New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Bartolomeo

  • People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331 (1990): Limits on Derivative Right to Counsel

    People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331 (1990)

    A suspect who has counsel assigned in a prior, unrelated case can waive the right to counsel in the absence of counsel during a subsequent interrogation regarding a new, unrelated charge.

    Summary

    Bing addresses the scope of a defendant’s right to counsel in New York, particularly when the defendant has prior representation in an unrelated case. The Court of Appeals held that the derivative right to counsel established in People v. Bartolomeo was no longer good law. Thus, a defendant can waive their right to counsel, even without counsel present, when being questioned on a new charge that is unrelated to a previous case where they were assigned counsel. This decision overruled the broader protections previously afforded to defendants under Bartolomeo, emphasizing the need for a clearer, more practical standard.

    Facts

    The defendant was arrested for criminal possession of a controlled substance and resisting arrest. While in custody, he volunteered information about an unrelated homicide. He was assigned counsel for the misdemeanor charges under an alias. Later, police learned his true identity and arrested him for a parole violation. After receiving Miranda warnings, the defendant waived his right to counsel and discussed the homicide again, making inculpatory statements. He was then charged with murder.

    Procedural History

    The Onondaga County Court granted the defendant’s motion to suppress his statements, finding a violation of his right to counsel. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, reversed, denying suppression. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether inculpatory statements made by a defendant, after waiving the right to counsel in the absence of counsel, should be suppressed when the defendant had previously been assigned counsel in a pending, unrelated misdemeanor case.

    Holding

    No, because the derivative right to counsel established in People v. Bartolomeo does not extend to subsequent interrogations on unrelated charges after a valid waiver of Miranda rights.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals addressed the interplay between People v. Rogers and People v. Bartolomeo, and ultimately overruled Bartolomeo to limit the scope of derivative right to counsel. The Court explained that the Bartolomeo rule, which imputed a duty to inquire about prior representation, lacked a “principled basis which justifies its social cost.” The Court emphasized that “there is little to be said for a [derivative] rule which is not firmly grounded on prior case law, cannot be applied uniformly, favors recidivists over first-time arrestees, and exacts such a heavy cost from the public.”

    The Court clarified that Rogers still stands for the principle that once a defendant in custody requests or is represented by counsel, interrogation must cease on any subject. However, Bing makes it clear that this protection does not extend to subsequent interrogations on unrelated charges when the defendant validly waives their Miranda rights. The Court distinguished Bing from Rogers noting, “In People v. Bartolomeo (supra), however, defendant was taken into custody for questioning on a new, unrelated charge. He was not represented on that charge and freely waived his right to counsel”.

    Thus, the Court held that a suspect is competent to waive the right to counsel in the absence of counsel regarding matters unrelated to a charge where counsel was previously assigned. This decision aimed to strike a balance between protecting defendants’ rights and ensuring effective law enforcement.

  • People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981): Right to Counsel and Interrogation on Related Charges

    People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981)

    Once a defendant is represented by counsel on a charge, even if that charge is unrelated to a new investigation, police cannot question the defendant about the new investigation in the absence of counsel if they are aware of the prior representation.

    Summary

    Bartolomeo was arrested and arraigned for criminal possession of stolen property. Subsequently, he was questioned about that crime and two rapes. He had counsel in connection to one of the rapes from a prior investigation. The Court of Appeals held that statements relating to the stolen car charge were inadmissible because his right to counsel had indelibly attached after arraignment on that charge. Further, because the police knew he had counsel on the prior rape charge, questioning on other matters, including the new rape charge, was precluded. The plea to the rape charge which was based on the erroneous denial of suppression was vacated, as was the other rape charge because the plea agreements were integrated.

    Facts

    Ms. McE reported a rape to police. Bartolomeo was represented by counsel for this charge in court proceedings related to a lineup.
    Ms. P reported being raped. She gave the license plate number of the car used, which was found to be stolen. Police found Bartolomeo asleep in the car, arrested him, and arraigned him on criminal possession of stolen property. He was not represented by counsel at this arraignment.
    Bartolomeo was then questioned about the stolen car and both rapes, making incriminating statements.

    Procedural History

    Bartolomeo was indicted on two counts of rape and one count of criminal possession of stolen property.
    The County Court suppressed statements about the stolen property and the Ms. P rape, but admitted statements about the Ms. McE rape.
    The Appellate Division reversed and granted the suppression motion in its entirety.
    The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements relating to the stolen car charge were admissible when Bartolomeo had been arraigned on that charge without counsel.
    Whether statements relating to the Ms. McE rape were admissible when Bartolomeo had counsel for that charge from a prior proceeding, even though it was a different investigation.
    Whether statements relating to the Ms. P rape were admissible given the illegal questioning about the stolen car and Bartolomeo’s representation by counsel on the Ms. McE rape charge.
    Whether the pleas to both rape counts should be vacated if one plea was based on an erroneous denial of suppression.

