New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Aponte

  • People v. Aponte, 14 N.Y.3d 107 (2010): Is Attempted Stalking a Cognizable Crime?

    People v. Aponte, 14 N.Y.3d 107 (2010)

    A person can be charged with attempted stalking in the third degree under New York Penal Law because the statute proscribes specific conduct, and one can attempt to engage in that conduct, even if the intended result does not occur.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals addressed whether attempted stalking in the third degree is a legally cognizable offense. The defendant was charged with stalking, harassment in the first degree, and harassment in the second degree based on allegations of following the complainant and making a death threat. The Criminal Court reduced the stalking charge to attempted stalking. The Court of Appeals held that attempted stalking is a valid offense because the stalking statute penalizes specific conduct, and a person can attempt to engage in that conduct. The court affirmed the Appellate Term’s order.

    Facts

    The misdemeanor complaint alleged that the defendant followed the complainant in his vehicle for three blocks as she walked to church. After she returned home and left with a friend, the defendant followed them for approximately five blocks, exited his vehicle, and confronted the complainant while she was in her friend’s car. He then told her, “I am going to kill you.” The complaint further stated the defendant had followed the complainant approximately 25 times over the previous three years at various locations.

    Procedural History

    The Criminal Court granted the prosecution’s motion to reduce the stalking charge to attempted stalking in the third degree. The defendant was convicted of attempted stalking in the third degree, harassment in the first degree, and harassment in the second degree after a bench trial. The Appellate Term affirmed the judgment. The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether attempted stalking in the third degree is a legally cognizable offense under New York law.

    Holding

    Yes, because the stalking statute proscribes specific conduct, and a person can attempt to engage in that conduct, regardless of whether the intended result (fear, alarm, etc.) actually occurs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that under Penal Law § 110.00, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime when, with intent to commit a crime, he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime. The Court relied on its precedent in People v. Prescott, holding that “where a penal statute imposes strict liability for committing certain conduct, an attempt is legally cognizable, since one can attempt to engage in conduct.” The court also cited People v. Saunders, where it held that a defendant could be charged with attempted criminal possession of a weapon because the underlying crime proscribed particular conduct. The Court found that the stalking statute, Penal Law § 120.50(3), penalizes behavior that is likely to cause harm, and does not require proof of actual harm. The Court stated: “While the conduct penalized is defined as engaging in ‘a course of conduct . . . likely to cause’ certain consequences, there is nothing impossible about attempting to engage in such a course of conduct.” As an example, the court explained, “if a telephone call or e-mail were ‘likely to cause’ the consequences referred to, an attempt to make such a phone call or send such an e-mail—even if the communication never reached its intended recipient—would be an attempt.” The court concluded that because the statute strictly penalizes conduct, an attempt to engage in that conduct is not a legal impossibility. The court also agreed with the appellate court that the factual allegations in the complaint established every element of stalking in the third degree and harassment in the first degree.

  • People v. Aponte, 2 N.Y.3d 304 (2004): Limits on Supplemental Jury Instructions After Deadlock

    2 N.Y.3d 304 (2004)

    A supplemental jury instruction given after a jury reports a deadlock is improper if it overemphasizes the importance of reaching a verdict without also reminding jurors not to surrender their conscientiously held beliefs.

    Summary

    Aponte was convicted of criminal sale of a controlled substance. After a relatively short trial, the jury deliberated for two days, sending two deadlock notes. The trial court gave a supplemental instruction emphasizing the need for a result and minimizing the possibility of a hung jury. The jury returned a guilty verdict five minutes later. The New York Court of Appeals held that the supplemental instruction was coercive and unbalanced because it stressed the need for a verdict without adequately reminding jurors not to abandon their sincerely held beliefs. The Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial, emphasizing the importance of balanced jury instructions.

    Facts

    Aponte was arrested as part of a buy-and-bust operation and charged with criminal sale of a controlled substance. At trial, the only disputed issue was the identity of Aponte as the seller. The trial lasted approximately three hours, with testimony from three witnesses. After summations, the judge charged the jury, and deliberations began. After approximately five hours of deliberation, the jury sent a note stating they were deadlocked.

