People v. Battle, 22 N.Y.2d 323 (1968)

A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser included offense if there is a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a finding that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense.

Summary

Defendant Battle was convicted of second-degree assault for allegedly stabbing Cage during a street fight. At trial, the judge refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of third-degree assault. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Battle was entitled to the lesser-included offense instruction because the evidence presented a reasonable doubt as to whether Battle committed the stabbing, while still establishing a lesser assault. The court emphasized that the defendant is entitled to the most favorable view of the evidence when determining whether a lesser-included offense instruction is warranted.

Facts

The altercation began as a fist fight between Battle, Cage, and Pitman. Cage initiated the fight by striking Battle, knocking him down. Pitman then intervened, and both Battle and Pitman chased Cage into a house. Cage testified that Battle stabbed him, but admitted he did not see a knife in Battle’s or Pitman’s hand. Another witness, Minor, testified to seeing Battle stab Cage, but also stated he was not present during the fight, potentially discrediting his testimony. Cage himself stated Minor arrived after the fight.

Procedural History

Battle was convicted of assault in the second degree in the trial court. The trial judge refused to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of assault in the third degree. Battle appealed this decision. The New York Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, ordering a new trial based on the improper denial of the lesser-included offense instruction.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of assault in the third degree when there was a reasonable view of the evidence that the defendant committed the lesser offense but not the greater offense of assault in the second degree.

Holding

Yes, because there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Battle stabbed Cage, which is a necessary element of assault in the second degree, while the evidence clearly supported a finding of a lesser assault.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals reasoned that a defendant is entitled to a charge on a lesser included offense if some reasonable view of the evidence would permit the jury to conclude that the defendant committed the lesser, but not the greater, offense. The court relied on Code of Criminal Procedure § 445, and prior case law, including People v. Malave, 21 N.Y.2d 26 (1967); People v. Mussenden, 308 N.Y. 558; and People v. Schleiman, 197 N.Y. 383. The Court stated the defendant is entitled to the most favorable view of the record when determining if such a charge is warranted.

Here, the court found that the testimony regarding the stabbing was contradictory and questionable. Cage did not see a knife, and Minor’s testimony was inconsistent. This created a reasonable doubt that Battle committed the stabbing, which is an element distinguishing second-degree assault from the lesser third-degree assault. Therefore, the jury should have been given the option to convict on the lesser charge. This is especially important because, even if Battle did not inflict the stabbing himself, to be found guilty of the greater offense, he would have to knowingly participate in the stabbing.

The court emphasized the importance of allowing the jury to consider the lesser charge in cases where the evidence is not conclusive on the elements that elevate the crime to a higher degree. This approach safeguards the defendant’s right to have the jury fully consider all reasonable interpretations of the evidence. The court drew a similarity to the facts in People v. Lindsey, 12 N.Y.2d 421.

The court did not address the precise elements that constituted the assault in the third degree. Instead, the Court focused solely on the fact that there was enough evidence for the jury to reasonably doubt the more serious stabbing offense while clearly being able to infer a lesser assault.