People v. Basch, 36 N.Y.2d 154 (1975)

When evidence regarding a witness’s potential involvement in a crime allows for different reasonable interpretations, the question of whether that witness is an accomplice is a factual determination for the jury, not a legal determination for the court.

Summary

Defendants Basch and Bruno were convicted of burglary and petit larceny. A key issue at trial was whether John Clee, who was present with the defendants, was an accomplice. Clee testified he was told to act as a “lookout” but claimed he did not participate in the burglary. The trial court instructed the jury that Joslyn (another participant) was an accomplice as a matter of law but left it to the jury to decide whether Clee was an accomplice. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the evidence allowed for different reasonable inferences about Clee’s involvement, the trial court properly submitted the accomplice question to the jury.

Facts

On January 9, 1972, Basch, Bruno, John Clee, and Tom Joslyn were snowmobiling. Joslyn testified that he and the defendants broke into the Kiwanis Club property and stole items. Clee testified that he was with the group but did not enter the clubhouse. Clee stated that he was told by one of the others to act as a “lookout” while the others went to “get some stuff.” He admitted that he waited with others at the top of a hill about 100 yards from the house, and that the others returned with stolen items, one of which Clee bought.

Procedural History

Basch and Bruno were indicted for burglary in the third degree and petit larceny. Joslyn, also indicted, pleaded guilty to petit larceny. At trial, the court instructed the jury that Joslyn was an accomplice as a matter of law, but left the determination of Clee’s status as an accomplice to the jury. The defendants were convicted. The Appellate Division affirmed the convictions, and the defendants appealed to the New York Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in submitting the question of Clee’s accomplice status to the jury.

Issue(s)

Whether the trial court erred in submitting to the jury, as a question of fact, whether John Clee was an accomplice.

Holding

No, because different inferences could reasonably be drawn from the evidence regarding Clee’s complicity in the crime.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals referenced CPL 60.22 (subd. 2), which defines an “accomplice” as a witness who “may reasonably be considered to have participated in: (a) The offense charged; or (b) An offense based upon the same or some of the same facts or conduct which constitute the offense charged.” The court clarified that if the undisputed evidence establishes that a witness is an accomplice, the jury must be so instructed. However, if different inferences may reasonably be drawn from the evidence, the question of complicity should be left to the jury. The court distinguished this case from situations where a “lookout” is, by prearrangement, keeping watch to avoid detection. Here, while Clee was told to act as a lookout, there was no proof he agreed to do so or actually acted in that capacity. The court noted the absence of proof that Clee aided in the preparation or execution of the crimes. The fact that Clee purchased one of the stolen items (the telephone) merely created “a question of whether he had participated in the burglary or larceny.” The court also considered whether Clee could be considered an accomplice as a matter of law for criminal facilitation or trespass, but found the evidence insufficient to establish either offense beyond dispute. Because the evidence allowed for different reasonable inferences regarding Clee’s role and level of involvement, the trial court properly submitted the question of his accomplice status to the jury. The court emphasized that the jury is best positioned to weigh conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses when different conclusions can be drawn from their testimony.