New York Law Review

Tag: People v. Adessa

  • People v. Adessa, 89 N.Y.2d 910 (1996): Limits on Resubmitting Charges to Grand Juries After Dismissal

    People v. Adessa, 89 N.Y.2d 910 (1996)

    When a court dismisses an indictment due to insufficient evidence, the prosecution is not limited in the number of times it can resubmit the charges to a grand jury, unlike when a grand jury itself dismisses the charges.

    Summary

    The defendant was initially indicted on robbery charges, but the court dismissed the indictment due to insufficient evidence. After a second grand jury declined to indict, the prosecution obtained permission to present the case to a third grand jury, which then indicted the defendant. The defendant argued that this third presentation violated CPL 190.75(3), which limits resubmissions after a grand jury dismissal. The New York Court of Appeals held that CPL 190.75(3) applies only to grand jury dismissals, not to court-ordered dismissals based on insufficient evidence under CPL 210.20. Therefore, the prosecution was permitted to resubmit the charges.

    Facts

    The defendant was initially charged with two counts of robbery in the second degree.

    The Supreme Court dismissed the initial indictment because the evidence presented to the Grand Jury was legally insufficient.

    The court granted leave to resubmit the charges to another Grand Jury.

    A second Grand Jury considered the charges, including two additional charges for attempted robbery, but voted “no true bill” (declined to indict).

    The People moved for leave to resubmit to a third Grand Jury, stating that the defendant’s friend, who had already pleaded guilty in connection with the crimes, would be willing to testify.

    The court granted leave, and the third Grand Jury indicted the defendant on all charges.

    Procedural History

    The Supreme Court initially dismissed the indictment due to insufficient evidence.

    After the third grand jury indicted the defendant, the defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the presentation to a third grand jury violated CPL 190.75(3).

    The Supreme Court rejected this argument.

    The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s decision.

    The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order.

    Issue(s)

    Whether CPL 190.75(3), which limits resubmissions to a grand jury after a grand jury dismissal, applies when a court dismisses an indictment due to insufficient evidence under CPL 210.20.

    Holding

    No, because CPL 190.75(3) applies only to Grand Jury dismissals, not court-ordered dismissals based on insufficiency of evidence under CPL 210.20.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals reasoned that at common law, a prosecutor could repeatedly resubmit charges to Grand Juries until an indictment was obtained. The Legislature enacted provisions in the Criminal Procedure Law to prevent prosecutorial abuse, including CPL 190.75, which governs Grand Jury dismissals, limiting the number of times the People can resubmit after a Grand Jury has dismissed charges. Specifically, CPL 190.75(3) states that if a Grand Jury dismisses a charge, the People can resubmit only after obtaining permission from the court, and if the charge “is again dismissed, it may not again be submitted to a grand jury.”

    By contrast, CPL 210.20, governing judicial dismissals, provides without qualification that where a court dismisses an indictment based on insufficiency of the evidence, it “may, upon application of the people, in its discretion authorize the people to submit the charge or charges to the same or another grand jury” (CPL 210.20[4]).

    The court emphasized that “discretionary judicial dismissals do not present the same potential for prosecutorial abuse, and are subject to their own check of appellate review,” thus the provision for judicial dismissals does not limit the number of resubmissions.

    The court concluded that CPL 190.75(3) and 210.20 are separate statutory provisions addressing separate legislative concerns. The dismissal of the first indictment was court-ordered pursuant to CPL 210.20, not a Grand Jury dismissal that implicates the limitations imposed on resubmission pursuant to CPL 190.75(3). Thus, the People’s single resubmission after the Grand Jury dismissed the charges was consistent with the law.

    The court also addressed the defendant’s reliance on language in People v. Cade, clarifying that CPL 190.75(3) applies solely to Grand Jury dismissals, not court-ordered dismissals.

  • People v. Adessa, 89 N.Y.2d 677 (1997): Dual Grand Jury Presentments and Prejudice to Defendants

    89 N.Y.2d 677 (1997)

    A “dual slip” presentment to a grand jury, where charges against a civilian defendant and a cross-complaint against a police officer arising from the same incident are presented to the same grand jury, is not inherently prejudicial and does not automatically require dismissal of the indictment against the civilian defendant, absent a showing of actual prejudice.

    Summary

    Matthew Adessa was indicted on several charges after an incident involving a traffic stop and altercation with police officers. He argued that the indictment was tainted because the grand jury was also presented with an investigation into the shooting of Adessa by one of the officers (a “dual slip” presentment), arguing this created an inherent bias against him. The New York Court of Appeals held that a dual presentment is not inherently prejudicial. Because Adessa failed to demonstrate any concrete prejudice resulting from the dual presentment, the indictment was properly upheld.

    Facts

    Adessa sped away from a gas station without paying for gas, nearly hitting a security guard. Two police officers pursued him in an unmarked car. After stopping, Adessa exited his vehicle with a baseball bat. Despite the officers identifying themselves and ordering him to drop the bat, Adessa moved towards them. One of the officers shot and wounded Adessa. Adessa fled again and was later arrested at a hospital. Adessa’s attorney informed the District Attorney’s office of a planned request for an administrative and criminal investigation into the officer’s conduct, and also advised the District Attorney that his client would not testify before the Grand Jury with respect to the charges leveled against him.

    Procedural History

    The case was presented to a grand jury as a “dual slip” presentment. The grand jury indicted Adessa on multiple charges but declined to indict the officer. Adessa moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the grand jury proceeding was tainted. The Supreme Court granted the motion, finding that the People breached their obligation of fairness. The Appellate Division reversed and reinstated the indictment, finding no impairment to the Grand Jury proceeding resulting in prejudice to Adessa. The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.

    Issue(s)

    Whether it is inherently prejudicial to obtain an indictment against a civilian defendant from a grand jury that has also been asked to consider a police misconduct charge arising out of the same incident, thereby impairing the integrity of the grand jury proceeding and tainting the indictment.

    Holding

    No, because the “dual slip” presentment procedure is not inherently prejudicial, and the defendant failed to demonstrate any concrete prejudice resulting from the procedure in this case.

    Court’s Reasoning

    The Court of Appeals rejected the argument that a joint presentment of citizen-police officer cross complaints is “inherently prejudicial” due to the “societal respect and admiration police officers enjoy.” The Court reasoned that police officer testimony figures prominently in nearly every aspect of criminal proceedings, and the probity of police officers is often assessed in the face of conflicting versions by civilian witnesses. It noted that the assumption that police testimony enjoys an unwarranted advantage is not necessarily valid, particularly in light of modern scrutiny of police conduct. The Court also emphasized that the defendant had the right to testify on his own behalf but chose not to, and that his decision to not testify was a strategic choice and not a result of the dual presentment. The court explicitly stated that its holding should not be seen as blanket approval of dual presentments, noting that situations could arise where such a practice could undermine fairness and lead to prejudice. The court stated, “Absent a breach of a statutory command or some indication of likely prejudice, there is no legal basis for interfering with the prosecutor’s prerogatives in determining the manner in which a Grand Jury presentment is made.”