New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Alcide

  • People v. Alcide, 21 N.Y.3d 687 (2013): Judge’s Participation in Testimony Readback

    People v. Alcide, 21 N.Y.3d 687 (2013)

    While a trial judge should generally avoid participating in readbacks of testimony to the jury, doing so is not a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal absent preservation, unless the judge’s actions demonstrate bias that deprives the defendant of a fair trial.

    Summary

    James Alcide was convicted of murder and weapon possession. During jury deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of testimony from two key witnesses. The trial judge, in an effort to expedite the process, participated in the readbacks by reading either the questions or the answers. Alcide argued that this participation constituted a mode of proceedings error, requiring reversal even without an objection. The New York Court of Appeals held that while it’s generally advisable for a judge not to participate in readbacks, doing so does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it demonstrates bias, and that Alcide’s claim was unpreserved.

    Facts

    Alcide was convicted of fatally shooting a man in a grocery store. Key evidence included testimony from a bystander who identified Alcide as the shooter and the victim’s friend who saw Alcide fleeing the scene with a gun. The defense attacked the reliability and credibility of these witnesses, citing inconsistencies and potential biases. During deliberations, the jury requested readbacks of the testimony of the bystander and the first police officer on the scene.

    Procedural History

    Alcide was convicted in the trial court. He appealed to the Appellate Division, arguing that the trial judge committed mode of proceedings errors. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Alcide appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial judge’s participation in the readback of testimony to the jury, by reading either the questions or answers, constituted a mode of proceedings error requiring reversal even in the absence of a timely objection.

    Holding

    1. No, because while it is generally advisable for a judge not to participate in readbacks of testimony, doing so does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it demonstrates bias that deprived the defendant of a fair trial, and Alcide’s claim was unpreserved.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals distinguished this case from People v. O’Rama, where the trial judge withheld the contents of a jury note from counsel. Here, the content of the jury’s requests for readbacks was disclosed in open court, and defense counsel had the opportunity to object to the judge’s proposed procedure. Because counsel did not object, the claim was unpreserved. The Court acknowledged the Second Department’s dictum in People v. Brockett that a trial judge should not participate as a reader during a read-back of testimony, as it might convey the impression that the court is aligned with a particular party. However, the Court clarified that such participation, while generally inadvisable, does not constitute a mode of proceedings error unless it creates a situation analogous to People v. De Jesus, where the judge’s conduct demonstrated clear bias against the defense. The court noted, “Not every procedural misstep in a criminal case is a mode of proceedings error”; rather, this narrow exception to the preservation rule is “reserved for the most fundamental flaws.” Here, the judge’s stated reasons for participating in the readbacks were to expedite the process and make it easier for the jury to follow, not to demonstrate bias. Because defense counsel failed to object to the judge’s participation in the readbacks at a time when the error could have been cured, the Court affirmed the Appellate Division’s order affirming Alcide’s conviction.

  • People v. Alcide, 89 N.Y.2d 961 (1997): Preserving Objections to Jury Polling

    People v. Alcide, 89 N.Y.2d 961 (1997)

    A defendant must make a specific objection or request for further inquiry during jury polling to preserve a claim that the court failed to adequately inquire into a juror’s verdict.

    Summary

    Alcide was convicted of second-degree murder and second-degree assault. During jury polling, one juror initially remained silent when asked if the verdict was hers, but eventually responded affirmatively after the court’s prompting. The defense attorney did not object to the procedure or request further inquiry. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to adequately inquire into the juror’s verdict was unpreserved for appellate review because the defense failed to object or request specific procedures during the polling process. The court also found no abuse of discretion in repeating the “acting-in-concert” instruction.

    Facts

    Alcide was tried for murder and assault stemming from an incident in Bronx County. During deliberations, the jury requested further explanation of attempted second-degree murder and second-degree assault. The court, in response, repeated its previous instruction on “acting-in-concert” liability. The jury then informed the court it had reached a verdict, finding Alcide guilty of second-degree murder and second-degree assault.

