People v. Aiken, 45 N.Y.2d 394 (1978)

A defendant’s voluntary absence from trial, while not waiving the right to effective assistance of counsel, significantly impacts the assessment of counsel’s effectiveness, particularly where counsel’s actions are strategic responses to the defendant’s absence.

Summary

Aiken was convicted of burglary after voluntarily absenting himself from his trial. On appeal, he argued ineffective assistance of counsel, citing his lawyer’s limited participation in the trial. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that while a defendant’s absence does not automatically waive the right to effective counsel, it must be considered when evaluating counsel’s performance. The court found that the attorney’s actions, including limited cross-examination and foregoing opening and closing statements, appeared to be a strategic decision in response to Aiken’s absence, aimed at securing a mistrial, and did not constitute ineffective assistance under the circumstances.

Facts

Police responded to a burglary call and found Aiken at the scene, attempting to hide. A windowpane was broken, and the master bedroom was in disarray. Aiken was charged with burglary in the second degree. He attended the first day of jury selection but failed to appear on subsequent days. The trial court determined his absence was willful and voluntary and proceeded with the trial in absentia.

Procedural History

Aiken was convicted of burglary in the second degree. He appealed, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s limited participation in the trial. The Appellate Division affirmed the conviction. Aiken then appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.

Issue(s)

Whether a defendant, by voluntarily absenting himself from trial, is denied the right to effective assistance of counsel when his attorney makes strategic decisions, such as limiting cross-examination and foregoing opening and closing statements, in response to the defendant’s absence.

Holding

No, because while a defendant’s absence does not waive his right to effective counsel, the court must consider that absence in assessing counsel’s effectiveness, and strategic decisions made in response to that absence do not necessarily constitute ineffective assistance.

Court’s Reasoning

The Court of Appeals acknowledged the defendant’s right to effective assistance of counsel, guaranteed by both the Federal and State Constitutions, but noted that the standard for evaluating effectiveness is not precisely defined. The court shifted away from the older “mockery of justice” standard to a more flexible, fact-specific inquiry, considering whether counsel’s representation was “adequate or effective in any meaningful sense.” The court emphasized that a defendant’s absence from trial significantly impacts counsel’s ability to provide effective representation. The court found that the attorney’s actions were a strategic attempt to obstruct the trial and pressure the court into declaring a mistrial. Waiver of opening and closing statements, failure to cross-examine, and failure to call witnesses were all seen as strategic choices, not necessarily indicative of ineffectiveness, given the defendant’s absence and the strength of the prosecution’s case. The court explicitly stated that “a defendant who absents himself from trial may not succeed on appeal by raising counsel’s purported ineffectiveness where counsel affirmatively, as a matter of trial strategy, sought to obstruct the trial of his client.” Ultimately, the court reasoned that allowing the appeal would permit the defendant to benefit from his own misconduct. The court also rejected the argument that retained counsel should be held to a different standard than appointed counsel, finding this distinction irrelevant to the core issue of effective representation.