People v. Bartley, 75 N.Y.2d 447 (1990)

A court’s inherent power to vacate a plea and sentence is limited, especially after judgment has been entered, and cannot be exercised over the defendant’s objection when the error goes beyond a mere clerical error on the record’s face.

Summary

Bartley pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny, with all parties mistakenly believing it was a felony. After sentencing and incarceration began, the mistake was discovered: the crime was a misdemeanor at the time of the offense. The trial court sought to correct the error by offering a plea to a different felony, but Bartley refused. The court then vacated the original plea. Bartley sought prohibition, arguing double jeopardy. The New York Court of Appeals held that the trial court lacked the power to vacate the plea after sentencing, absent fraud or misrepresentation, and reinstated the original plea for misdemeanor resentencing.

Facts

Bartley and a co-defendant were indicted for robbery, assault, and grand larceny.

Pursuant to a plea bargain, Bartley pleaded guilty to attempted grand larceny in the third degree, with a promised sentence of 1 1/2 to 3 years.

At the time of the plea, all parties incorrectly believed attempted grand larceny in the third degree was a Class E felony, justifying the agreed-upon sentence given Bartley’s status as a predicate felon.

In reality, the crime was a Class A misdemeanor at the time the crimes were committed, and the felony reclassification did not take effect until later.

The error was discovered after Bartley began serving his sentence.

The trial court offered Bartley the opportunity to plead guilty to grand larceny in the fourth degree (a felony) to match the agreed-upon sentence, but Bartley refused.

The trial court then vacated the original plea and set the matter down for trial.

Procedural History

Bartley commenced an Article 78 proceeding to prohibit further prosecution on the felony charges, reinstate his original plea, and be resentenced as a misdemeanor offender.

The Appellate Division granted the petition, prohibiting further felony prosecution, reinstating the original conviction, and remanding for resentencing.

The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether a court has the inherent power to vacate an illegally imposed plea and sentence, based on a mutual mistake of fact, after the criminal proceeding has terminated by the entry of judgment, and against the defendant’s wishes, where the mistake is that the underlying crime was actually a misdemeanor, not a felony, at the time of commission?

Holding

No, because after a sentence is imposed and a judgment is entered, a plea cannot be disturbed based upon the parties’ mutual mistake when there is no statutory basis for setting aside such a plea, and because courts lack inherent power to vacate a plea and sentence over the defendant’s objection where the error goes beyond a mere clerical error apparent on the face of the record.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals acknowledged its prior holdings that courts have inherent power to vacate orders and judgments obtained by fraud or misrepresentation but emphasized that this power is not unlimited.

The Court distinguished cases where clerical errors were corrected or where fraud was involved, noting that the error here went beyond a simple clerical mistake and there was no allegation of fraud. Citing Matter of Campbell v. Pesce, 60 NY2d 165, the court reiterated that there is no inherent power to vacate a plea and sentence over the defendant’s objection after the proceeding has terminated, unless the error is a mere clerical one.

The Court explained that while the sentence was illegal (felony time for a misdemeanor plea), the proper remedy was to impose a new sentence consistent with the misdemeanor plea, not to vacate the plea itself. The court stated: “Once defendant’s sentence was imposed and judgment was entered, however, his plea could not be disturbed based upon the parties’ mutual mistake since no statutory basis existed for setting aside such a plea”.

The court explicitly rejected the People’s argument that the mutual mistake rendered the plea bargain voidable under contract law principles. Further prosecution on the original felony charges was barred by double jeopardy.