New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Andrews

  • People v. Patel, Andrews, Kruger, 22 N.Y.3d 606 (2014): Limits on Coram Nobis Relief for Untimely Appeals

    People v. Patel, Andrews, Kruger, 22 N.Y.3d 606 (2014)

    Coram nobis relief for an untimely appeal is a narrow exception, available only when a defendant has no other procedural recourse and could not reasonably have discovered the attorney’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal within the one-year statutory grace period.

    Summary

    The New York Court of Appeals clarified the scope of coram nobis relief for defendants seeking to file untimely appeals, particularly in light of the decision in People v. Syville. The Court held that coram nobis is a narrow exception, available only when a defendant has no other procedural recourse and could not reasonably have discovered the attorney’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal within the one-year statutory grace period. The Court reversed the Appellate Division’s grant of coram nobis relief in Patel because Patel had previously sought relief under CPL 460.30 within the one-year period. The Court affirmed the denial of coram nobis relief in Andrews because Andrews failed to offer sufficient factual allegations supporting his claim of ineffective assistance. The Court also affirmed the denial of coram nobis relief in Kruger, holding that it does not extend to discretionary criminal leave applications to the Court of Appeals.

    Facts

    • People v. Vinod Patel: Patel pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography and waived his right to appeal. Within the one-year grace period, he sought permission to file a late notice of appeal, claiming ineffective assistance. The Appellate Division initially rejected his application. After Syville, Patel sought coram nobis relief, which the Appellate Division granted.
    • People v. Churchill Andrews: Andrews pleaded guilty to selling narcotics and waived his right to appeal. He later filed a CPL article 440 motion, which was denied. He then moved for coram nobis relief, claiming ineffective assistance for failure to file a notice of appeal. The Appellate Division rejected both applications.
    • People v. Kevin Kruger: Kruger pleaded guilty to burglary and waived his right to appeal. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction. Kruger later sought coram nobis relief to file a late criminal leave application, claiming his lawyer failed to do so. The Appellate Division denied the motion.

    Procedural History

    • Patel: The Appellate Division initially denied Patel’s CPL 460.30 motion but later granted coram nobis relief. The People appealed to the Court of Appeals.
    • Andrews: The Supreme Court denied Andrews’ CPL article 440 motion. The Appellate Division affirmed that denial and also denied his coram nobis motion. Andrews appealed the coram nobis decision to the Court of Appeals.
    • Kruger: The Appellate Division denied Kruger’s coram nobis motion. Kruger appealed to the Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether coram nobis relief is available when a defendant has previously sought relief under CPL 460.30 within the one-year grace period.
    2. Whether a motion for coram nobis relief provided sufficient factual allegations to support the assertion that the lawyer failed to inform the defendant about pursuing an appeal or file a notice of appeal.
    3. Whether the reasoning of Syville applies to discretionary criminal leave applications to the Court of Appeals.

    Holding

    1. No, because coram nobis is available only when a defendant has no other procedural recourse.
    2. No, because Syville requires a defendant to demonstrate that appellate rights were lost as a result of ineffective assistance, supported by specific factual allegations.
    3. No, because there is no federal constitutional right to legal representation on a discretionary application for an appeal to a state’s highest court.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court emphasized that Syville established a narrow exception to the CPL 460.30 time limit for coram nobis relief, available only in rare cases where a defendant has no other procedural recourse. In Patel, the Court reasoned that because Patel had availed himself of the CPL 460.30 procedure within the one-year grace period, he could not later seek similar relief via coram nobis. The Court distinguished pre-CPL cases, noting that they were largely abrogated by the codification of coram nobis remedies.

    In Andrews, the Court found that Andrews’ coram nobis application lacked sufficient factual allegations to support his claim of ineffective assistance. Unlike the defendants in Syville, Andrews made only perfunctory claims without providing specific details or countering the attorney’s assertion that Andrews had decided against an appeal.

    Regarding Kruger, the Court distinguished between appeals as of right and discretionary criminal leave applications. Because there is no federal constitutional right to counsel for discretionary appeals to a state’s highest court, the failure to file a CLA does not necessarily establish ineffective assistance of counsel or a due process violation. The court stated, “[U]nlike an appeal as of right, however, there is no federal constitutional entitlement to legal representation on a discretionary application for an appeal to a state’s highest court (see Ross v Moffitt, 417 US 600, 615-616 [1974]; Halbert v Michigan, 545 US at 611-612; Hernandez v Greiner, 414 F3d 266, 269-270 [2d Cir 2005]). Thus, the failure to file a CLA, standing alone, does not necessarily establish that Kruger was deprived of effective assistance of counsel or due process of law (see Wainwright v Torna, 455 US 586, 587-588 [1982]).”

  • People v. Andrews, 78 N.Y.2d 88 (1991): Limits of Automatic Standing in Possessory Crimes

    People v. Andrews, 78 N.Y.2d 88 (1991)

    Automatic standing to challenge a search and seizure is limited to cases where the criminal possessory charge is rooted solely in a statutory presumption attributing possession to the defendant; it does not extend to charges based on ordinary constructive possession.

    Summary

    Defendant Andrews was convicted of drug and weapons charges. He sought to suppress evidence, arguing he had standing. The Court of Appeals held that automatic standing only applies when the possessory charge is *solely* based on a statutory presumption. Since the weapon and paraphernalia charges were based on constructive possession, not solely on a statutory presumption, Andrews had to demonstrate a personal expectation of privacy in the searched premises, which he failed to do. The Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s decision, limiting the application of automatic standing.

    Facts

    Police searched an apartment and found controlled substances, a weapon, and drug paraphernalia. Andrews was charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance, criminal possession of a weapon, and criminally using drug paraphernalia. The drug charge was based on Penal Law §220.25 (2), a statutory presumption. The other charges were based on constructive possession. Andrews did not reside at the apartment.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially denied Andrews’ motion to suppress for lack of standing. The Appellate Division held the appeal in abeyance and remitted for a hearing on the suppression motion. On remittal, the Supreme Court held Andrews had automatic standing to challenge the drug charge but needed to demonstrate a personal expectation of privacy for the other charges. The Appellate Division modified the judgment, reversing the drug conviction but affirming the others. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal to consider the standing issue for the weapon and drug paraphernalia charges.

    Issue(s)

    Whether the defendant should be accorded automatic standing to challenge the search and seizure of the weapon and drug paraphernalia, where one charge (drug possession) was rooted in a statutory presumption, but the other charges were based on ordinary constructive possession.

    Holding

    No, because automatic standing is a narrow exception limited to cases where the criminal possessory charge is rooted *solely* in a statutory presumption attributing possession to the defendant. Since the charges related to the weapon and paraphernalia were based on ordinary constructive possession, the defendant was required to demonstrate a personal expectation of privacy in the searched premises.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals emphasized the distinction between statutory presumption-based possession and ordinary constructive possession. Citing People v. Wesley, the Court stated that when a charge is based on ordinary constructive possession, standing is available only if the defendant demonstrates a “personal legitimate expectation of privacy in the searched premises.” The Court refused to extend the automatic standing exception established in People v. Millan, which applies when possession is attributed solely through a statutory presumption, to cases involving constructive possession based on other evidence. The Court reasoned that expanding automatic standing would undermine the general rule requiring a personal expectation of privacy. The Court quoted People v. Ponder, stating that a defendant must ” ‘establish, that he himself was the victim of an invasion of privacy’ ” to challenge a search. The court emphasized that the “unfairness… perceived in Millan is not present in cases where a defendant is charged with constructive possession on the basis of evidence other than the statutory presumption”.