    Holding

    No, because Bartolomeo’s right to counsel had indelibly attached after the arraignment on the criminal possession charge, and he could not be interrogated on that charge without counsel present.
    No, because counsel having once entered the proceedings in connection with the charge under investigation, Bartolomeo could not waive his right to counsel in the absence of that attorney. The police and District Attorney were aware of the representation.
    No, because the questioning was an integrated whole where the questioning about the criminal possession was “so interrelated and intertwined” with the questioning about the Ms. P rape. Additionally, the defendant was known to be represented by counsel in connection with the “McE” rape charge, questioning on other matters was precluded.
    Yes, because the plea agreement with respect to the two rape counts was integrated and vacatur of one plea requires vacatur of both.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that once the right to counsel attaches, interrogation is prohibited unless counsel is present. This protection extends to questioning on matters that are “so interrelated and intertwined” with the charged crime. Because Bartolomeo had counsel on the McE rape charge, the police knew or should have known he had counsel and could not question him on any matter without counsel present.

    The Court cited People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167 (1979) stating questioning on other matters was precluded when the defendant was known to be represented by counsel. “Moreover, as defendant was known to be represented by counsel in connection with the “McE” rape charge, questioning on other matters was precluded.”

    The Court also agreed with the Appellate Division’s reasoning that the plea agreement was integrated, meaning that if one plea was vacated, both must be vacated. This ensures fairness and prevents the prosecution from benefiting from a plea bargain that was based on flawed evidence. “Inasmuch as the plea to the “McE” rape count was based on an erroneous denial of suppression that plea must be vacated. Additionally, we agree with the Appellate Division, and for the reasons stated in the opinion of Justice Guy T. Mangano, that, although the plea to the “P” rape count was made after suppression, nonetheless the plea agreement with respect to the two rape counts was integrated and vacatur of one plea requires vacatur of both.”

  • People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981): Duty to Inquire About Counsel After Prior Arrest

    People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981)

    When police know a suspect has been recently arrested by the same agency on an unrelated charge, they have a duty to inquire whether the suspect has counsel on that charge before interrogating the suspect; failure to inquire is equivalent to knowing the suspect has counsel, precluding interrogation without counsel present.

    Summary

    Bartolomeo was arrested for arson and represented by counsel. Days later, officers from the same police department arrested him for murder, aware of the arson arrest but not the representation. After waiving his rights, Bartolomeo made incriminating statements. The court held that because the police knew of the recent arrest, they had a duty to ask if he had counsel. Failing to do so, they were charged with that knowledge, rendering the waiver invalid. Thus, the statements were suppressed. However, the court upheld the search warrant for Bartolomeo’s car, finding probable cause existed based on an accomplice’s sworn statement.

    Facts

    On May 27, 1978, Bartolomeo was arrested for arson and arraigned with attorney Joseph Stabile representing him.
    On June 5, 1978, officers from the same police department arrested Bartolomeo for the April murder of John McLaughlin.
    The officers, Detectives Rafferty and Donohue, knew of the arson arrest but not that Bartolomeo had counsel in that case.
    Bartolomeo was advised of his Miranda rights and waived his right to counsel, not mentioning he had an attorney on the arson charge.
    After being confronted with an accomplice’s statement, Bartolomeo made incriminating statements about the McLaughlin homicide.
    About 45 minutes into the interrogation, an attorney contacted by Stabile informed police he represented Bartolomeo and demanded questioning cease, which it did.

    Procedural History

    Bartolomeo was convicted of second-degree murder after a jury trial.
    Prior to trial, Bartolomeo moved to suppress his statements and evidence seized from his car, which was denied.
    The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction without opinion.
    Bartolomeo appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether statements obtained during a police interrogation must be suppressed when the interrogating officers knew the suspect was recently arrested by the same law enforcement agency on an unrelated charge, and failed to inquire whether the suspect had counsel on the prior charge, when, in fact, the suspect was represented by counsel on that charge.
    Whether a search warrant for a vehicle was properly issued based on an accomplice’s sworn statement providing details of the crime.

