New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Asaro

  • People v. Asaro, 21 N.Y.3d 677 (2013): Establishing Recklessness Through Speeding and Prior Warnings

    People v. Asaro, 21 N.Y.3d 677 (2013)

    To prove recklessness in vehicular manslaughter or assault cases involving speeding, the prosecution must demonstrate an “additional affirmative act” beyond simply exceeding the speed limit, coupled with proof that the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial risk.

    Summary

    Patrick Asaro was convicted of manslaughter and assault after a high-speed car crash that killed one person and injured several others. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that there was sufficient evidence to prove Asaro acted recklessly. The evidence showed that Asaro, after drinking and possibly smoking marijuana, stopped his car, revved the engine, accelerated to speeds over 90 mph in a 55 mph zone, crossed a double yellow line, and crashed head-on into another vehicle. Crucially, he had also been warned about speeding on that road earlier that evening and immediately before the crash.

    Facts

    Several hours before the accident, Asaro attended a party where he consumed vodka and beer. He showed off modifications to his car designed to increase its speed and noise. He drove to pick up two individuals from a train station, and on the way back to the party, he stopped in the middle of the road for no apparent reason. Asaro revved the engine and rapidly accelerated to a high speed. A passenger warned him to slow down as they approached a sharp turn. Asaro crossed the double yellow line and collided head-on with another vehicle, killing the driver and injuring the passenger. Witnesses testified to Asaro’s high speed and that he appeared intoxicated. A blood test revealed the presence of marijuana, although a later test was negative. At the scene, Asaro said, “I’m sorry, I only had a few.”

    Procedural History

    Asaro was indicted on multiple charges, including manslaughter, assault, reckless endangerment, and reckless driving. At trial, he moved to dismiss the manslaughter and assault charges, arguing insufficient evidence of recklessness. The trial court denied the motion, and the jury convicted him on most charges. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to establish that Asaro acted with the mental state of recklessness to support convictions for second-degree manslaughter and second-degree assault.
    2. Whether the trial court erred by giving an adverse inference charge regarding lost Rosario material (the accident reconstruction expert’s handwritten notes) instead of striking the expert’s testimony about the car’s speed.

    Holding

    1. Yes, because there was sufficient evidence that Asaro was aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk by driving at an extremely high speed after being warned about the danger of the road.
    2. No, because the defendant requested to strike all of the expert’s testimony, not specifically the testimony relating to speed, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying that broad request.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized that a finding of recklessness requires more than just speeding; there must be an “additional affirmative act.” Here, the court pointed to Asaro’s stopping the car, revving the engine, and rapidly accelerating as such acts. Furthermore, the court highlighted the testimony that Asaro had been warned twice about speeding on that particular road, first earlier in the evening and again immediately before the crash. This established that Asaro was aware of the risk and consciously disregarded it. The court distinguished recklessness from criminal negligence, noting that recklessness requires awareness of the risk, while criminal negligence involves a negligent failure to perceive the risk. The court quoted People v. Cabrera, 10 NY3d 370, 377 (2008), stating the evidence demonstrated conduct exhibiting “the kind of seriously blameworthy carelessness whose seriousness would he apparent to anyone who shares the community’s general sense of right and wrong.” The court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to issue an adverse inference charge rather than striking the accident reconstruction expert’s testimony, as the defendant’s request to strike was overly broad. The court emphasized that the defendant didn’t specifically target the speed-related testimony.

  • People v. Asaro, 94 N.Y.2d 792 (1999): Forgery Requires Falsely Making an Instrument

    People v. Asaro, 94 N.Y.2d 792 (1999)

    A person does not commit forgery when they sign their own name to an application, even if the application contains false information.

    Summary

    Vincent Asaro was convicted of forgery, criminal possession of a forged instrument, and offering a false instrument for filing for misrepresenting his date of birth on a driver’s license renewal application. The New York Court of Appeals modified the Appellate Division’s order, dismissing the forgery and criminal possession charges. The Court held that because Asaro signed his own name and provided his own Social Security number, he did not “falsely make” the application, a necessary element of forgery. Furthermore, the license itself was genuine, even with false information, as the DMV was authorized to issue it.

    Facts

    Asaro completed a driver’s license renewal application, misrepresenting his date of birth. He signed the application with his own name and provided his correct Social Security number. The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) was authorized to issue driver’s licenses.

    Procedural History

    Asaro was convicted in the Supreme Court of forgery in the second degree, criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree, and offering a false instrument for filing in the first degree. The Appellate Division affirmed this conviction. Asaro appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the act of signing one’s own name to an application containing false information constitutes forgery in the second degree under Penal Law § 170.10(2)?

    2. Whether a driver’s license containing false information, but issued by the authorized Department of Motor Vehicles, constitutes a forged instrument for the purposes of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the second degree under Penal Law § 170.25?

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant signed his own name and provided his own Social Security number; therefore, he did not “falsely make” the application as required for a forgery conviction.

    2. No, because the Department of Motor Vehicles was authorized to issue the license, and the false information did not affect the genuineness of the document.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals focused on the element of “falsely make” within the definition of forgery. The court referenced People v. Johnson, stating that signing one’s own name does not constitute falsely making an instrument, even if the content is false. The court reasoned that Asaro represented himself accurately and truthfully as Vincent Asaro and did not falsely claim to be another person. The court distinguished the act of providing false information from the act of creating a false instrument. The Court also cited People v. Cannarozzo, which held that a document issued by an authorized entity does not become a forged instrument simply because it contains false information. The genuineness of the document, stemming from the DMV’s authorization, was the key factor. The court emphasized that the DMV was authorized to issue Asaro the license. Even though that license contained false information (the incorrect birthdate), the false information did not transform the otherwise genuine document into a forgery. To hold otherwise would potentially criminalize a wide range of actions where individuals provide false information to authorized entities, which was not the intent of the forgery statutes. The Court stated that to be a forged instrument, the license would have to be made without authorization, not merely contain false information supplied by the licensee.