    Procedural History

    The trial court convicted Alcide of second-degree murder and second-degree assault. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction, with two justices dissenting. A dissenting justice granted Alcide leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the defendant’s claim that the trial court failed to adequately inquire into a juror’s vote during polling is preserved for appellate review when the defendant failed to object or request further inquiry during the polling process.
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by including an instruction on the “acting-in-concert” theory of liability in its response to the jury’s note.

    Holding

    1. No, because the defendant failed to make a specific objection or request further inquiry when the juror was being polled, and again failed to object after the entire jury was polled.
    2. No, because there is no distinction between liability as a principal and criminal culpability as an accessory, and the prosecution pursued both lines of reasoning.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals held that under CPL 310.80, a juror’s negative response during polling requires the court to refuse the verdict and direct further deliberations. While a juror’s response may raise doubts requiring resolution, a request for specific procedures to correct irregularities must be preserved for review. Here, Alcide’s counsel failed to object or request further inquiry when the juror hesitated. The court stated, “Defendant’s contention on appeal concerning a claimed failure of the trial court to make certain inquiries is unpreserved for our review.”

    Regarding the “acting-in-concert” instruction, the court stated, “Because there is ‘no distinction between liability as a principal and criminal culpability as an accessory’ and the prosecution pursued both lines of reasoning in presenting its case, the court’s repetition of its previous instructions to which defendant had not objected was consistent with ‘the substantive scope of the initial written inquiries’.” The court found no abuse of discretion.

  • People v. Alcide, 56 N.Y.2d 964 (1982): Duty to Respond to Jury Notes and Interested Witness Charge

    People v. Alcide, 56 N.Y.2d 964 (1982)

    A court’s failure to respond to a jury note constitutes reversible error only if it seriously prejudices the defendant, and an interested witness charge is proper when the court instructs the jury that they may consider whether any witness has an interest in the outcome of the case.

    Summary

    The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by not responding to a jury note and by improperly instructing the jury on interested witnesses. The jury note concerned two jurors’ request to be dismissed before sundown due to Sabbath observance. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order, holding that the failure to respond to the jury note did not seriously prejudice the defendant and that the interested witness charge was proper because the court instructed the jury that they could consider whether any witness had an interest in the outcome of the case.

    Facts

    During jury deliberations, the jury sent out several notes requesting exhibits, readbacks, or additional instructions. On the second day, two jurors sent a note stating they were Sabbath observers and requested dismissal before sundown. The court did not respond to this note and did not inform counsel of its existence. Twenty minutes after the note was sent, the jury announced it had reached a verdict, and the court accepted the verdict without addressing the note.

    Procedural History

    The defendant was convicted at trial. He appealed, arguing that the trial court’s failure to respond to the jury note and the interested witness charge were errors. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. The defendant then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

    Issue(s)

    1. Whether the trial court’s failure to respond to the jury note regarding the jurors’ Sabbath observance constituted reversible error under CPL 310.30?

    2. Whether the trial court erred in its instruction to the jury regarding interested witnesses?

    Holding

    1. No, because the failure to respond to the jury note did not seriously prejudice the defendant.

    2. No, because the court gave a standard instruction that the jury could consider whether any witness had an interest in the outcome of the case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    Regarding the jury note, the court stated that CPL 310.30 requires a meaningful response to jury requests for instruction or information. However, reversal is required only where the failure to respond “seriously prejudice[s]” the defendant. The court reasoned that the note did not concern the crimes charged or the evidence, and there was no significant probability that the jurors were coerced or pressured into returning a guilty verdict because of the court’s failure to respond. The court noted that the jury reached a verdict well before sundown, negating any inference of coercion. As stated in the opinion, “It is only where the failure to respond to a jury note ‘seriously prejudice[s]’ defendant that a reversal is required”.

    Regarding the interested witness charge, the court found no error because the trial court provided the standard instruction, informing the jury that they could consider whether any witness had an interest in the outcome of the case. The court clarified that merely because a witness was interested did not automatically mean that they were untruthful. The court also stated, “There is no question that defendant was an interested witness as a matter of law as the court appears to have charged”. While the judge specifically named the defendant’s wife, the instruction was not misleading, and the jury could have found any witness to be interested. The charge, viewed as a whole, was considered balanced and understandable.