy testified that no deal for leniency had been struck.
    “After Malloy had testified that no deal for leniency had been struck, the trial assistants, as representatives of their office, had the responsibility of clarifying the record by disclosing all the details of what had actually transpired between their office and Malloy and his attorney.”
    The Court rejected the argument that disclosure during trial obviated the Brady violation because there was no full disclosure by an informed prosecutor. The harm was not harmless, as Malloy was the sole identification witness, and his credibility was pivotal. “The error cannot be said to be harmless (People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230, 237). Malloy was the sole identification witness, and his credibility was a pivotal consideration.”