New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Alston

  • People v. Alston, 88 N.Y.2d 519 (1996): Permissible Jury Selection Methods Under New York Criminal Procedure Law

    88 N.Y.2d 519 (1996)

    CPL 270.15 allows trial courts flexibility in jury selection, permitting methods where the prosecution exercises peremptory challenges before the defendant, without requiring the prosecution to exhaust all challenges to the entire panel at once.

    Summary

    The case addresses whether New York’s Criminal Procedure Law (CPL 270.15) mandates the prosecution to make all peremptory challenges to a jury array before the defendant makes any, or if the court can require sequential challenges to individual jurors or subsets. The Court of Appeals held that CPL 270.15 allows trial courts flexibility in jury selection as long as the prosecution exercises peremptory challenges before the defendant and doesn’t challenge a juror already accepted by both parties. This decision upheld the trial courts’ methods and affirmed the defendants’ convictions.

    Facts

    In People v. Alston, after initial rounds of jury selection, the trial court directed the parties to exercise peremptory challenges to the first five prospective jurors to complete the jury. The defendant objected, arguing the prosecution had to challenge the entire panel. In People v. Morris, the court instructed attorneys to make peremptory challenges juror by juror, with the prosecution going first. The defendant objected, arguing CPL 270.15 required the prosecution to exhaust all peremptory challenges against the entire panel before the defense made any.

    Procedural History

    Both defendants appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial courts’ methods violated CPL 270.15. The Appellate Division rejected these arguments. The cases were consolidated on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals due to the similar issue regarding jury selection procedures.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 270.15 mandates that the prosecution exercise all peremptory challenges to a particular array of jurors before the defendant is required to exercise any peremptory challenges to that array, or whether the trial court has discretion to implement alternative methods.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 270.15 provides flexibility in jury selection, permitting methods where the prosecution exercises peremptory challenges before the defendant, and the prosecution does not challenge a juror already accepted by both parties, consistent with the statute’s language and history.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals found that CPL 270.15 allows flexibility in jury selection. Specifically, the court noted the ambiguity in CPL 270.15 (2), stating that the phrase “[t]he people must exercise their peremptory challenges first” can be interpreted to mean that each prosecution challenge must precede each defense challenge, rather than requiring all prosecution challenges to precede any defense challenges. The court reasoned that interpreting the statute to require the prosecution to exhaust all peremptory challenges to the entire panel would give some defendants a tactical advantage, dependent on the judge’s discretionary decisions regarding filling the jury box. Quoting People v. McQuade, the court acknowledged that “the requirement…that the People shall challenge first, is the only substantial advantage remaining to a defendant.” The Court found that the historical rule that the People make peremptory challenges first, and never be permitted to go back and challenge a juror accepted by the defense was not violated by the juror-by-juror method. The dissent argued the statute plainly requires the People to exercise all peremptory challenges to the panel “first,” before the defense begins and that once the defense exercises its challenge or challenges, the statute precludes the People from challenging any juror then in the box, not just those jurors in the box whom “both sides have had an opportunity” to challenge.

  • People v. Alston, 73 N.Y.2d 921 (1989): Justification and Criminal Possession of a Weapon

    People v. Alston, 73 N.Y.2d 921 (1989)

    Justification is not a defense to the charge of criminal possession of a weapon; the only defense is temporary innocent possession, while justification may excuse the unlawful use of the weapon.

    Summary

    Alston was convicted of assault and criminal possession of a weapon after a street fight where he shot the victim. He argued self-defense, claiming the victim attacked him with a gun and screwdriver, and he only used the gun to protect himself after wresting it from the victim. The Court of Appeals held that justification is not a defense to criminal possession of a weapon. The court reasoned that once unlawful possession is established, the crime is complete. While justification can excuse the unlawful *use* of a weapon, it cannot retroactively excuse the unlawful *possession* of it. The court also addressed supplemental jury instructions and missing witness issues.

    Facts

    William Roche and Alston engaged in a street altercation. Alston fired several shots at Roche, hitting him multiple times. At trial, Alston claimed Roche initiated the attack, first with a gun and then with a screwdriver. Alston testified that he disarmed Roche and fired the weapon in self-defense.

    Procedural History

    Alston was indicted on charges of attempted murder, first-degree assault (intentional), first-degree assault (reckless), and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The trial court dismissed the reckless assault charge. The jury acquitted Alston of attempted murder but convicted him of intentional assault and criminal possession of a weapon. Alston appealed, challenging the jury instructions.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether justification is a defense to the charge of criminal possession of a weapon.
    2. Whether the trial court erred in its supplemental instructions to the jury by not repeating the justification defense.

    Holding

    1. No, because justification may excuse the unlawful *use* of the weapon, but not the initial unlawful *possession* of it.
    2. No, because the court responded meaningfully to the jury’s inquiry, and the defense counsel did not timely request a reiteration of the justification charge.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that the essence of illegal conduct under Penal Law sections 265.01-265.05 is the unlawful possession of a weapon. While intent can elevate the severity of the crime, the possession itself must be unlawful. “Once the unlawful possession of the weapon is established, the possessory crime is complete and any unlawful use of the weapon is punishable as a separate crime.” The court acknowledged the defense of temporary and lawful possession, such as finding a weapon and intending to turn it over to authorities, or taking a weapon from an assailant. However, the court distinguished this from justification, stating, “Justification may excuse otherwise unlawful use of the weapon but it is difficult to imagine circumstances where it could excuse unlawful possession of it.” The court emphasized that Alston received the benefit of the justification defense in connection with the attempted murder and assault charges. Regarding the supplemental jury instructions, the court found no error because the trial court responded meaningfully to the jury’s specific inquiry about the elements of the crimes charged. The court noted that defense counsel did not request a repetition of the justification charge until after the jury had resumed deliberations, and reiterating the charge at that point might have unduly emphasized the issue. The court also rejected Alston’s other claims of error, finding that the trial court properly denied the request to charge that the screwdriver was a dangerous instrument as a matter of law and that the failure to call Carmen Rivera as a witness did not warrant a missing witness charge because her testimony would have been cumulative. The court stated that under CPL 310.30 the court must “give such requested information or instruction as [it] deems proper.” The court found that “the court possesses some discretion in framing its supplemental instructions but it must respond meaningfully to the jury’s inquiries”.