    Holding

    Yes, because when the interrogating detectives possessed actual knowledge of the outstanding arson charge against the defendant, they were obligated to inquire whether defendant was represented by an attorney on that charge. Having failed to make such inquiry, the officers were chargeable with what such an inquiry would have disclosed.
    No, because an ample showing of probable cause was made based on the accomplice’s sworn statement, and the Aguilar test does not apply when the warrant application includes a sworn statement from someone with firsthand knowledge of the facts.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The court reasoned that police knowledge of a suspect’s representation by counsel on a separate charge precludes interrogation without counsel present. “Knowledge that one in custody is represented by counsel, albeit on a separate, unrelated charge, precludes interrogation in the absence of counsel and renders ineffective any purported waiver of the assistance of counsel when such waiver occurs out of the presence of the attorney.”
    The court extended this principle to situations where police know of a recent prior arrest by the same agency. “Hence, the interrogating detectives here, with actual knowledge of the outstanding arson charge against defendant, were under an obligation to inquire whether defendant was represented by an attorney on that charge.”
    The court distinguished the case from situations with remote prior arrests or arrests by different agencies.
    The court rejected the argument to suppress evidence seized from the car because the warrant was based on a sworn statement from an accomplice, Caprisecca, providing firsthand details of the crime. The warrant recited that probable cause had been shown that the Volkswagen constituted evidence of a crime and tended to show that a particular person had committed a crime.
    The court found the Aguilar v. Texas two-pronged test inapplicable here because it applies when an officer’s affidavit relies on information from an informant, not when there’s a sworn statement from someone with direct knowledge.
    The court also rejected the argument to extend the accomplice corroboration rule (CPL 60.22) to the issuance of search warrants, citing the difference between proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and establishing probable cause.
    The court noted the significant difference in kind between the determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as the predicate for the imposition of criminal sanctions, on the one hand, and the demonstration of probable cause sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements for search and seizure as the warrant for police investigation, on the other, justifies a differentiation (Brinegar v United States, 338 US 160).

  • People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981): Limits on “Indelible” Right to Counsel in Interrogations on Unrelated Charges

    People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225 (1981)

    The “indelible” right to counsel, which prevents police questioning in the absence of an attorney, does not extend to unrelated charges when that right arises solely from the filing of an accusatory instrument on the unrelated charge, unless the police know about the pending unrelated charge.

    Summary

    Bartolomeo was convicted of murder. He argued that his confession should have been suppressed because he had an “indelible” right to counsel on an unrelated shoplifting charge due to an outstanding arrest warrant. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the right to counsel on the shoplifting charge did not preclude questioning on the murder charge, as the police lacked actual knowledge of the outstanding warrant. The Court distinguished between actual representation by counsel and the mere existence of an outstanding charge, limiting the scope of the Rogers rule.

    Facts

    Bartolomeo was a suspect in a murder investigation. He voluntarily accompanied detectives to a police station and then to undergo a polygraph examination. Before the polygraph, the detective knew of an outstanding shoplifting charge against Bartolomeo. After the polygraph, Bartolomeo confessed to the murder. Bartolomeo argued that because an accusatory instrument and arrest warrant were outstanding on the shoplifting charge, his right to counsel had attached, and his confession to murder should be suppressed.

    Procedural History

    The trial court denied Bartolomeo’s motion to suppress his confession. He was convicted of murder. The Appellate Division affirmed. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the “indelible” right to counsel, arising from the filing of an accusatory instrument and the issuance of an arrest warrant on an unrelated charge, precludes police questioning on a new charge when the police know of the pending unrelated charge.

    Holding

    No, because the “indelible” right to counsel does not extend to unrelated charges solely because of the existence of an outstanding accusatory instrument unless the police actually know about the pending unrelated charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished its prior holding in People v. Rogers, which held that once a defendant is represented by counsel, they cannot be questioned on any matter without counsel present. The Court noted that Rogers involved actual representation by an attorney, whereas Bartolomeo’s right to counsel on the shoplifting charge stemmed solely from the commencement of formal proceedings (the outstanding warrant). The Court emphasized that extending the Rogers rule to situations where the police were unaware of pending unrelated charges would place an unreasonable burden on law enforcement. The Court stated, “To extend the Rogers rule to the circumstances here presented would be to expand the derivative right to counsel beyond the reach of logic and sound policy. To hold that the warrant outstanding in a Town Court 50 miles away constructively interposes an attorney between the police and defendant, would unrealistically limit police interrogation procedures.” The Court also pointed out that there was no active attorney-client relationship on the shoplifting charge to be protected. The dissent argued that the commencement of criminal proceedings should be equated with actual representation by counsel, and that the Rogers rule should apply to prevent police from circumventing the right to counsel by questioning defendants on unrelated charges. Chief Judge Cooke, in dissent, asserted that “the rationale of Rogers itself—that law enforcement officials should not be permitted to circumvent the right to counsel by the simple expedient of questioning on unrelated charges—requires this result.” The majority rejected this view, fearing it would “unrealistically limit police interrogation procedures.”