New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Bark

  • People v. Bark, 66 N.Y.2d 170 (1985): Limits on Defendant’s Right to Plead Guilty

    People v. Bark, 66 N.Y.2d 170 (1985)

    A defendant does not have an unconditional right to plead guilty to a misdemeanor complaint in local criminal court when the prosecution requests an adjournment to present the charge to a Grand Jury.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s right to plead guilty under CPL 220.10(2) is not absolute when the prosecution seeks to present the charge to a Grand Jury. The defendant attempted to plead guilty to a misdemeanor complaint before the District Attorney could present the case to a Grand Jury. The Court reasoned that CPL 340.20(1), which applies article 220 to non-indictment accusatory instruments, does so only “to the extent that they can be so applied.” The Court found that applying CPL 220.10(2) in this instance would nullify CPL 170.20(2), which allows the District Attorney to present the charge to a Grand Jury before a guilty plea is entered. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision to allow the adjournment.

    Facts

    The defendant was charged via a misdemeanor complaint in local criminal court. Prior to any indictment, the defendant attempted to plead guilty to the misdemeanor charge. The prosecution requested an adjournment under CPL 170.20(2) to present the charge against the defendant to a Grand Jury, seeking a potential indictment for a higher charge.

    Procedural History

    The trial court ruled that CPL 220.10 does not supersede CPL 170.20 and granted the adjournment. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision. The case was then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 220.10(2) affords a defendant an unconditional right to plead guilty in a local criminal court to a charge lodged in a misdemeanor complaint, even when the prosecution has requested an adjournment under CPL 170.20(2) to present the charge to a Grand Jury.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 340.20(1) applies the plea provisions of article 220 only to the extent that they do not override other specific provisions of law, such as CPL 170.20(2), which grants the District Attorney the right to present the charge to a Grand Jury before a guilty plea is entered.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that CPL 340.20(1), which makes the plea provisions of article 220 applicable to instruments other than indictments, does so only “to the extent that they can be so applied.” The court emphasized that CPL 170.20(2) unequivocally allows the District Attorney to adjourn proceedings to present the charge to a Grand Jury before the entry of a plea of guilty. The court stated, “where, as here, the application of article 220 would nullify the effect of another express provision of law specifically relating to the prosecution of crimes in local criminal courts, the specific provision, such as that embodied in CPL 170.20 (subd 2), must be read as one of the exceptions contemplated by CPL 340.20 (subd 1).”

    The Court further explained the purpose of CPL 220.10(2), stating that “[t]he purpose of CPL 220.10 (subd 2) is to afford an indicted defendant an opportunity, as a matter of right, to plead guilty to all charges in an indictment so that he might avoid the expense and ordeal of a trial.” The Court clarified that the statute was not designed to allow a defendant to preempt the accusatory process before it is complete, especially when the initial assessment of the defendant’s wrongdoing was inadequate. The court concluded that the timing of the defendant’s offer to plead guilty, preceding the prosecution’s adjournment request, was insufficient to alter this outcome.