    Procedural History

    The trial court instructed the jury to continue deliberating after the first deadlock note. After further deliberations and a second deadlock note stating the jury could not reach a unanimous decision, the trial court delivered a supplemental instruction. Defense counsel objected, arguing the instruction was an improper Allen charge. The trial court denied the objection. The jury returned a guilty verdict five minutes after the supplemental instruction. The defendant was convicted. The Appellate Division reversed, holding the supplemental jury instruction was unbalanced and coercive. The People appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a trial court’s supplemental instruction to a deadlocked jury was unbalanced and coercive, thereby depriving the defendant of a fair trial.

    Holding

    Yes, because the supplemental instruction overemphasized the jury’s obligation to reach a verdict without adequately reminding jurors not to surrender their conscientiously held beliefs.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals acknowledged that supplemental charges encouraging a verdict after a deadlock are permissible. However, the court must not coerce the jury into a particular verdict. The Court found the trial court’s instruction overemphasized the obligation to return a verdict by stating, “The point of this process is to get a result” and suggesting the jurors were failing in their duty. The instruction also failed to advise the jurors not to surrender conscientiously held beliefs. The Court noted, “Contrary to the court’s supplemental instruction, the object of the jury system is not to ‘get a result,’ it is ‘to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors themselves’.” The swiftness of the verdict after the instruction further suggested coercion. The Court emphasized that while an Allen charge need not explicitly state that the verdict must be each juror’s individual decision, the charge must contain some language balancing the instruction to reach a verdict with a reminder that jurors should not abandon their convictions. The Court stated criminal “jury instructions generally are not fertile ground for innovation during trial”.

  • People v. Aponte, 28 N.Y.2d 347 (1971): Competency Standard for Post-Conviction Relief for Incarcerated Individuals

    People v. Aponte, 28 N.Y.2d 347 (1971)

    A prisoner certified to a mental hospital may pursue post-conviction remedies, such as coram nobis, only after a preliminary determination of their competency to participate in legal proceedings, ensuring they understand the proceedings and can rationally assist in their defense.

    Summary

    This case addresses whether a prisoner certified to Dannemora State Hospital as mentally ill can use post-conviction remedies to challenge their underlying criminal conviction. The Court held that while these prisoners are not categorically denied the right to attack their convictions, they must first demonstrate competency to participate in legal proceedings. This ensures fairness and protects the integrity of the legal process, balancing the prisoner’s rights with the practical concerns of managing mentally ill inmates and the need for a valid legal process.

    Facts

    Aponte, Waters, and Conover were all inmates who had been transferred to Dannemora State Hospital after being certified as mentally ill. They sought post-conviction relief (coram nobis or habeas corpus) to challenge the validity of their original criminal convictions. Aponte argued he didn’t understand the proceedings when he pleaded guilty due to insanity and a language barrier. Waters claimed insanity at the time of his guilty plea. Conover asserted he was not currently insane and cited defects in his indictment and arraignment.

    Procedural History

    In each case, the court of original jurisdiction denied the application for post-conviction relief, citing People v. Booth and stating that such applications could only be renewed once the inmate’s sanity was restored. The Appellate Division affirmed these decisions without opinion. The cases were then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    Whether a prisoner certified to a mental hospital is entitled to pursue post-conviction remedies to challenge the validity of their criminal conviction without first demonstrating their competency to understand the proceedings and assist in their defense.

    Holding

    No, because a preliminary determination of competency is required to ensure fairness to the individual and protect the integrity of the legal process. The Court held that prisoners must first demonstrate their competency to participate in legal proceedings before pursuing coram nobis or similar remedies.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court reasoned that allowing prisoners certified as mentally ill to pursue post-conviction relief without a competency determination could lead to unfair and impractical outcomes. It cited the risks associated with removing mentally ill prisoners from treating hospitals, the burden on the penal system, and the potential for disrupting hospital operations. The Court found that the procedures outlined in Section 408 of the Correction Law, designed to implement the constitutional requirements of United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, could be adapted to accommodate competency determinations. The court emphasized that “Equal protection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.” The Court established a procedure where inmates can apply to the Supreme Court for a competency determination, requiring factual allegations of competency and a prima facie showing of entitlement to coram nobis relief. If the court finds both, it must conduct a hearing to determine competency. If the inmate is deemed competent, the coram nobis motion can then be made to the court of conviction. This approach balances the prisoner’s right to challenge their conviction with the practical considerations of managing mentally ill inmates.